asportation requirement in California

2025(See, e.g., id. at p. 836.) Although “measured distance is relevant, . . . ‘no minimum distance is required to satisfy the asportation requirement’ . . . ‘so long as the movement is substantial’ ([People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141 ,] 1152), and ‘each case must be considered in the context of the totality of its circumstances.’ (Ibid.)” (People v. Corcoran (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 272, 279 [holding that movement of 10 feet was a substantial distance in connection with a robbery].) 15 2.

2024(Ibid. [asportation element of kidnapping satisfied where defendant did not attempt to rape victim until after moving her a distance of nine feet].) Moreover, “[a]lthough ‘the actual distance the victim was forced to move’ is a ‘relevant factor,’ the Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly stated no minimum distance is required to satisfy the asportation requirement.’ ([People v. Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1162 ].) Actual distance ‘must be considered in context, including the nature of the crime and its environment. . . . [E]ach case must be considered in the context of the totality of its circu

2023(Stats.1990, ch. 1560, § 1, p. 7329.)’ [Citation.] To effectuate this change, the Legislature amended former section 208 to include kidnapping for the purpose of enumerated sex crimes.” (People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 979 (Robertson), citing former § 208, subd. (d), & citing & quoting Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1150 .) “In 1997, the Legislature revised [section 209] to define aggravated kidnapping as kidnapping to commit robbery or certain sex offenses, and modified the asportation standard by eliminating the requirement that the movement of the victim ‘substantially’

2022Yet, dragging a store clerk nine feet from the front counter of a store to a small back room for the purpose of raping her [citation] or forcibly moving a robbery victim 40 feet within a parking lot into a car [citation] might, under the circumstances, substantially increase the risk of harm to the victim and thus satisfy the asportation requirement." (Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1152 ; see People v. Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 23 [substantial evidence supported asportation element in aggravated kidnapping case in which the victim was forcibly moved 105 feet at night from the parkin

2023(Stats.1990, ch. 1560, § 1, p. 7329.)’ [Citation.] To effectuate this change, the Legislature amended former section 208 to include kidnapping for the purpose of enumerated sex crimes.” (People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 979 (Robertson), citing former § 208, subd. (d), & citing & quoting Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1150 .) “In 1997, the Legislature revised [section 209] to define aggravated kidnapping as kidnapping to commit robbery or certain sex offenses, and modified the asportation standard by eliminating the requirement that the movement of the victim ‘substantially’

2021Once again, section 209, subdivision (b)(1), provides that “[a]ny person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit robbery . . . shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole.” However, to satisfy the asportation requirement, the movement of the victim must be “beyond that merely incidental to the commission of” the robbery, and the movement must “increase[] the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in, the intended underlying offense.” (§ 209, subd. (b)(2); People v. Simmons (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1458, 14

2021The perpetrators had committed a series of home invasion robberies in which the victims were moved “distances of 18 feet, 5 or 6 feet, and 30 feet respectively.” (Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at 42 . p. 1126.) Under the version of section 209 then in effect, as well as under precedential authority, those slight movements established the asportation requirement.

2016(See Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 463-464 [movement 8 incidental where union picketers moved migrant workers 15 feet during riot]; People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1126 [movement incidental where defendants, "in the course of robbing and raping three women in their own homes, forced them to move about their rooms for distances of 18 feet, 5 or 6 feet, and 30 feet respectively"].) The cases were decided before Martinez clarified the factors relevant to the asportation analysis, and involve different associated crimes and substantially shorter distances than are at issu

2023(Ibid.) But in 1999, our state Supreme Court held that a factfinder “should instead consider the ‘totality of the circumstances’ in determining whether the victim was moved for a ‘ “substantial distance,” ’ including factors such as ‘whether that movement increased the risk of harm above that which existed prior to the asportation, decreased the likelihood of detection, and increased both the danger inherent in a victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape and the attacker’s enhanced opportunity to commit additional crimes.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 237 (Martinez

2022(Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 233 , italics added; see People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1152 [explaining that “dragging a store clerk nine feet from the front counter of a store to a small back room for the purpose of raping her [citation] or forcibly moving a robbery victim 40 feet within a parking lot into a car [citation] might, under the circumstances, substantially increase the risk of harm to the victim and thus satisfy the asportation requirement” for aggravated kidnapping].) Flores relies on People v. Perkins (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 454 (Perkins) for support that his movem

