13 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1999–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
TAURUS IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.green2 sentences2012See Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.Supp.2d 849, 871 (W.D.Wis.2008) (holding that pursuant to Castleberry no finding of actual fraud was required to pierce veil of LLC under Texas law). 2012See Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 534 F. Supp. 2d 849, 871 (W.D. | 2 | 2 |
Almanza v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Almanza , 686 S.W.2d, at 171 ("[I]f no proper objection was made at trial and the accused must claim that the error was 'fundamental,' he will obtain a reversal only if the error is so egregious and created such harm that he 'has not had a fair and impartial trial' -- in short 'egregious harm.'"). 39. 1999Nevertheless, Jimenez analyzes the issue as charge error under Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (opinion on rehearing). | 2 | 2 |
Oursbourn v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 181 (Tex. Crim. 2010Id. , at 165 ("[W]hen the evidence raises an issue of the 'voluntariness' of a defendant's statement under Article 38.22, the trial judge must give a general voluntariness instruction under Sections 6 and 7 of that article because it is the 'law applicable to the case.' But when the defendant does not request this statutorily mandated instruction, the trial court's failure to include it is reviewed only for 'egregious harm' under Almanza ."). 38. | 1 | 3 |
Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhynegreen2 sentences2019Mother identified a three-day window before expiration of the statutorily mandated hearing deadline that—in theory—would be 68 See In re K.S.L., 538 S.W.3d 107, 114 (Tex. 2017) (applying the procedural due process analysis from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), which involves balancing “three elements: the private interests at stake, the government’s interest supporting the challenged procedure, and the risk that the procedure will lead to erroneous decisions”). 69 Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996). 70 Id. 71 Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 3 2019Mother identified a three-day window before expiration of the statutorily mandated hearing deadline that—in theory—would be 68 See In re K.S.L., 538 S.W.3d 107, 114 (Tex. 2017) (applying the procedural due process analysis from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), which involves balancing “three elements: the private interests at stake, the government’s interest supporting the challenged procedure, and the risk that the procedure will lead to erroneous decisions”). 69 Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996). 70 Id. 71 Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 3 | 1 | 1 |
Halsell v. Dehoyosgreen1 sentence2019Mother identified a three-day window before expiration of the statutorily mandated hearing deadline that—in theory—would be 68 See In re K.S.L., 538 S.W.3d 107, 114 (Tex. 2017) (applying the procedural due process analysis from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), which involves balancing “three elements: the private interests at stake, the government’s interest supporting the challenged procedure, and the risk that the procedure will lead to erroneous decisions”). 69 Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996). 70 Id. 71 Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 3 | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen1 sentence2019Mother identified a three-day window before expiration of the statutorily mandated hearing deadline that—in theory—would be 68 See In re K.S.L., 538 S.W.3d 107, 114 (Tex. 2017) (applying the procedural due process analysis from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), which involves balancing “three elements: the private interests at stake, the government’s interest supporting the challenged procedure, and the risk that the procedure will lead to erroneous decisions”). 69 Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996). 70 Id. 71 Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 3 | 1 | 1 |
In re Interest of K.S.L.green1 sentence2019Mother identified a three-day window before expiration of the statutorily mandated hearing deadline that—in theory—would be 68 See In re K.S.L., 538 S.W.3d 107, 114 (Tex. 2017) (applying the procedural due process analysis from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), which involves balancing “three elements: the private interests at stake, the government’s interest supporting the challenged procedure, and the risk that the procedure will lead to erroneous decisions”). 69 Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996). 70 Id. 71 Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 3 | 1 | 1 |
Igo v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See Igo v. State, 210 S.W.3d 645 , 647- 48 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Shuffield v. Stategreen1 sentence2011When the evidence raises an issue of the ―voluntariness‖ of a defendant’s statement under article 38.22, the trial court must give a general voluntariness instruction under sections six and seven of that article because it is the ―law applicable to the case,‖ but when the defendant fails to request this statutorily mandated instruction, the trial court’s 19 See Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 793 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2004State v. Lewis, 151 S.W.3d 213, 223 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2004, no pet. h.) (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 319-20 , 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1974 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)). 2004State v. Lewis, 151 S.W.3d 213, 223 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2004, no pet. h.) (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 319-20 , 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1974 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)). | 1 | 1 |
