reason given rule in Texas

1978A reason given for the rule is that the *26 attention of the judge may not have been called to the request, and without a bill the appellate court cannot know that the party making the request did not waive or withdraw it, as he could do.” See also Zaruba v. Zaruba, supra; Steppe v. O’Day, 315 S.W.2d 599 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1958, writ ref’d n. r. e.).

1978A reason given for the rule is that the *26 attention of the judge may not have been called to the request, and without a bill the appellate court cannot know that the party making the request did not waive or withdraw it, as he could do.” See also Zaruba v. Zaruba, supra; Steppe v. O’Day, 315 S.W.2d 599 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1958, writ ref’d n. r. e.).

1947The same reason is given for this rule in Green v. Irving, 54 Miss. 450 , 28 Am.

1947The parties would contract with reference to a record showing that no street existed.” • In Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Weed, 121 Texas 427, 440 , 50 S. W. (2d) 1080 , the reason given for the presumption of intention to convey to the center of the street or highway is the fact that valuable rights and privileges appurtenant to property should be presummed to pass in a conveyance thereof in the absence of a clear and unequivocal intent to the contrary.” The opinion in that case treats the title to the land in the street or highway, burdened with the easement, as an appurtenant right or an incident to

1947The parties would contract with reference to a record showing that no street existed.” • In Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Weed, 121 Texas 427, 440 , 50 S. W. (2d) 1080 , the reason given for the presumption of intention to convey to the center of the street or highway is the fact that valuable rights and privileges appurtenant to property should be presummed to pass in a conveyance thereof in the absence of a clear and unequivocal intent to the contrary.” The opinion in that case treats the title to the land in the street or highway, burdened with the easement, as an appurtenant right or an incident to

1938Thus where land is conveyed subject to a mortgage, the vendor is in the position of a surety for the debt to be paid out of the land; and before he can be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee to sue, the vendor must have paid the entire debt, and not merely the interest on the debt secured by the mortgage." That announcement is amply sustained by decisions there cited, including Fievel v. Zuber, 67 Tex. 275 , 3 S.W. 273 ; Texas St.

1938Thus where land is conveyed subject to a mortgage, the vendor is in the position of a surety for the debt to be paid out of the land; and before he can be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee to sue, the vendor must have paid the entire debt, and not merely the interest on the debt secured by the mortgage." That announcement is amply sustained by decisions there cited, including Fievel v. Zuber, 67 Tex. 275 , 3 S.W. 273 ; Texas St.

1936We think the fallacy of the reason given for this rule is thoroughly demonstrated in the case of Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass’n v. Ferrenbach, supra, quoting: “There are several reasons which we think demonstrate that the rule of the above cases is inadmissible, bearing in mind that the end desired is compensation to the insured for loss sustained and not the punishment of the company.

1936Bank of Commerce v. Farrington (Tex.Civ.App.) 243 S.W. 544, 545 , par. 2; Mooneyham v. Cornick (Tex.Civ.App.) 294 S.W. 894, 898 (second column) ; Smith v. Smith (Tex.Civ.App.) 200 S.W. 540, 546 , pars. 1 to 3, inclusive; Pullman Palace-Car Co. v. Booth (Tex.Civ.App.) 28 S.W. 719 , par. 9; Dale Oil & Refining Co. v. City of Tulja (Tex.Civ.App.) 25 S.W.(2d) 671, 673 , par. 1; James McCord Co. v. Citizens’ Hotel Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 287 S.W. 906, 910 , par. 4.

1936Bank of Commerce v. Farrington (Tex.Civ.App.) 243 S.W. 544, 545 , par. 2; Mooneyham v. Cornick (Tex.Civ.App.) 294 S.W. 894, 898 (second column) ; Smith v. Smith (Tex.Civ.App.) 200 S.W. 540, 546 , pars. 1 to 3, inclusive; Pullman Palace-Car Co. v. Booth (Tex.Civ.App.) 28 S.W. 719 , par. 9; Dale Oil & Refining Co. v. City of Tulja (Tex.Civ.App.) 25 S.W.(2d) 671, 673 , par. 1; James McCord Co. v. Citizens’ Hotel Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 287 S.W. 906, 910 , par. 4.

