validity of any claim in California

2004Guarantee Assn. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1269, 1275 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 561 ] (Reed).) Just as default judgments or judgments entered collusively may not be considered as evidence of the liability of the insurer when the insurance company is in liquidation, Insurance Code section 1063.2, subdivision (g) provides that for CIGA, no “default judgment . . . against the insolvent insurer, or against the insured of the insolvent insurer, [shall] be binding against the association.” “The clear purpose of the statutory language is to protect CIGA against collusion and to require simply that the validity of a

2000Guarantee Assn. (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 641, 645 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 16 ] (Biggs), “is to protect CIGA against collusion and to require simply that the validity of any claim be determined in an adversary setting before being reduced to a judgment which CIGA must honor.” 9 It appears that, by excluding from the primary definition of covered claims a default or stipulated judgment against the insolvent insurer, the Legislature necessarily determined that a judgment obtained in an adversary setting would constitute an obligation imposed by law, and we so hold.

2014Co. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 767, 778 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 869 ].) The Legislature intended “to exact strict compliance with the preliminary notice requirement.” (Ibid.; see IGA Aluminum Products, Inc. v. Manufacturers Bank (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 699, 703-704 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 859 ] [same].) *848 Lender contends the trial court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that Dynalectric, a direct contractor, was not required to serve Lender with a preliminary notice under subdivision (b) of section 3097 (section 3097(b)) as a condition to maintaining its stop notice claim because service of a preliminary

2014Co. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 767, 778 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 869 ].) The Legislature intended “to exact strict compliance with the preliminary notice requirement.” (Ibid.; see IGA Aluminum Products, Inc. v. Manufacturers Bank (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 699, 703-704 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 859 ] [same].) *848 Lender contends the trial court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that Dynalectric, a direct contractor, was not required to serve Lender with a preliminary notice under subdivision (b) of section 3097 (section 3097(b)) as a condition to maintaining its stop notice claim because service of a preliminary

2022(People v. Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1338 .) Moreover, while a “prosecutor may vigorously challenge the validity of any defense, and can characterize the testimony of a witness . . . as untruthful,” it is misconduct “to state or imply that defense counsel has fabricated a defense.” (Id. at p. 1337.) Here, the prosecutor did not simply argue that the defense was unsupported by the evidence or that Dr. Melinek’s opinion was controverted, flawed, or not worthy of consideration.

2021Accusing Defendant of Lying Defendant argues the prosecutor also improperly “signaled to the jury her personal belief that Brown perjured himself and was guilty of the offense.” Specifically, defendant complains that the prosecutor called him an “arrogant” and “defensive” “liar” who was motivated to commit perjury “because he wants to walk out those doors,” and argued “he lies to police generally because he’s a drug dealer and that’s what he does” and that “he’s fine with lying if it will save him.” 28 “A prosecutor may vigorously challenge the validity of any defense, and can characterize the

2016(See Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1337 [“[a] prosecutor may vigorously challenge the validity of any defense, and can characterize the testimony of a witness, including the defendant, as untruthful, but to state or imply that defense counsel has fabricated a defense is generally misconduct”]; People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 734 [“‘[a] prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she attacks the integrity of defense counsel, or casts aspersions on defense counsel’”]; People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 832 [“‘[a]n attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an att

2016(See Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1337 [“[a] prosecutor may vigorously challenge the validity of any defense, and can characterize the testimony of a witness, including the defendant, as untruthful, but to state or imply that defense counsel has fabricated a defense is generally misconduct”]; People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 734 [“‘[a] prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she attacks the integrity of defense counsel, or casts aspersions on defense counsel’”]; People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 832 [“‘[a]n attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an att

2016(See Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1337 [“[a] prosecutor may vigorously challenge the validity of any defense, and can characterize the testimony of a witness, including the defendant, as untruthful, but to state or imply that defense counsel has fabricated a defense is generally misconduct”]; People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 734 [“‘[a] prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she attacks the integrity of defense counsel, or casts aspersions on defense counsel’”]; People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 832 [“‘[a]n attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an att

2016(See Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1337 [“[a] prosecutor may vigorously challenge the validity of any defense, and can characterize the testimony of a witness, including the defendant, as untruthful, but to state or imply that defense counsel has fabricated a defense is generally misconduct”]; People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 734 [“‘[a] prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she attacks the integrity of defense counsel, or casts aspersions on defense counsel’”]; People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 832 [“‘[a]n attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an att

