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13 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Poston v. Clintongreen2 sentences2007See SMC 11.56.020(A)(1)(b) for the analogous city code provision. [1] See also former WAC 448-13-060(5) (2001 & Supp.2002) ("the criteria applied to determine the validity of any test and so certify it, should be those provisions of the Washington Administrative Code in effect at the time the test is administered"). [2] See Poston v. Clinton, 66 Wash.2d 911, 915-16 , 406 P.2d 623 (1965) (holding an amended statute governing breath test procedures operates prospectively since the legislature intended a breath test to be administered in compliance with then-applicable procedures). [3] "The legis 2007See SMC 11.56.020(A)(1)(b) for the analogous city code provision. [1] See also former WAC 448-13-060(5) (2001 & Supp.2002) ("the criteria applied to determine the validity of any test and so certify it, should be those provisions of the Washington Administrative Code in effect at the time the test is administered"). [2] See Poston v. Clinton, 66 Wash.2d 911, 915-16 , 406 P.2d 623 (1965) (holding an amended statute governing breath test procedures operates prospectively since the legislature intended a breath test to be administered in compliance with then-applicable procedures). [3] "The legis | 2 | 2 |
Evitts v. Luceygreen1 sentence2012See Evitts, 469 U.S. at 400 (a state may not extinguish a defendant’s right to an appeal “because another right of the appellant — the right to effective assistance of counsel — has been violated”). ¶33 Ultimately, however, the effectiveness of counsel and the validity of any waiver of the right to appeal are highly fact-specific inquiries that depend on an assessment of the particular facts and circumstances of each case. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Stegall
green
2 sentences2016“The validity of any waiver of a constitutional right, as well as the inquiry required by the court to establish waiver, [depends] on the circumstances of each case, including the defendant’s experience and capabilities.” Stegall, 124 Wn.2d at 725 . 2015“The validity of any waiver of a constitutional right, as well as the inquiry required by the court to establish waiver, will depend on the circumstances of each case” State v. Stegall, 124 Wn.2d 719, 725 , 881 P.2d 979 (1994). ¶15 Turning to our public trial jurisprudence, two relevant principles emerge and define the contours of a valid waiver. | 6 | 2008–2024 |
State v. Wicke
green
2 sentences2008State v. Wicke, 91 Wn.2d 638, 645 , 591 P.2d 452 (1979). ¶23 “The validity of any waiver of a constitutional right, as well as the inquiry required by the court to establish waiver, will depend on the circumstances of each case, including the defendant’s experience and capabilities.” State v. Stegall, 124 Wn.2d 719, 725 , 881 P.2d 979 (1994). 2008State v. Wicke, 91 Wn.2d 638, 645 , 591 P.2d 452 (1979). ¶23 “The validity of any waiver of a constitutional right, as well as the inquiry required by the court to establish waiver, will depend on the circumstances of each case, including the defendant’s experience and capabilities.” State v. Stegall, 124 Wn.2d 719, 725 , 881 P.2d 979 (1994). | 2 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Cham
green
1 sentence2016State v. Cham, 165 Wn. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Benitez
green
1 sentence2016We do not require that a defendant “be apprised of every aspect of the jury trial right in order for the defendant’s waiver to be valid.” State v. Benitez, 175 Wn. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Association of Washington Business v. Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences2007By its plain language, RCW 34.05.570(2)(c) states the correct standard of review when a court is determining the validity of a rule. “ ‘This court may declare an agency rule invalid if it: (1) violates constitutional provisions, (2) exceeds statutory authority of the agency, (3) was adopted without compliance to statutory rule-making procedures, or (4) is arbitrary and capricious.’ ” Ass’n of Wash. Bus. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 155 Wn.2d 430, 437 , 120 P.3d 46 (2005) (quoting Wash. Pub. 2007By its plain language, RCW 34.05.570(2)(c) states the correct standard of review when a court is determining the validity of a rule. “ ‘This court may declare an agency rule invalid if it: (1) violates constitutional provisions, (2) exceeds statutory authority of the agency, (3) was adopted without compliance to statutory rule-making procedures, or (4) is arbitrary and capricious.’ ” Ass’n of Wash. Bus. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 155 Wn.2d 430, 437 , 120 P.3d 46 (2005) (quoting Wash. Pub. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Washington Public Ports Ass'n v. Department of Revenue
green
1 sentence2004A reviewing court may declare a rule invalid only if (1) the rule violates constitutional provisions; (2) the rule exceeds the agency's statutory authority; (3) the rule's adoption did not comply with statutory rule-making procedures; or (4) the rule is arbitrary and capricious. [2] RCW 34.05.570(2)(c); Washington Public Ports Ass'n v. State, Dep't of *1130 Revenue, 148 Wash.2d 637, 645 , 62 P.3d 462 (2003). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
WPPA v. State, Dept. of Revenue
green
1 sentence2004A reviewing court may declare a rule invalid only if (1) the rule violates constitutional provisions; (2) the rule exceeds the agency's statutory authority; (3) the rule's adoption did not comply with statutory rule-making procedures; or (4) the rule is arbitrary and capricious. [2] RCW 34.05.570(2)(c); Washington Public Ports Ass'n v. State, Dep't of *1130 Revenue, 148 Wash.2d 637, 645 , 62 P.3d 462 (2003). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences1994Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938). 1994Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.