tacit admission rule in Pennsylvania

2011The words of Justice Musmanno ring just as true today: The Superior Court, in affirming the conviction of the defendant, declared that it was bound by Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419 , 32 A.2d 889 [(1943)], which pronounced the proposition: ‘The rule of evidence is well established that, when a statement made in the presence and hearing of a person is incriminating in character and naturally calls for a denial but is not challenged or contradicted by the accused although he has opportunity and liberty to speak, the statement and the fact of his failure to deny it are admissible in evidenc

2011The words of Justice Musmanno ring just as true today: The Superior Court, in affirming the conviction of the defendant, declared that it was bound by Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419 , 32 A.2d 889 [(1943)], which pronounced the proposition: ‘The rule of evidence is well established that, when a statement made in the presence and hearing of a person is incriminating in character and naturally calls for a denial but is not challenged or contradicted by the accused although he has opportunity and liberty to speak, the statement and the fact of his failure to deny it are admissible in evidenc

1968Shadd v. Myers, 423 Pa. 82, 86, 223 A. 2d 296 , this Court held that the tacit admission rule was no longer valid in Pennsylvania under the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436.

1968Jefferson contends that his reply was an equivocal one and therefore at most could only be regarded as a tacit admission quoting from 112 U. of Pa. Law Review 226: “. . . the tacit admission rule may also be invoked if the accused responds not with silence but with words somewhere between a denial and an express acquiescence.”, and adding that such a tacit admission was proscribed by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 .

2005Commonwealth v. Coccioletti, 493 Pa. 103 , 425 A.2d 387, 392 (1981) (“implied admissions made while free from custody, with no police present, are still admissible”); Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 452 Pa. 185 , 299 A.2d 254 , 265-66 & n. 15 (1973) (plurality opinion by Pomeroy, J.) (collecting cases).

2005Commonwealth v. Coccioletti, 493 Pa. 103 , 425 A.2d 387, 392 (1981) (“implied admissions made while free from custody, with no police present, are still admissible”); Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 452 Pa. 185 , 299 A.2d 254 , 265-66 & n. 15 (1973) (plurality opinion by Pomeroy, J.) (collecting cases).

2000Additionally, the Commonwealth relies upon Commonwealth v. Bolus, 545 Pa. 103 , 680 A.2d 889 (1996), and asserts that even if the court concluded that DiNieola had remained silent when confronted with the accusation of criminal misconduct, the tacit admission rule is not invoked because the alleged silence occurred pre-arrest.

1967In Raley , the Supreme Court refused to condone the Ohio Supreme Court’s speculation that the defendants would have behaved the same way regardless of what the Commission told them. 360 U.S. at 439 , 79 S. Ct. at 1267 , For a convincing argument that the tacit admission rule violates the defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation, see Judge Hootman’s dissenting opinion in the instant ease, 207 Pa. Superior Ct. 274, 290-92 , 217 A. 2d 824, 832-33 (1966).

1967In Raley , the Supreme Court refused to condone the Ohio Supreme Court’s speculation that the defendants would have behaved the same way regardless of what the Commission told them. 360 U.S. at 439 , 79 S. Ct. at 1267 , For a convincing argument that the tacit admission rule violates the defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation, see Judge Hootman’s dissenting opinion in the instant ease, 207 Pa. Superior Ct. 274, 290-92 , 217 A. 2d 824, 832-33 (1966).

1967The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 , and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , have, in effect, shattered the tacit admission rule as pronounced in Valione.

1967The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 , and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , have, in effect, shattered the tacit admission rule as pronounced in Valione.

1967The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 , and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , have, in effect, shattered the tacit admission rule as pronounced in Valione.

1967No system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens’ abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights.” ( 378 U.S. 478 ) Another infirmity in the tacit admission rule is that it invests hearsay with evidentiary authority which is not recognized in any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.

1967The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 , and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , have, in effect, shattered the tacit admission rule as pronounced in Valione.

1966See Commonwealth v. Smith, 105 Pa. Superior Ct. 497 , 161 A. 418 ; Ibid 111 Pa. Superior Ct. 363 , 170 A. 331 .

1966See Commonwealth v. Smith, 105 Pa. Superior Ct. 497 , 161 A. 418 ; Ibid 111 Pa. Superior Ct. 363 , 170 A. 331 .