dual capacity doctrine in Illinois

1994We find no need to again trace the evolution of the dual capacity doctrine from its first application in Illinois in the case of Marcus v. Green (1973), 13 Ill.

1981Mary's L.J. 818 (1974).) Professor Larson explains that the decisive test in applying the dual capacity doctrine `is not concerned with how separate or different the second function of the employer is from the first but with whether the second function generates obligations unrelated to those flowing from the first, that of employer.' (2A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation3 sec. 72.80, at 14-117 (1976).) A mere separate theory of liability against the same legal person as the employer is not a true basis for use of the *1135 dual capacity doctrine; the doctrine, instead, requires a distinct sep

2002“In Stevens v. Industrial Com., 346 Ill. 495 , the court adopted the so-called dual capacity doctrine followed by a majority of the States.

1980This court adopted the dual-capacity doctrine in Stevens v. Industrial Com. (1931), 346 Ill. 495 .

1985Plaintiff’s reliance upon a case in which a California court applied the dual-capacity doctrine to a situation where the employer was himself a physician and treated one of his employees (Duprey v. Shane (1952), 39 Cal. 2d 781 , 249 P.2d 8 ) is equally unavailing.

1985Plaintiff’s reliance upon a case in which a California court applied the dual-capacity doctrine to a situation where the employer was himself a physician and treated one of his employees (Duprey v. Shane (1952), 39 Cal. 2d 781 , 249 P.2d 8 ) is equally unavailing.

1982App. 3d 77 , 402 N.E.2d 412 , affd in part, rev’d in part (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 352 , 423 N.E.2d 876 , makes the assertion that the dual capacity doctrine cannot be applied in a situation involving an employee suing a co-employee.

1982In coming to this conclusion, the court stated that there was no indication by the Illinois Supreme Court in Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary District, where it recently applied the dual capacity doctrine, that the co-employee immunity should be waived “merely because an employee might be serving an employer in a capacity different than that of another employee whom he might injure.” (McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1980), 82 Ill.

1981Mary’s L.J. 818 (1974).) Professor Larson explains that the decisive test in applying the dual capacity doctrine ‘is not concerned with how separate or different the second function of the employer is from the first but with whether the second function generates obligations unrelated to those flowing from the first, that of employer.’ (2A A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation sec. 72.80, at 14 — 117 (1976).) A mere separate theory of liability against the same legal person as the employer is not a true basis for use of the dual capacity doctrine; the doctrine, instead, requires a distinct separate

1981Mary’s L.J. 818 (1974).) Professor Larson explains that the decisive test in applying the dual capacity doctrine ‘is not concerned with how separate or different the second function of the employer is from the first but with whether the second function generates obligations unrelated to those flowing from the first, that of employer.’ (2A A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation sec. 72.80, at 14 — 117 (1976).) A mere separate theory of liability against the same legal person as the employer is not a true basis for use of the dual capacity doctrine; the doctrine, instead, requires a distinct separate

2012Id. at 435 .

2001Reynolds, 263 Ill.

2008See Sharp, 95 Ill. 2d at 327-28 , 447 N.E.2d at 788 (dual-capacity doctrine did not apply to partnership defendant that owned construction business that employed plaintiff, even though partnership defendant also owned property where construction work was being done and where plaintiffs injury had occurred); Kontos, 241 Ill.

2008See Sharp, 95 Ill. 2d at 327-28 , 447 N.E.2d at 788 (dual-capacity doctrine did not apply to partnership defendant that owned construction business that employed plaintiff, even though partnership defendant also owned property where construction work was being done and where plaintiff’s injury had occurred); Kontos, 241 Ill.

2003The court reasoned that, "under the dual capacity doctrine, the second capacity must be one that creates legal obligations on the part of the employer to the public in general and not just to its employees." Rosales , 41 Ill.

2003The court reasoned that, “under the dual capacity doctrine, the second capacity must be one that creates legal obligations on the part of the employer to the public in general and not just to its employees.” Rosales, 41 Ill.

1977The majority refuses to acknowledge the validity of the dual capacity doctrine and in doing so erroneously ignores the plain holding of the supreme court in Laffoon v. Bell & Zoller Coal Co. (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 437 , 359 N.E.2d 125 .

1977The majority refuses to acknowledge the validity of the dual capacity doctrine and in doing so erroneously ignores the plain holding of the supreme court in Laffoon v. Bell & Zoller Coal Co. (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 437 , 359 N.E.2d 125 .

2014In the second appeal, Garland v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 2013 IL App (1st) 112121 , plaintiff Jennifer Garland, surviving spouse of Scott A. Garland, who perished in the plane crash, brought a complaint under the dual capacity doctrine, alleging that defendant Morgan Stanley availed itself so extensively of the use of private pilots and airplanes in its business that it should itself be liable for injuries occurring during those flights.

2014In the second appeal, Garland v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 2013 IL App (1st) 112121 , plaintiff Jennifer Garland, surviving spouse of Scott A. Garland, who perished in the plane crash, brought a complaint under the dual capacity doctrine, alleging that defendant Morgan Stanley availed itself so extensively of the use of private pilots and airplanes in its business that it should itself be liable for injuries occurring during those flights.

2003Incandela v. Giannini , 250 Ill.

2003Incandela v. Giannini, 250 Ill.

1998See Sharp v. Gallagher, 95 Ill. 2d 322 , 447 N.E.2d 786 (1983); Goins v. Mercy Center for Health Care Services, 281 Ill.

1998See Sharp v. Gallagher , 95 Ill. 2d 322 , 447 N.E.2d 786 (1983); Goins v. Mercy Center for Health Care Services , 281 Ill.

1995Sales Co., 35 Ill. 2d at 424 , 220 N.E.2d at 408 .) This rule of law is known as the dual-capacity doctrine.

1995Sales Co., 35 Ill. 2d at 424 , 220 N.E.2d at 408 .) This rule of law is known as the dual-capacity doctrine.

1984Among the cases cited by the court was Deauville v. Hall (1961), 188 Cal. App. 2d 535 , 10 Cal. Rptr. 511 .

1984Among the cases cited by the court was Deauville v. Hall (1961), 188 Cal. App. 2d 535 , 10 Cal. Rptr. 511 .

1983A majority of the appellate court reversed on the basis of the dual-capacity doctrine ( 94 Ill.

1981App. 3d 1128 , 419 N.E.2d 443 .) This exception to employer immunity, called the dual capacity doctrine, is discussed in the recent Illinois Supreme Court decision of McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 352 , 423 N.E.2d 876 .

2013Meerbrey, 139 Ill. 2d at 463 .5 ¶ 27 A. Accidental Injury ¶ 28 Plaintiff contends that two exceptions to the exclusivity rule of the Act apply here: (1) the injury was not accidental; and (2) the dual capacity doctrine applies.

1996App. 3d 73 (1995), described the doctrine thusly: "Section 5(a) states that the Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive means of compensation for injury or death sustained by a covered employee 'while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee.’ [Citation.] An employer normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive remedy principle may be liable in tort to his own employee if he occupies, in addition to his capacity as employer, a second capacity that confers on him obligations independent of those imposed on him as employer. [Citation.] Under this dual-capacity doctrine

1995In Mufich v. Heisler Green Chemical Co. (1984), 121 Ill.

1993(Bolnick v. Industrial Comm’n (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 22, 26 ; see Master Leakfinding Co. v. Industrial Comm’n (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 517, 526 .) Defendant alleges that he was the manager and more than a mere stockholder, but this allegation supports a conclusion that he was an executive.