Martinez v. Stategreen2 sentences2001It could not be charge error for the trial court to include the statutorily mandated instruction."); Martinez v. State, 969 S.W.2d 497, 500-02 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.) (parole charge not constitutional error, and, assuming it is, constitutional harm analysis applies); Garcia v. State, 911 S.W.2d 866, 868-69 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no pet.) (parole charge not constitutional error because it is not misleading). [5] See Hill v. State, 30 S.W.3d 505, 508-09 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (holding that giving a good conduct time instruction amounted to egregious harm). 2001It could not be charge error for the trial court to include the statutorily mandated instruction.”); Martinez v. State, 969 S.W.2d 497, 500-02 (Tex.App.—Austin 1998, no pet.) (parole charge not constitutional error, and, assuming it is, constitutional harm analysis applies); Garcia v. State, 911 S.W.2d 866, 868-69 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1995, no pet.) (parole charge not constitutional error because it is not misleading). .See Hill v. State, 30 S.W.3d 505, 508-09 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (holding that giving a good conduct time instruction amounted to egregious harm). | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Stategreen2 sentences2001It could not be charge error for the trial court to include the statutorily mandated instruction."); Martinez v. State, 969 S.W.2d 497, 500-02 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.) (parole charge not constitutional error, and, assuming it is, constitutional harm analysis applies); Garcia v. State, 911 S.W.2d 866, 868-69 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no pet.) (parole charge not constitutional error because it is not misleading). [5] See Hill v. State, 30 S.W.3d 505, 508-09 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (holding that giving a good conduct time instruction amounted to egregious harm). 2001It could not be charge error for the trial court to include the statutorily mandated instruction.”); Martinez v. State, 969 S.W.2d 497, 500-02 (Tex.App.—Austin 1998, no pet.) (parole charge not constitutional error, and, assuming it is, constitutional harm analysis applies); Garcia v. State, 911 S.W.2d 866, 868-69 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1995, no pet.) (parole charge not constitutional error because it is not misleading). .See Hill v. State, 30 S.W.3d 505, 508-09 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (holding that giving a good conduct time instruction amounted to egregious harm). | 1 | 1 |
Garcia v. Stategreen2 sentences2001It could not be charge error for the trial court to include the statutorily mandated instruction."); Martinez v. State, 969 S.W.2d 497, 500-02 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.) (parole charge not constitutional error, and, assuming it is, constitutional harm analysis applies); Garcia v. State, 911 S.W.2d 866, 868-69 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no pet.) (parole charge not constitutional error because it is not misleading). [5] See Hill v. State, 30 S.W.3d 505, 508-09 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (holding that giving a good conduct time instruction amounted to egregious harm). 2001It could not be charge error for the trial court to include the statutorily mandated instruction.”); Martinez v. State, 969 S.W.2d 497, 500-02 (Tex.App.—Austin 1998, no pet.) (parole charge not constitutional error, and, assuming it is, constitutional harm analysis applies); Garcia v. State, 911 S.W.2d 866, 868-69 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1995, no pet.) (parole charge not constitutional error because it is not misleading). .See Hill v. State, 30 S.W.3d 505, 508-09 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (holding that giving a good conduct time instruction amounted to egregious harm). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stewart v. State
green
1 sentence2015See Igo, 210 S.W.3d at 647–48 (holding erroneous parole instruction did not cause egregious harm although maximum sentence was assessed where charge contained admonishing language, parole law not mentioned in closing argument, and evidence regarding punishment was exceptionally strong); Stewart v. State, 293 S.W.3d 853 , 856–60 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. ref’d) (concluding remainder of charge correct and included admonishing language, nothing suggested jury acted on erroneous language or had any question concerning application or meaning of parole law, and counsel’s arguments emphasized t | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers
green
1 sentence2011App.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1056 (2006). 11 failure to include it is reviewed only for egregious harm under Almanza.20 Because there is no evidence that Appellant’s statement was not freely and voluntarily made, the trial court did not err by omitting the instruction. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
City of Keller v. Wilson
green
1 sentence2011See id. § 554.004(a); City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 823 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Francis v. Franklin
green
2 sentences2004State v. Lewis, 151 S.W.3d 213, 223 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2004, no pet. h.) (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 319-20 , 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1974 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)). 2004State v. Lewis, 151 S.W.3d 213, 223 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2004, no pet. h.) (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 319-20 , 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1974 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Bradley v. State
green
2 sentences2001The First Court of Appeals has reasoned that "[w]hen faced with a conflicting statutory requirement that is, as applied to a particular defendant, unconstitutional, the trial court must follow the mandate of article 36.14, tailoring the charge so that it becomes a correct statement of the law as it applies to the particular defendant." Bradley v. State, 45 S.W.3d 221, 223 , (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. filed) (holding that the jury instruction that his sentence might be reduced through award of good conduct time was unconstitutional as applied to him because he was not eligible for 2001The First Court of Appeals has reasoned that ''[w]hen faced with a conflicting statutory requirement that is, as applied to a particular defendant, unconstitutional, the trial court must follow the mandate of article 36.14, tailoring the charge so that it becomes a correct statement of the law as it applies to the particular defendant.” Bradley v. State, 45 S.W.3d 221, 223 , (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. filed) (holding that the jury instruction that his sentence might be reduced through award of good conduct time was unconstitutional as applied to him because he was not eligible fo | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.