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13 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 2002–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
University of Texas at Arlington v. Bishopgreen2 sentences2022Sell v. Peters Fine Art, Ltd., 390 S.W.3d 622, 624 (Tex. –6– App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (citing Univ. of Tex. at Arlington v. Bishop, 997 S.W.2d 350, 355 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied). 2015Univ. of Tex. at Arlington v. Bishop, 997 S.W.2d 350, 355 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied). 6 Appellant contends that the order imposing sanctions does not comply with Section 10.005 because it does not explain the trial court’s basis for issuing sanctions in the amount of either $1,000 or $500. | 7 | 7 |
Rudisell v. Paquettegreen2 sentences2005Code Ann. § 10.005 (Vernon Supp. 2004–2005) (“[a] court shall describe in an order imposing a sanction under this chapter the conduct the court has determined violated Section 10.001 and explain the basis for the sanction imposed”); Rudisell , 89 S.W.3d at 238 (“[t]he use of ‘shall’ in the statute indicates that the requirement for particularity in the sanction order is mandatory”). 2005Rem.Code Ann. § 10.005 (Vernon Supp.2004-2005) (“[a] court shall describe in an order imposing a sanction under this chapter the conduct the court has determined violated Section 10.001 and explain the basis for the sanction imposed”); Rudisell v. Paquette, 89 S.W.3d 233, 238 (“[t]he use of ‘shall’ in the statute indicates that the requirement for particularity in the sanction order is mandatory”). | 3 | 4 |
Sell, Steve v. Peters Fine Art, LTD. AKA Gerald Peters Gallerygreen2 sentences2022Sell v. Peters Fine Art, Ltd., 390 S.W.3d 622, 624 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.); Rudisell v. Paquette, 89 S.W.3d 233, 238 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). 2022Sell v. Peters Fine Art, Ltd., 390 S.W.3d 622, 624 (Tex. –6– App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (citing Univ. of Tex. at Arlington v. Bishop, 997 S.W.2d 350, 355 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied). | 2 | 2 |
Cheniere Energy, Inc., Charif Souki, Individually, and Greg Rayford, Individually v. Azin Lotfigreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625-26 (Tex.2008) (”[W]e construe the statute’s words according to their plain and common meaning ... unless such a construction leads to absurd results.”). .Accord Jardin, 431 S.W.3d at 772 (relying on its understanding of First Amendment concept of "right to petition” to guide construction of TCPA's "exercise of the right to petition”); see Cheniere Energy, 449 S.W.3d at 216 (concluding, with respect to TCPA’s "exercise of the right of association,” that "the stated purpose of the statute indicates a requirement of some nexus between the 2015See, e.g., City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625-26 (Tex.2008) (”[W]e construe the statute’s words according to their plain and common meaning ... unless such a construction leads to absurd results.”). .Accord Jardin, 431 S.W.3d at 772 (relying on its understanding of First Amendment concept of "right to petition” to guide construction of TCPA's "exercise of the right to petition”); see Cheniere Energy, 449 S.W.3d at 216 (concluding, with respect to TCPA’s "exercise of the right of association,” that "the stated purpose of the statute indicates a requirement of some nexus between the | 2 | 2 |
City of Rockwall v. Hughesgreen2 sentences2015Code § 27.002. 93 See, e.g., City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621 , 625–26 (Tex. 2008) (“[W]e construe the statute’s words according to their plain and common meaning . . . unless such a construction leads to absurd results.”). 94 Accord Jardin, 431 S.W.3d at 772 (relying on its understanding of First Amendment concept of “right to petition” to guide construction of TCPA’s “exercise of the right to petition”); see Cheniere Energy, 449 S.W.3d at 216 (concluding, with respect to TCPA’s “exercise of the right of association,” that “the stated purpose of the statute indicates a requirement o 2015See, e.g., City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625-26 (Tex.2008) (”[W]e construe the statute’s words according to their plain and common meaning ... unless such a construction leads to absurd results.”). .Accord Jardin, 431 S.W.3d at 772 (relying on its understanding of First Amendment concept of "right to petition” to guide construction of TCPA's "exercise of the right to petition”); see Cheniere Energy, 449 S.W.3d at 216 (concluding, with respect to TCPA’s "exercise of the right of association,” that "the stated purpose of the statute indicates a requirement of some nexus between the | 1 | 1 |