2024(Ibid. [asportation element of kidnapping satisfied where defendant did not attempt to rape victim until after moving her a distance of nine feet].) Moreover, “[a]lthough ‘the actual distance the victim was forced to move’ is a ‘relevant factor,’ the Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly stated no minimum distance is required to satisfy the asportation requirement.’ ([People v. Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1162 ].) Actual distance ‘must be considered in context, including the nature of the crime and its environment. . . . [E]ach case must be considered in the context of the totality of its circu

2023In some cases, a shorter distance may suffice in the presence of other factors, while in others a longer distance, in the absence of other circumstances, may be found insufficient.” (Ibid.) For example, “moving robbery victims between six and 30 feet within their home or apartment . . . may be viewed as merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and thus insufficient to satisfy the asportation requirement of aggravated kidnapping.” (Ibid. [citing cases].) “Yet, dragging a store clerk nine feet from the front counter of a store to a small back room for the 5 purpose of raping her . . .

2024(Ibid. [asportation element of kidnapping satisfied where defendant did not attempt to rape victim until after moving her a distance of nine feet].) Moreover, “[a]lthough ‘the actual distance the victim was forced to move’ is a ‘relevant factor,’ the Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly stated no minimum distance is required to satisfy the asportation requirement.’ ([People v. Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1162 ].) Actual distance ‘must be considered in context, including the nature of the crime and its environment. . . . [E]ach case must be considered in the context of the totality of its circu

2024(Ibid. [asportation element of kidnapping satisfied where defendant did not attempt to rape victim until after moving her a distance of nine feet].) Moreover, “[a]lthough ‘the actual distance the victim was forced to move’ is a ‘relevant factor,’ the Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly stated no minimum distance is required to satisfy the asportation requirement.’ ([People v. Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1162 ].) Actual distance ‘must be considered in context, including the nature of the crime and its environment. . . . [E]ach case must be considered in the context of the totality of its circu

2022(See People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164-1165 (Cooper).) For purposes of robbery, “a taking is not over at the moment of caption; it continues through asportation.” (People v. Gomez 22 (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 256 .) “Although, for purposes of establishing guilt, the asportation requirement is initially satisfied by evidence of slight movement [citation], asportation is not confined to a fixed point in time.

2021(Id. at p. 502.) The Court disagreed: “Though the crime of robbery continues ‘as long as the loot is being carried away to a place of temporary safety,’ ‘for purposes of establishing guilt, the asportation requirement is initially satisfied by evidence of slight movement.’ (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165 .) Therefore, defendant did not need to flee the scene of his crimes to be guilty of robbery, and his flight is evidence of his consciousness of that guilt.” (Id. at p. 502.)6 Moreover, defendant’s conduct in fleeing the scene of the robbery certainly supported the inference that

2023(Stats.1990, ch. 1560, § 1, p. 7329.)’ [Citation.] To effectuate this change, the Legislature amended former section 208 to include kidnapping for the purpose of enumerated sex crimes.” (People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 979 (Robertson), citing former § 208, subd. (d), & citing & quoting Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1150 .) “In 1997, the Legislature revised [section 209] to define aggravated kidnapping as kidnapping to commit robbery or certain sex offenses, and modified the asportation standard by eliminating the requirement that the movement of the victim ‘substantially’

2022Yet, dragging a store clerk nine feet from the front counter of a store to a small back room for the purpose of raping her [citation] or forcibly moving a robbery victim 40 feet within a parking lot into a car [citation] might, under the circumstances, substantially increase the risk of harm to the victim and thus satisfy the asportation requirement." (Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1152 ; see People v. Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 23 [substantial evidence supported asportation element in aggravated kidnapping case in which the victim was forcibly moved 105 feet at night from the parkin

2016For example, moving robbery victims between six and 30 feet within their home or apartment (see Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 1123-1124) or 15 feet from the teller area of a bank to its vault (People v. Washington (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 290, 299 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 ]) may be viewed as merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and thus insufficient to satisfy the asportation requirement of aggravated kidnapping.[ 5 ] Yet, dragging a store clerk nine feet from the front counter of a store to a small back room for the purpose of raping her (see People v. Shadden[, supra,] 93 Cal.App.

2016For example, moving robbery victims between six and 30 feet within their home or apartment (see Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 1123-1124) or 15 feet from the teller area of a bank to its vault (People v. Washington (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 290, 299 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 ]) may be viewed as merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and thus insufficient to satisfy the asportation requirement of aggravated kidnapping.[ 5 ] Yet, dragging a store clerk nine feet from the front counter of a store to a small back room for the purpose of raping her (see People v. Shadden[, supra,] 93 Cal.App.