2016(See Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1337 [“[a] prosecutor may vigorously challenge the validity of any defense, and can characterize the testimony of a witness, including the defendant, as untruthful, but to state or imply that defense counsel has fabricated a defense is generally misconduct”]; People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 734 [“‘[a] prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she attacks the integrity of defense counsel, or casts aspersions on defense counsel’”]; People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 832 [“‘[a]n attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an att

2016(See Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1337 [“[a] prosecutor may vigorously challenge the validity of any defense, and can characterize the testimony of a witness, including the defendant, as untruthful, but to state or imply that defense counsel has fabricated a defense is generally misconduct”]; People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 734 [“‘[a] prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she attacks the integrity of defense counsel, or casts aspersions on defense counsel’”]; People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 832 [“‘[a]n attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an att

2014Co. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 767, 778 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 869 ].) The Legislature intended “to exact strict compliance with the preliminary notice requirement.” (Ibid.; see IGA Aluminum Products, Inc. v. Manufacturers Bank (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 699, 703-704 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 859 ] [same].) *848 Lender contends the trial court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that Dynalectric, a direct contractor, was not required to serve Lender with a preliminary notice under subdivision (b) of section 3097 (section 3097(b)) as a condition to maintaining its stop notice claim because service of a preliminary

2014Co. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 767, 778 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 869 ].) The Legislature intended “to exact strict compliance with the preliminary notice requirement.” (Ibid.; see IGA Aluminum Products, Inc. v. Manufacturers Bank (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 699, 703-704 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 859 ] [same].) *848 Lender contends the trial court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that Dynalectric, a direct contractor, was not required to serve Lender with a preliminary notice under subdivision (b) of section 3097 (section 3097(b)) as a condition to maintaining its stop notice claim because service of a preliminary

2015(People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 171; People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 847 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 684 , 489 P.2d 564 ].) To the extent the prosecutor here did not *1338 simply argue the defense was unsupported by facts and thus a sham, but that defense counsel “put forward” a sham, the argument improperly implied that counsel was personally dishonest. “ ‘An attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an attack on the defendant himself, and, in view of the accepted doctrines of legal ethics and decorum [citation], it is never excusable.’ ” (People v. Hill, supra, 17

2015(People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 171; People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 847 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 684 , 489 P.2d 564 ].) To the extent the prosecutor here did not *1338 simply argue the defense was unsupported by facts and thus a sham, but that defense counsel “put forward” a sham, the argument improperly implied that counsel was personally dishonest. “ ‘An attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an attack on the defendant himself, and, in view of the accepted doctrines of legal ethics and decorum [citation], it is never excusable.’ ” (People v. Hill, supra, 17

2015(People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 171; People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 847 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 684 , 489 P.2d 564 ].) To the extent the prosecutor here did not *1338 simply argue the defense was unsupported by facts and thus a sham, but that defense counsel “put forward” a sham, the argument improperly implied that counsel was personally dishonest. “ ‘An attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an attack on the defendant himself, and, in view of the accepted doctrines of legal ethics and decorum [citation], it is never excusable.’ ” (People v. Hill, supra, 17

2004Guarantee Assn. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1269, 1275 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 561 ] (Reed).) Just as default judgments or judgments entered collusively may not be considered as evidence of the liability of the insurer when the insurance company is in liquidation, Insurance Code section 1063.2, subdivision (g) provides that for CIGA, no “default judgment . . . against the insolvent insurer, or against the insured of the insolvent insurer, [shall] be binding against the association.” “The clear purpose of the statutory language is to protect CIGA against collusion and to require simply that the validity of a

2004Guarantee Assn. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1269, 1275 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 561 ] (Reed).) Just as default judgments or judgments entered collusively may not be considered as evidence of the liability of the insurer when the insurance company is in liquidation, Insurance Code section 1063.2, subdivision (g) provides that for CIGA, no “default judgment . . . against the insolvent insurer, or against the insured of the insolvent insurer, [shall] be binding against the association.” “The clear purpose of the statutory language is to protect CIGA against collusion and to require simply that the validity of a

1996(Truestone, Inc. v. Simi West Industrial Park II (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 715, 721 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 757 ].) The complaint does not allege that any of the plaintiffs filed a preliminary notice, and they make no such argument here.