Frederic Jardin v. Soren Marklund, Douglas Wene and Chem32, LLCgreen2 sentences2015Code § 27.002. 93 See, e.g., City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621 , 625–26 (Tex. 2008) (“[W]e construe the statute’s words according to their plain and common meaning . . . unless such a construction leads to absurd results.”). 94 Accord Jardin, 431 S.W.3d at 772 (relying on its understanding of First Amendment concept of “right to petition” to guide construction of TCPA’s “exercise of the right to petition”); see Cheniere Energy, 449 S.W.3d at 216 (concluding, with respect to TCPA’s “exercise of the right of association,” that “the stated purpose of the statute indicates a requirement o 2015See, e.g., City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625-26 (Tex.2008) (”[W]e construe the statute’s words according to their plain and common meaning ... unless such a construction leads to absurd results.”). .Accord Jardin, 431 S.W.3d at 772 (relying on its understanding of First Amendment concept of "right to petition” to guide construction of TCPA's "exercise of the right to petition”); see Cheniere Energy, 449 S.W.3d at 216 (concluding, with respect to TCPA’s "exercise of the right of association,” that "the stated purpose of the statute indicates a requirement of some nexus between the | 1 | 1 |
Albertson's, Inc. v. Sinclairgreen1 sentence2002Univ. of Tex. at Arlington v. Bishop, 997 S.W.2d 350, 355 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied) (citing Albertson’s, Inc. v. Sinclair, 984 S.W.2d 958, 961 (Tex.1999)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Millergreen1 sentence2015But cf. Neyland, 2015 WL 1612155 , at *12 & n.2 (Field, J., concurring) (while agreeing with Cheniere (and, logically, with me) that TCPA’s text must be construed in the context of its purposes, concluding, at least with regard to the “exercise of the right of association,” that the Act’s explicit text departs from the underlying constitutional concept in some respects). 95 See In re Miller, 433 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“A lis pendens is not an independent claim; it has no existence separate from the lawsuit of which it notifies.”). 96 See Bill Johnson’s Res | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015But cf. Neyland, 2015 WL 1612155 , at *12 & n.2 (Field, J., concurring) (while agreeing with Cheniere (and, logically, with me) that TCPA’s text must be construed in the context of its purposes, concluding, at least with regard to the “exercise of the right of association,” that the Act’s explicit text departs from the underlying constitutional concept in some respects). 95 See In re Miller, 433 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“A lis pendens is not an independent claim; it has no existence separate from the lawsuit of which it notifies.”). 96 See Bill Johnson’s Res | 1 | 2015–2015 |
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited
green
1 sentence2015But cf. Neyland, 2015 WL 1612155 , at *12 & n.2 (Field, J., concurring) (while agreeing with Cheniere (and, logically, with me) that TCPA’s text must be construed in the context of its purposes, concluding, at least with regard to the “exercise of the right of association,” that the Act’s explicit text departs from the underlying constitutional concept in some respects). 95 See In re Miller, 433 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“A lis pendens is not an independent claim; it has no existence separate from the lawsuit of which it notifies.”). 96 See Bill Johnson’s Res | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board
green
1 sentence2015But cf. Neyland, 2015 WL 1612155 , at *12 & n.2 (Field, J., concurring) (while agreeing with Cheniere (and, logically, with me) that TCPA’s text must be construed in the context of its purposes, concluding, at least with regard to the “exercise of the right of association,” that the Act’s explicit text departs from the underlying constitutional concept in some respects). 95 See In re Miller, 433 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“A lis pendens is not an independent claim; it has no existence separate from the lawsuit of which it notifies.”). 96 See Bill Johnson’s Res | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.