vehicular violation in Texas

2012To make the traffic stop lawful, the police need not have, in addition to the vehicular violation, “cause to believe any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity.” Id . at 327, 129 S. Ct. at 784 (noting, however, that to justify a patdown of driver or passenger during the stop, police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous).

2012See Johnson , 555 U.S. at 327, 333 , 129 S. Ct. at 784, 788 (stating that in a traffic-stop setting, a lawful investigatory stop occurs when it is lawful for police to detain an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation).

2023See, e.g., Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (“Even in cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justified application of the vehicular exception.”); id. at 393 (“[T]he vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not actually moving.”); Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367 (“[T]he inherent mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.

2023See, e.g., Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (“Even in cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justified application of the vehicular exception.”); id. at 393 (“[T]he vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not actually moving.”); Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367 (“[T]he inherent mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.

2023See United States v. Short, 2 F.4th 1076, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 2021) (“an easily repairable flat tire did not cause the vehicle to lose its inherent mobility”), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 626 (2021); United States v. Fields, 456 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Even where an automobile is not immediately mobile at the time of the search, ‘the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justifie[s] application of the vehicular exception.’” (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 , 105 S. Ct. 2066 , 85 L.

2023See United States v. Short, 2 F.4th 1076, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 2021) (“an easily repairable flat tire did not cause the vehicle to lose its inherent mobility”), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 626 (2021); United States v. Fields, 456 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Even where an automobile is not immediately mobile at the time of the search, ‘the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justifie[s] application of the vehicular exception.’” (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 , 105 S. Ct. 2066 , 85 L.

2023See, e.g., Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (“Even in cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justified application of the vehicular exception.”); id. at 393 (“[T]he vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not actually moving.”); Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367 (“[T]he inherent mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.

2015Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 232, 327 (2009); Vafaiyan v. State, 279 S.W.3d 374, 380 (Tex. Crim.