1996(Truestone, Inc. v. Simi West Industrial Park II (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 715, 721 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 757 ].) The complaint does not allege that any of the plaintiffs filed a preliminary notice, and they make no such argument here.

1972Subdivision (b) thereof provided that all alterations or repairs, work or labor done or materials furnished upon any land, shall be held to have been “constructed, performed or furnished at the instance of” the owner of the land or person having or claiming an interest therein and that “such interest owned or claimed shall be subject to any lien filed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, unless such owner . . . shall, within 10 days after he shall have obtained knowledge of such construction, alteration or repair or work or labor, give notice that he will not be responsible for t

1972Subdivision (b) thereof provided that all alterations or repairs, work or labor done or materials furnished upon any land, shall be held to have been “constructed, performed or furnished at the instance of” the owner of the land or person having or claiming an interest therein and that “such interest owned or claimed shall be subject to any lien filed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, unless such owner . . . shall, within 10 days after he shall have obtained knowledge of such construction, alteration or repair or work or labor, give notice that he will not be responsible for t

1972Vada Taggart negate[s] any lien on the properties sought, for [she was an owner] of the subject property,” In Schrader Iron Works, Inc. v. Lee, 26 Cal.App.3d 621, 630 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 106 ], we pointed out that it is not necessary for a lien claimant to give a prelien notice to an owner of property with whom the claimant entered into a direct contract for the performance of the work or the furnishing of materials where such owner owned the property at the time the contract was made.

1972Vada Taggart negate[s] any lien on the properties sought, for [she was an owner] of the subject property,” In Schrader Iron Works, Inc. v. Lee, 26 Cal.App.3d 621, 630 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 106 ], we pointed out that it is not necessary for a lien claimant to give a prelien notice to an owner of property with whom the claimant entered into a direct contract for the performance of the work or the furnishing of materials where such owner owned the property at the time the contract was made.

1972“In construing a statute our concern is to ascertain and to give effect to the legislative intent. [Citations.] In ascertaining the intent articulated in a statute, the court should first turn to the words of the statute to determine the will of the Legislature [citations] and give effect to the statute according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed *630 in framing it. [Citations.]” (Noroian v. Department of Administration, 11 Cal.App.3d 651, 654-655 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 889 ].) Analyzing the subject statute pursuant to the foregoing principle of statutory construction, we interpre

1972“In construing a statute our concern is to ascertain and to give effect to the legislative intent. [Citations.] In ascertaining the intent articulated in a statute, the court should first turn to the words of the statute to determine the will of the Legislature [citations] and give effect to the statute according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed *630 in framing it. [Citations.]” (Noroian v. Department of Administration, 11 Cal.App.3d 651, 654-655 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 889 ].) Analyzing the subject statute pursuant to the foregoing principle of statutory construction, we interpre

1969(Scott, Blake & Wynne v. Summit Ridge Estates, Inc., 251 Cal.App.2d 347, 353 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 587 ].) Whether appellant’s claim of lien arose by reason of respondents’ failure to insulate themselves from such claim under the provisions of section 1183.1 or whether it arose by the appellant’s giving the required notice under section 1193 is not material to or decisive of the issues here presented.

1969(Scott, Blake & Wynne v. Summit Ridge Estates, Inc., 251 Cal.App.2d 347, 353 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 587 ].) Whether appellant’s claim of lien arose by reason of respondents’ failure to insulate themselves from such claim under the provisions of section 1183.1 or whether it arose by the appellant’s giving the required notice under section 1193 is not material to or decisive of the issues here presented.

1967(Alter v. Michael (1966) 64 Cal.2d 480, 482-485 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 553 , 413 P.2d 153 ]; Cole v. Rush (1955) 45 Cal.2d 345, 355 [ 289 P.2d 450 , 54 A.L.R.2d 1137 ] ; McColgan v. Jones, Hubbard, etc., Inc. (1938) 11 Cal.2d 243, 247 [ 78 P.2d 1010 ], 3 G.C.P. 1193 provides in part: ' (a) Except one under direct contract with the owner or one performing actual labor for wages, every person who furnishes labor, service, equipment or material for which a lien *16 otherwise can be claimed under this chapter, must, as a necessary prerequisite to the validity of any claim of lien subsequently filed, cause

