dispositional review hearing in Utah

2006Independent of the dictates of section 78-3a-312, the A.E. court stated that "the dispositional review hearing should not be combined with a termination of parental rights hearing because (1) it places an unfair burden on [the parent], (2) the separate hearings focus the juvenile court on different issues of fact and law, and (3) each involves different burdens of proof." A.E., 938 P.2d at 816 . ¶ 30 With regard to the unfair burden on parents, the court stated that combining the permanency hearing with the termination trial inherently places the parent "at a disadvantage." Id.

2006Independent of the dictates of section 78-3a-312, the A.E. court stated that "the dispositional review hearing should not be combined with a termination of parental rights hearing because (1) it places an unfair burden on [the parent], (2) the separate hearings focus the juvenile court on different issues of fact and law, and (3) each involves different burdens of proof." A.E., 938 P.2d at 816 . ¶ 30 With regard to the unfair burden on parents, the court stated that combining the permanency hearing with the termination trial inherently places the parent "at a disadvantage." Id.

2011A permanency plan hearing "is admittedly a 'sequential step' established by the Legislature which cannot be ignored by the juvenile court." In re K.M., 965 P.2d 576, 582 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (citation omitted).

1998“In interpreting a statute, we read it to harmonize it with its subsections.” A.E. v. Christean, 938 P.2d at 816 . “[I]f there is doubt or uncertainty as to the ... application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with its intent and purpose.” State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (internal quotations & citations omitted).

1998Parties to a judicial proceeding are entitled to notice “that a particular issue is being considered by a court” and must be given “an opportunity to present evidence and argument on that issue before decision.” Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990).

1998See Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 , 1311 n. 4 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (holding trial court judge could revisit prior judge's interim order in same case because two judges were "a single judicial office for law of the case purposes"). [4] Having a different judge presiding at the dispositional review hearing and at the termination of parental rights hearing is not the normal practice in our juvenile courts.

1997See State in re J.L.W., 900 P.2d 543, 549 (Utah.Ct.App.1995).

1997STANDARD OF REVIEW Whether the juvenile court had authority to postpone the dispositional review hearing and combine it with a termination of parental rights hearing is a question of law dependent on an interpretation of section 78-3a-312 of the Utah Code. "`We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's interpretation.'" State in re R.N.J., 908 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah.Ct.App.1995) (citation omitted).

1997STANDARD OF REVIEW Whether the juvenile court had authority to postpone the dispositional review hearing and combine it with a termination of parental rights hearing is a question of law dependent on an interpretation of section 78-3a-312 of the Utah Code. "`We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's interpretation.'" State in re R.N.J., 908 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah.Ct.App.1995) (citation omitted).

1997Cf. State in re P.H. v. Harrison, 783 P.2d 565, 569 (Utah.Ct.App.1989) (stating “every reasonable effort should be made to preserve the family unit.”).

1997Cf. State in re P.H. v. Harrison, 783 P.2d 565, 569 (Utah.Ct.

1997In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705 (Utah 1978), the supreme court explained that the term "shall" may be either discretionary or mandatory depending on "whether or not the directions given an officer are for the benefit of the taxpayer, e.g., to give him notice and an opportunity for a hearing, or for any other purpose important to him." Id. at 707 (emphasis added); see also Annotation, Provisions of Tax Statute as to Time for Performance of Acts by Boards or Officers as Mandatory or Directory, 151 A.L.R. 248 , 248 (1944) (distinguishing between provisions as to time f

1997In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705 (Utah 1978), the supreme court explained that the term "shall" may be either discretionary or mandatory depending on "whether or not the directions given an officer are for the benefit of the taxpayer, e.g., to give him notice and an opportunity for a hearing, or for any other purpose important to him." Id. at 707 (emphasis added); see also Annotation, Provisions of Tax Statute as to Time for Performance of Acts by Boards or Officers as Mandatory or Directory, 151 A.L.R. 248 , 248 (1944) (distinguishing between provisions as to time f

1997See State in re J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 163, 164 (Utah.Ct.App.1994) (stating “hyper-technical application of res judicata is improper in adjudications where the welfare of children is at stake.”).

1997See State in re J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 163, 164 (Utah.Ct.App.1994) (stating "hyper-technical application of res judicata is improper in adjudications where the welfare of children is at stake.").

1997Cf. Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 580 (Utah.Ct.App. 1991) (instructing district court not to consider "attorneys fees incurred in pursuing the underlying appeal" because "[t]his procedure promotes judicial economy and prevents expenditures of time on matters which will be moot if the [appellants] ultimately do not prevail on appeal.").