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9 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2001 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lyon v. Barrettgreen2 sentences1988In Lyon v. Barrett, 89 N.J. 294, 299 (1982), the Supreme Court noted that although the facts in the case made it unnecessary for the court to address the validity of the doctrine, the Appellate Division had addressed the issue and found the doctrine inapplicable. 1988In Lyon v. Barrett, 89 N.J. 294, 299 (1982), the Supreme Court noted that although the facts in the case made it unnecessary for the court to address the validity of the doctrine, the Appellate Division had addressed the issue and found the doctrine inapplicable. | 2 | 3 |
Wright v. District Court in & for the County of Jeffersongreen2 sentences2000Declaring that "[m]edical malpractice is not an inherent risk of the brewing business," in Wright v. District Court, 661 P. 2d 1167, 1171 (1983), the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a brewery employee whose back injury was aggravated by the malpractice of a company doctor could maintain a malpractice claim against the company doctor because the doctor's relationship with the employee was identical to that of a doctor in private practice with a patient. 2000Declaring that “[mjedical malpractice is not an inherent risk of the brewing business,” in Wright v. District Court, 661 P.2d 1167, 1171 (1983), the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a brewery employee whose back injury was aggravated by the malpractice of a company doctor could maintain a malpractice claim against the company doctor because the doctor’s relationship with the employee A similar result was reached by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Davis v. Stover, 258 Ga. 156 , 366 S.E.2d 670 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
DeFigueiredo v. US METALSgreen2 sentences1994Super. 407 , 563 A. 2d 50 (App.Div. 1989) that While the dual capacity doctrine may have viability in some circumstances, it is clearly inapplicable here, where the employee is injured during the course of his employment on the premises of the employer. [at 407-8, 563 A. 2d 50 ] What sets this case apart from both Doe and DeFigueiredo is that fact that here we are dealing not with the dual capacity of one corporation but with the merger of formerly separate corporations, each of which acted in a different capacity. 1994Super. 407 , 563 A. 2d 50 (App.Div. 1989) that While the dual capacity doctrine may have viability in some circumstances, it is clearly inapplicable here, where the employee is injured during the course of his employment on the premises of the employer. [at 407-8, 563 A. 2d 50 ] What sets this case apart from both Doe and DeFigueiredo is that fact that here we are dealing not with the dual capacity of one corporation but with the merger of formerly separate corporations, each of which acted in a different capacity. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dixon v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences1982But cf. Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 499 , 125 Cal. Rptr. 872 (D.Ct.App. 1976), which commented on the fact that several cases refused to extend the rationale of Duprey v. Shane, supra , to different factual contexts. 1982But cf. Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 499 , 125 Cal. Rptr. 872 (D.Ct.App. 1976), which commented on the fact that several cases refused to extend the rationale of Duprey v. Shane, supra , to different factual contexts. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
DeFigueiredo v. US METALS
neutral
2 sentences1989We thus affirm *409 substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Menza in his thoughtful opinion of August 5, 1988. 235 N.J. 1989We thus affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Menza in his thoughtful opinion of August 5, 1988. 235 N.J.Super. 458 . | 2 | 1989–1989 |
Petrocco v. at & T Teletype, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Plaintiff's reliance on Petrocco v. At & T Teletype, Inc., 273 N.J.Super. 613 , 642 A. 2d 1072 (Law Div.1994) is entirely misplaced. 2001Plaintiff's reliance on Petrocco v. At & T Teletype, Inc., 273 N.J.Super. 613 , 642 A. 2d 1072 (Law Div.1994) is entirely misplaced. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Davis v. Stover
green
2 sentences2000Declaring that “[mjedical malpractice is not an inherent risk of the brewing business,” in Wright v. District Court, 661 P.2d 1167, 1171 (1983), the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a brewery employee whose back injury was aggravated by the malpractice of a company doctor could maintain a malpractice claim against the company doctor because the doctor’s relationship with the employee A similar result was reached by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Davis v. Stover, 258 Ga. 156 , 366 S.E.2d 670 (1988). 2000Declaring that “[mjedical malpractice is not an inherent risk of the brewing business,” in Wright v. District Court, 661 P.2d 1167, 1171 (1983), the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a brewery employee whose back injury was aggravated by the malpractice of a company doctor could maintain a malpractice claim against the company doctor because the doctor’s relationship with the employee A similar result was reached by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Davis v. Stover, 258 Ga. 156 , 366 S.E.2d 670 (1988). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Boyle v. Breme
green
2 sentences2000I disagree and would adopt the dual capacity doctrine relied on by Justice Handler in Boyle v. Breme, 93 N.J. 569, 570-77 , 461 A.2d 1164 (1983) (Handler, J., dissenting), and permit injured plaintiffs to assert medical malpractice claims against a co-employee company doctor. 2000I disagree and would adopt the dual capacity doctrine relied on by Justice Handler in Boyle v. Breme, 93 N.J. 569, 570-77 , 461 A.2d 1164 (1983) (Handler, J., dissenting), and permit injured plaintiffs to assert medical malpractice claims against a co-employee company doctor. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Billy v. Consolidated Machine Tool Corp.