1936Bank of Commerce v. Farrington (Tex.Civ.App.) 243 S.W. 544, 545 , par. 2; Mooneyham v. Cornick (Tex.Civ.App.) 294 S.W. 894, 898 (second column) ; Smith v. Smith (Tex.Civ.App.) 200 S.W. 540, 546 , pars. 1 to 3, inclusive; Pullman Palace-Car Co. v. Booth (Tex.Civ.App.) 28 S.W. 719 , par. 9; Dale Oil & Refining Co. v. City of Tulja (Tex.Civ.App.) 25 S.W.(2d) 671, 673 , par. 1; James McCord Co. v. Citizens’ Hotel Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 287 S.W. 906, 910 , par. 4.

1936The reason given for the rule is that such a plea destroys the plaintiff’s, prima facie case made by statute, and casts, upon him the burden of introducing proof other than the instrument itself to support his cause of action.” See, also, Drew v.. Harrison, 12 Tex. 279 , par. 2; Kelly v.. Kelly, 12 Tex. 452 , par. 1; Fulshear v. Randon, 18 Tex. 275 , par. 2, 70 Am.Dec. 281; May v. Pollard, 28 Tex. 677 , par. 2; City Nat.

1936The reason given for the rule is that such a plea destroys the plaintiff’s, prima facie case made by statute, and casts, upon him the burden of introducing proof other than the instrument itself to support his cause of action.” See, also, Drew v.. Harrison, 12 Tex. 279 , par. 2; Kelly v.. Kelly, 12 Tex. 452 , par. 1; Fulshear v. Randon, 18 Tex. 275 , par. 2, 70 Am.Dec. 281; May v. Pollard, 28 Tex. 677 , par. 2; City Nat.

1936The reason given for the rule is that such a plea destroys the plaintiff’s, prima facie case made by statute, and casts, upon him the burden of introducing proof other than the instrument itself to support his cause of action.” See, also, Drew v.. Harrison, 12 Tex. 279 , par. 2; Kelly v.. Kelly, 12 Tex. 452 , par. 1; Fulshear v. Randon, 18 Tex. 275 , par. 2, 70 Am.Dec. 281; May v. Pollard, 28 Tex. 677 , par. 2; City Nat.

1936The reason given for the rule is that such a plea destroys the plaintiff’s, prima facie case made by statute, and casts, upon him the burden of introducing proof other than the instrument itself to support his cause of action.” See, also, Drew v.. Harrison, 12 Tex. 279 , par. 2; Kelly v.. Kelly, 12 Tex. 452 , par. 1; Fulshear v. Randon, 18 Tex. 275 , par. 2, 70 Am.Dec. 281; May v. Pollard, 28 Tex. 677 , par. 2; City Nat.

1936Bank of Commerce v. Farrington (Tex.Civ.App.) 243 S.W. 544, 545 , par. 2; Mooneyham v. Cornick (Tex.Civ.App.) 294 S.W. 894, 898 (second column) ; Smith v. Smith (Tex.Civ.App.) 200 S.W. 540, 546 , pars. 1 to 3, inclusive; Pullman Palace-Car Co. v. Booth (Tex.Civ.App.) 28 S.W. 719 , par. 9; Dale Oil & Refining Co. v. City of Tulja (Tex.Civ.App.) 25 S.W.(2d) 671, 673 , par. 1; James McCord Co. v. Citizens’ Hotel Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 287 S.W. 906, 910 , par. 4.

1924The reason given for the requirement is stated by our Supreme Court in the case of Cotulla v. Goggan & Bros., 77 Tex. 32 , 13 S. W. 742 , as follows: “It may frequently occur that a party who has filed his application for findings of law and fact may waive or withdraw it.

1924The reason given for the requirement is stated by our Supreme Court in the case of Cotulla v. Goggan & Bros., 77 Tex. 32 , 13 S. W. 742 , as follows: “It may frequently occur that a party who has filed his application for findings of law and fact may waive or withdraw it.

1906Dec., 139 ; Bennett v. Ives, 30 Conn., 329 .) For a recent discussion of the *273 question and review of the authorities, see Slate v. Henkle, 78 Pac.

1906Dec., 139 ; Bennett v. Ives, 30 Conn., 329 .) For a recent discussion of the *273 question and review of the authorities, see Slate v. Henkle, 78 Pac.