2014Code, § 211.) The taking element is comprised of “gaining possession of the victim’s property and asporting or carrying away the loot.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165 .) The asportation requirement is satisfied by “evidence of slight movement.” (Ibid.; People v. Pham (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 61, 65 ; see also People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 27-28 .) The perpetrator must form the “intent to steal . . . either before or during the commission of the act of force.” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34 .) Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,

2006(People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 450 , 811 P.2d 742 ]; People v. Vargas, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 463 ; People v. Pham (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 61, 65-67 [ 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 ]; People v. Clark (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 132, 133 [ 160 P.2d 553 ]; Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Crimes Against Property, § 93, pp. 123-124.) In this case, defendant and an unidentified accomplice physically took possession of Mr. Long’s truck.

2016(See Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 463-464 [movement 8 incidental where union picketers moved migrant workers 15 feet during riot]; People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1126 [movement incidental where defendants, "in the course of robbing and raping three women in their own homes, forced them to move about their rooms for distances of 18 feet, 5 or 6 feet, and 30 feet respectively"].) The cases were decided before Martinez clarified the factors relevant to the asportation analysis, and involve different associated crimes and substantially shorter distances than are at issu

2016(See Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 463-464 [movement 8 incidental where union picketers moved migrant workers 15 feet during riot]; People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1126 [movement incidental where defendants, "in the course of robbing and raping three women in their own homes, forced them to move about their rooms for distances of 18 feet, 5 or 6 feet, and 30 feet respectively"].) The cases were decided before Martinez clarified the factors relevant to the asportation analysis, and involve different associated crimes and substantially shorter distances than are at issu

2015These factors support the asportation requirement for kidnapping.” (Id. at p. 1435; see also People v. Shadden (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 164, 168-169 [movement of victim nine feet to the back of a store meets asportation requirement of kidnapping]; People v. Smith (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1594 [movement of victim 40 to 50 feet from driveway “open to street view” to interior of camper sufficient to support enhancement for rape committed during a kidnapping].) Here, as Yuli was forced toward the parked van and saw that the sliding door was open, she became “even more scared.” Although there was n

2012As previously explained, our Supreme Court has “repeatedly stated no minimum distance is required to satisfy the asportation requirement” and actual distance “must be considered in context, including the nature of the crime and its environment.” (Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1152 .) “Where movement changes the victim’s environment, it does not have to be great in distance to be substantial.” ( Shadden, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 169, 167-169 [dragging a store clerk nine feet from the front counter of a store to a small back room for the purpose of raping her was sufficient to support a

1999If that is the case, we must determine whether the asportation standard is derived from simple kidnapping (§ 207(a)) or aggravated kidnapping (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)). [4] (See Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 8 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317 , 884 P.2d 1369 .) Aggravated kidnapping is for the purpose of robbery or certain sex offenses. (§ 209(b)(1); see People v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 598 , 114 Cal.Rptr. 250 , 522 P.2d 1058 ; see generally, Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 20 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317 , 884 P.2d *538 1369; People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1139, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225

1999If that is the case, we must determine whether the asportation standard is derived from simple kidnapping (§ 207(a)) or aggravated kidnapping (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)). [4] (See Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 8 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317 , 884 P.2d 1369 .) Aggravated kidnapping is for the purpose of robbery or certain sex offenses. (§ 209(b)(1); see People v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 598 , 114 Cal.Rptr. 250 , 522 P.2d 1058 ; see generally, Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 20 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317 , 884 P.2d *538 1369; People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1139, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225

1999If that is the case, we must determine whether the asportation standard is derived from simple kidnapping (§ 207(a)) or aggravated kidnapping (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)). [4] (See Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 8 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317 , 884 P.2d 1369 .) Aggravated kidnapping is for the purpose of robbery or certain sex offenses. (§ 209(b)(1); see People v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 598 , 114 Cal.Rptr. 250 , 522 P.2d 1058 ; see generally, Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 20 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317 , 884 P.2d *538 1369; People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1139, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225

1999If that is the case, we must determine whether the asportation standard is derived from simple kidnapping (§ 207(a)) or aggravated kidnapping (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)). [4] (See Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 8 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317 , 884 P.2d 1369 .) Aggravated kidnapping is for the purpose of robbery or certain sex offenses. (§ 209(b)(1); see People v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 598 , 114 Cal.Rptr. 250 , 522 P.2d 1058 ; see generally, Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 20 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317 , 884 P.2d *538 1369; People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1139, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225