1967(Alter v. Michael (1966) 64 Cal.2d 480, 482-485 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 553 , 413 P.2d 153 ]; Cole v. Rush (1955) 45 Cal.2d 345, 355 [ 289 P.2d 450 , 54 A.L.R.2d 1137 ] ; McColgan v. Jones, Hubbard, etc., Inc. (1938) 11 Cal.2d 243, 247 [ 78 P.2d 1010 ], 3 G.C.P. 1193 provides in part: ' (a) Except one under direct contract with the owner or one performing actual labor for wages, every person who furnishes labor, service, equipment or material for which a lien *16 otherwise can be claimed under this chapter, must, as a necessary prerequisite to the validity of any claim of lien subsequently filed, cause

1967(Alter v. Michael (1966) 64 Cal.2d 480, 482-485 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 553 , 413 P.2d 153 ]; Cole v. Rush (1955) 45 Cal.2d 345, 355 [ 289 P.2d 450 , 54 A.L.R.2d 1137 ] ; McColgan v. Jones, Hubbard, etc., Inc. (1938) 11 Cal.2d 243, 247 [ 78 P.2d 1010 ], 3 G.C.P. 1193 provides in part: ' (a) Except one under direct contract with the owner or one performing actual labor for wages, every person who furnishes labor, service, equipment or material for which a lien *16 otherwise can be claimed under this chapter, must, as a necessary prerequisite to the validity of any claim of lien subsequently filed, cause

1967(Alter v. Michael (1966) 64 Cal.2d 480, 482-485 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 553 , 413 P.2d 153 ]; Cole v. Rush (1955) 45 Cal.2d 345, 355 [ 289 P.2d 450 , 54 A.L.R.2d 1137 ] ; McColgan v. Jones, Hubbard, etc., Inc. (1938) 11 Cal.2d 243, 247 [ 78 P.2d 1010 ], 3 G.C.P. 1193 provides in part: ' (a) Except one under direct contract with the owner or one performing actual labor for wages, every person who furnishes labor, service, equipment or material for which a lien *16 otherwise can be claimed under this chapter, must, as a necessary prerequisite to the validity of any claim of lien subsequently filed, cause

1967(Alter v. Michael (1966) 64 Cal.2d 480, 482-485 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 553 , 413 P.2d 153 ]; Cole v. Rush (1955) 45 Cal.2d 345, 355 [ 289 P.2d 450 , 54 A.L.R.2d 1137 ] ; McColgan v. Jones, Hubbard, etc., Inc. (1938) 11 Cal.2d 243, 247 [ 78 P.2d 1010 ], 3 G.C.P. 1193 provides in part: ' (a) Except one under direct contract with the owner or one performing actual labor for wages, every person who furnishes labor, service, equipment or material for which a lien *16 otherwise can be claimed under this chapter, must, as a necessary prerequisite to the validity of any claim of lien subsequently filed, cause

1967(Alter v. Michael (1966) 64 Cal.2d 480, 482-485 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 553 , 413 P.2d 153 ]; Cole v. Rush (1955) 45 Cal.2d 345, 355 [ 289 P.2d 450 , 54 A.L.R.2d 1137 ] ; McColgan v. Jones, Hubbard, etc., Inc. (1938) 11 Cal.2d 243, 247 [ 78 P.2d 1010 ], 3 G.C.P. 1193 provides in part: ' (a) Except one under direct contract with the owner or one performing actual labor for wages, every person who furnishes labor, service, equipment or material for which a lien *16 otherwise can be claimed under this chapter, must, as a necessary prerequisite to the validity of any claim of lien subsequently filed, cause

1955(See also California Physicians Service v. Garrison, 28 Cal.2d 790, 800 [ 172 P.2d 4 , 167 A.L.R. 306 ], and Nougues v. Douglass, 7 Cal. 65, 74 .) The right of any interested person to obtain a judicial declaration as to the validity of any rule, regulation, order or standard of general application adopted by any state agency to implement, interpret or make specific, any law enforced or administered by it or to govern its procedure is found in the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (Gov.

1955(See also California Physicians Service v. Garrison, 28 Cal.2d 790, 800 [ 172 P.2d 4 , 167 A.L.R. 306 ], and Nougues v. Douglass, 7 Cal. 65, 74 .) The right of any interested person to obtain a judicial declaration as to the validity of any rule, regulation, order or standard of general application adopted by any state agency to implement, interpret or make specific, any law enforced or administered by it or to govern its procedure is found in the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (Gov.