statutorily mandated instruction in California

2017The trial court erroneously denied the defendant’s request for a posttrial fitness hearing under Penal Code section 1170.17, subdivision (c), and instead relied on the probation report to conclude that the defendant could appropriately be prosecuted as an adult. ( Villa, supra, at pp. 452-453 .) The court’s error was that it made the requisite determination without holding a statutorily-mandated hearing.

2017The trial court erroneously denied the defendant's request for a posttrial fitness hearing under Penal Code section 1170.17, subdivision (c), and instead relied on the probation report to conclude that the defendant could appropriately be prosecuted as an adult. ( Villa , supra , at pp. 452-453, 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 463 .) The court's error was that it made the requisite determination without holding a statutorily-mandated hearing.

2017The Court of Appeal found the error to be harmless under the Watson standard of prejudice. ( Villa , supra , at p. 453, 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 463 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 299 P.2d 243 .) In the instant case, Suarez was directly charged in criminal court under former Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d) but, unlike Villa , there was no occasion for any court to assess his fitness for a juvenile disposition.

2017The Court of Appeal found the error to be harmless under the Watson standard of prejudice. ( Villa , supra , at p. 453, 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 463 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 299 P.2d 243 .) In the instant case, Suarez was directly charged in criminal court under former Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d) but, unlike Villa , there was no occasion for any court to assess his fitness for a juvenile disposition.

1997He relies largely on People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 ], where we held that a statutorily mandated instruction on the Governor’s power to commute a life sentence— the so-called “Briggs instruction”—violated the California Constitution.

1997He relies largely on People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 ], where we held that a statutorily mandated instruction on the Governor’s power to commute a life sentence— the so-called “Briggs instruction”—violated the California Constitution.

1997(Cf. California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992 [ 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 ] [upholding the same instruction against federal constitutional challenge].) The Attorney General responds first that defendant has not preserved the claim.

1997(Cf. California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992 [ 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 ] [upholding the same instruction against federal constitutional challenge].) The Attorney General responds first that defendant has not preserved the claim.

2014(People v. Jones (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1173, 1181 .) We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s failure to elucidate additional mitigating factors on the record. 15 Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to the aggravated term, we will affirm the judgment.

1995(Cf. Robertson, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 357 .) We acknowledge, however, that the discovery stay and 30-day hearing requirement of section 425.16 literally applied in all cases might well *868 adversely implicate a plaintiff’s due process rights, particularly in a libel suit against a media defendant.

1991(Theroux, supra, 410 N.W.2d at p. 358 ; Davis, supra, 707 S.W.2d at pp. 712, 715.) Thus, carefully analyzed, neither case directly conflicts with the majority position.

1991The distinguishing feature of each case, however, is that in neither was the issue of a court-ordered waiver presented; the court had allocated the exemption to the noncustodial parent, but had failed to order the custodial parent to execute the statutorily mandated waiver. ( Theroux, supra, 410 N.W.2d at p. 358 ; Davis, supra, 707 S.W.2d at pp. 712, 715.) Thus, carefully analyzed, neither case directly conflicts with the majority position. [7] At the hearing on respondent's motion for the allocation of the exemption, the trial court was made aware of the need for Dina to sign a waiver, and th