green
2 sentences1994In that case the court concluded at 156, 432 N.Y.S. 2d 879 , 412 N.E. 2d 934 : "(W)e conclude that ... the exclusivity provisions of that Statute do not bar a common law action against the employer for injuries sustained in the course of his employment ... (where) the employer's liability, if any, is alleged to have risen solely from its independent assumption, by contract or operation of law, of the obligations and liabilities of a third-party tort-feasor." The dual capacity doctrine has not found favor in this State. 1994In that case the court concluded at 156, 432 N.Y.S. 2d 879 , 412 N.E. 2d 934 : "(W)e conclude that ... the exclusivity provisions of that Statute do not bar a common law action against the employer for injuries sustained in the course of his employment ... (where) the employer's liability, if any, is alleged to have risen solely from its independent assumption, by contract or operation of law, of the obligations and liabilities of a third-party tort-feasor." The dual capacity doctrine has not found favor in this State. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Purdy
green
1 sentence1982For these reasons, and because of the persuasiveness of case law from other jurisdictions rejecting it, we reject the dual capacity doctrine as the law of this state. [ 601 P. 2d at 260 ] Nor has the so-called "dual-capacity" doctrine thrived in New Jersey. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Hoffman v. Rogers
green
2 sentences1982Some states purport to apply the dual capacity doctrine generally, Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781 , 249 P. 2d 8 (Sup.Ct. 1952); Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d 655 , 99 Cal. Rptr. 455 (D.Ct.App. 1972), at least in the situation of a hospital employee where "the nonemployer aspect of the employer's activity generates a different set of obligations by the employer toward the employee," D'Angona v. Los Angeles Cty., 27 Cal. 3d 661 , 613 P. 2d 238, 242 , 166 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Sup.Ct. 1980). 1982Some states purport to apply the dual capacity doctrine generally, Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781 , 249 P. 2d 8 (Sup.Ct. 1952); Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d 655 , 99 Cal. Rptr. 455 (D.Ct.App. 1972), at least in the situation of a hospital employee where "the nonemployer aspect of the employer's activity generates a different set of obligations by the employer toward the employee," D'Angona v. Los Angeles Cty., 27 Cal. 3d 661 , 613 P. 2d 238, 242 , 166 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Sup.Ct. 1980). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences1982Some states purport to apply the dual capacity doctrine generally, Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781 , 249 P. 2d 8 (Sup.Ct. 1952); Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d 655 , 99 Cal. Rptr. 455 (D.Ct.App. 1972), at least in the situation of a hospital employee where "the nonemployer aspect of the employer's activity generates a different set of obligations by the employer toward the employee," D'Angona v. Los Angeles Cty., 27 Cal. 3d 661 , 613 P. 2d 238, 242 , 166 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Sup.Ct. 1980). 1982Some states purport to apply the dual capacity doctrine generally, Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781 , 249 P. 2d 8 (Sup.Ct. 1952); Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d 655 , 99 Cal. Rptr. 455 (D.Ct.App. 1972), at least in the situation of a hospital employee where "the nonemployer aspect of the employer's activity generates a different set of obligations by the employer toward the employee," D'Angona v. Los Angeles Cty., 27 Cal. 3d 661 , 613 P. 2d 238, 242 , 166 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Sup.Ct. 1980). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Duprey v. Shane
green
2 sentences1982Some states purport to apply the dual capacity doctrine generally, Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781 , 249 P. 2d 8 (Sup.Ct. 1952); Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d 655 , 99 Cal. Rptr. 455 (D.Ct.App. 1972), at least in the situation of a hospital employee where "the nonemployer aspect of the employer's activity generates a different set of obligations by the employer toward the employee," D'Angona v. Los Angeles Cty., 27 Cal. 3d 661 , 613 P. 2d 238, 242 , 166 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Sup.Ct. 1980). 1982Some states purport to apply the dual capacity doctrine generally, Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781 , 249 P. 2d 8 (Sup.Ct. 1952); Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d 655 , 99 Cal. Rptr. 455 (D.Ct.App. 1972), at least in the situation of a hospital employee where "the nonemployer aspect of the employer's activity generates a different set of obligations by the employer toward the employee," D'Angona v. Los Angeles Cty., 27 Cal. 3d 661 , 613 P. 2d 238, 242 , 166 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Sup.Ct. 1980). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Taylor v. Pfaudler Sybron Corp.
green
1 sentence1982In Taylor v. Pfaudler Sybron Corp., 150 N.J. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Mager v. United Hospitals of Newark
green
1 sentence1982In Mager v. United Hospitals of Newark, 88 N.J. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.