2017As explained herein, however, we conclude the Burns formulation of the force requirement encompasses the Morales test. 4 “To satisfy the asportation requirement for robbery, ‘no great movement is required, and it is not necessary that the property be taken out of the physical presence of the victim.’ [Citation.] ‘[S]light movement’ is enough to satisfy the asportation requirement.” (Hill, supra. 17 Cal.4th at p. 852 .) 5 Anderson does state in discussing the force element, “defendant drove Pamela’s car with more force than necessary to move it to a place of safety.” (Anderson, supra. 51 Cal.tt

2013Although Austin does not dispute other elements of his robbery conviction, we note this same evidence also supports the taking finding (see People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 852 [noting that the "'taking element of robbery has two necessary elements, gaining possession of the victim's property and asporting or carrying away the loot'" and noting that to "satisfy the asportation requirement for robbery . . . 'it is not necessary that the property be taken out of the physical presence of the victim'" and that "slight movement" is sufficient to satisfy the asportation requirement]) and the fi

2022(Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 233 , italics added; see People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1152 [explaining that “dragging a store clerk nine feet from the front counter of a store to a small back room for the purpose of raping her [citation] or forcibly moving a robbery victim 40 feet within a parking lot into a car [citation] might, under the circumstances, substantially increase the risk of harm to the victim and thus satisfy the asportation requirement” for aggravated kidnapping].) Flores relies on People v. Perkins (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 454 (Perkins) for support that his movem

2021(Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1152 .) “In some cases a shorter distance may suffice in the presence of other factors, while in others a longer distance, in the absence of other circumstances, may be found insufficient.” (Ibid.) To illustrate this point, our Supreme Court has explained: 8 “Prior to 1997, the asportation standard for the crime of aggravated kidnapping mirrored that for the aggravated kidnapping enhancement. [Citation.] We thus rely on cases, such as Dominguez, that concerned the pre-1997 standard for the crime of aggravated kidnapping as well as cases regarding the kidnapp

2022(People v. Leavel (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 823, 834 , citing People v. Power 9. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 126, 139 [increased risk of harm includes physical or “mental, emotional, or psychological harm”]; accord, People v. Nguyen (2000) 22 Cal.4th 872, 874 .) This seemingly insubstantial distance would likely have satisfied the asportation requirement to support a conviction for a completed kidnapping to commit robbery.

2016(See People v. Nguyen (2000) 22 Cal.4th 872, 886 [finding that the “increase in the risk of psychological trauma to the victim beyond that to be expected from a stationary robbery” can satisfy the asportation requirement].) Thus, we reject Cabrera’s argument that the only reasonable interpretation of the facts is that he reduced—rather than increased—the risk of harm by moving Kim to the back office.

2021Application of these factors in any given case will necessarily depend on the particular facts and context of the case.” (People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1153 , italics added and original italics deleted.) Fourth, quoting the Johnson court’s observation that the residual clause of the ACCA “has proved ‘nearly impossible to apply consistently’ ” (Johnson, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 601 ), defendant claims the asportation standard of aggravated kidnapping is similarly suspect because it is applied inconsistently.

2017This is precisely the type of determination that Johnson held was beyond the void-for-vagueness problem presented by the residual clause. ( Johnson, supra , 135 S.Ct. at p. 2561 ["As a general matter, we do not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the application of a qualitative standard *540 such as 'substantial risk' to real-world conduct; 'the law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly ... some matter of degree.' "].) That Court of Appeal opinions both affirm and reverse convictions based on the asportation requirement in these statutes is no

2016For example, moving robbery victims between six and 30 feet within their home or apartment (see Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 1123-1124) or 15 feet from the teller area of a bank to its vault (People v. Washington (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 290, 299 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 ]) may be viewed as merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and thus insufficient to satisfy the asportation requirement of aggravated kidnapping.[ 5 ] Yet, dragging a store clerk nine feet from the front counter of a store to a small back room for the purpose of raping her (see People v. Shadden[, supra,] 93 Cal.App.

2016For example, moving robbery victims between six and 30 feet within their home or apartment (see Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 1123-1124) or 15 feet from the teller area of a bank to its vault (People v. Washington (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 290, 299 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 ]) may be viewed as merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and thus insufficient to satisfy the asportation requirement of aggravated kidnapping.[ 5 ] Yet, dragging a store clerk nine feet from the front counter of a store to a small back room for the purpose of raping her (see People v. Shadden[, supra,] 93 Cal.App.

2015“Although, for purposes of establishing guilt, the asportation requirement is initially satisfied by evidence of slight movement (see People v. Clark (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 132, 133 ), asportation is not confined to a fixed point in time.

1991Although, for purposes of establishing guilt, the asportation requirement is initially satisfied by evidence of slight movement (see People v. Clark (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 132, 133 [ 160 P.2d 553 ]), asportation is not confined to a fixed point in time.* ****** 8 The asportation continues thereafter as long as the loot is being carried away to a place of temporary safety.

1999DISCUSSION A. Section 208(b) as a Separate Crime or a Punishment Provision Section 208(b) provides for an increased sentencing range "[i]f the person kidnapped is under 14 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime...." Because section 208(b) proscribes "kidnapp[ing]" and not merely holding and detaining an individual, it must be construed to contain an asportation requirement. ( People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 11 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317 , 884 P.2d 1369 ( Rayford ); cf. § 209, subd. (a); People v. Macinnes (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 838, 844 , 106 Cal.Rptr. 589 .) Defendant asserts t

1999DISCUSSION A. Section 208(b) as a Separate Crime or a Punishment Provision Section 208(b) provides for an increased sentencing range "[i]f the person kidnapped is under 14 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime...." Because section 208(b) proscribes "kidnapp[ing]" and not merely holding and detaining an individual, it must be construed to contain an asportation requirement. ( People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 11 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317 , 884 P.2d 1369 ( Rayford ); cf. § 209, subd. (a); People v. Macinnes (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 838, 844 , 106 Cal.Rptr. 589 .) Defendant asserts t

2012As previously explained, our Supreme Court has “repeatedly stated no minimum distance is required to satisfy the asportation requirement” and actual distance “must be considered in context, including the nature of the crime and its environment.” (Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1152 .) “Where movement changes the victim’s environment, it does not have to be great in distance to be substantial.” ( Shadden, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 169, 167-169 [dragging a store clerk nine feet from the front counter of a store to a small back room for the purpose of raping her was sufficient to support a

2012As previously explained, our Supreme Court has “repeatedly stated no minimum distance is required to satisfy the asportation requirement” and actual distance “must be considered in context, including the nature of the crime and its environment.” (Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1152 .) “Where movement changes the victim’s environment, it does not have to be great in distance to be substantial.” ( Shadden, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 169, 167-169 [dragging a store clerk nine feet from the front counter of a store to a small back room for the purpose of raping her was sufficient to support a

2023(Stats.1990, ch. 1560, § 1, p. 7329.)’ [Citation.] To effectuate this change, the Legislature amended former section 208 to include kidnapping for the purpose of enumerated sex crimes.” (People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 979 (Robertson), citing former § 208, subd. (d), & citing & quoting Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1150 .) “In 1997, the Legislature revised [section 209] to define aggravated kidnapping as kidnapping to commit robbery or certain sex offenses, and modified the asportation standard by eliminating the requirement that the movement of the victim ‘substantially’

2021Once again, section 209, subdivision (b)(1), provides that “[a]ny person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit robbery . . . shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole.” However, to satisfy the asportation requirement, the movement of the victim must be “beyond that merely incidental to the commission of” the robbery, and the movement must “increase[] the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in, the intended underlying offense.” (§ 209, subd. (b)(2); People v. Simmons (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1458, 14

2020When a defendant questions the sufficiency of the evidence, we are required “to review the record ‘ “ ‘in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Arias (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1434 .) There is a distinction between the asportation requirement for aggravated kidnapping (e.g., kidnapping for the purpose of robbery under section 209, subdivision (b)) and the aspor

2016(See id. at p. 295; People v. Arias (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1435 .) "These factors support the asportation requirement for kidnapping." (People v. Arias, supra, at p. 1435 .) IV A 1 Part of Jennings's sentence fell within the purview of the One Strike law because the jury found some One Strike circumstances applied in this case.

2022(See People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164-1165 (Cooper).) For purposes of robbery, “a taking is not over at the moment of caption; it continues through asportation.” (People v. Gomez 22 (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 256 .) “Although, for purposes of establishing guilt, the asportation requirement is initially satisfied by evidence of slight movement [citation], asportation is not confined to a fixed point in time.

2014People v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 256 (Gomez) explains: “‘[A]lthough, for purposes of establishing guilt, the asportation requirement is initially satisfied by evidence of slight movement [citation], asportation is not confined to a fixed point in time.