analytic framework in Arizona

2025In some of these cases, the supreme court issued broad pronouncements that manslaughter instructions “are required when supported by the evidence,” State v. Delahanty, 226 Ariz. 502, 507, ¶ 23 (2011), and “[a]n accused murderer is entitled to an instruction on . . . manslaughter if the evidence shows the killing was done in the heat of passion,” State v. Noleen, 142 Ariz. 101, 107 (1984), but Peterson has not cited, and our research has not revealed, any case finding a superior court committed fundamental, prejudicial error by failing to instruct sua sponte a jury on provocation manslaughter.

2025In some of these cases, the supreme court issued broad pronouncements that manslaughter instructions “are required when supported by the evidence,” State v. Delahanty, 226 Ariz. 502, 507, ¶ 23 (2011), and “[a]n accused murderer is entitled to an instruction on . . . manslaughter if the evidence shows the killing was done in the heat of passion,” State v. Noleen, 142 Ariz. 101, 107 (1984), but Peterson has not cited, and our research has not revealed, any case finding a superior court committed fundamental, prejudicial error by failing to instruct sua sponte a jury on provocation manslaughter.

2025See State v. Davis, 206 Ariz. 377 , 380–81, ¶ 12 (2003) (finding no “compelling reason to interpret Arizona’s cruel and unusual punishment provision differently from the related provision in the federal constitution”). ¶21 First, Schaeffer challenges the constitutionality of the statutory minimum (5 years), presumptive (10 years), and maximum (15 years) sentences for the sale or transfer of methamphetamine.

2025State v. Gipson, 229 Ariz. 484, 486, ¶ 13 (2012).

2024See Cramer v. Starr, 240 Ariz. 4, 10, ¶ 21 (2016) (explaining that absent contrary law, Arizona courts generally follow the Restatement); see also Garza v. Gama, 240 Ariz. 373, 378, ¶ 16 (App. 2016) (“Arizona courts generally look to the [Restatement] to determine which state’s substantive law applies to a claim.”).

2024See Cramer v. Starr, 240 Ariz. 4, 10, ¶ 21 (2016) (explaining that absent contrary law, Arizona courts generally follow the Restatement); see also Garza v. Gama, 240 Ariz. 373, 378, ¶ 16 (App. 2016) (“Arizona courts generally look to the [Restatement] to determine which state’s substantive law applies to a claim.”).

2024Accordingly, we borrow from the analytic framework applied in analogous cases evaluating a community interest in stock options and pension benefits. ¶16 “The concept of community property law in Arizona is built upon two pillars[.]” Potthoff v. Potthoff, 128 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1981).

2019See Yetman v. English, 168 Ariz. 71, 79 (1991). ¶23 Without expressly outlining this analytic framework, the superior court engaged in an analysis of Lai’s statements and concluded that none were defamatory.

2017Id. at 526-27, ¶ 59 . 5 BUXTON et al. v. BUTLER Decision of the Court ¶14 If we were writing on a clean slate, we might adopt an analytic framework similar to Caruthers—but in light of Morris, we decline Butler’s invitation to do so here.

2017Comm’n, 123 Ariz. 348, 350 (1979). ¶11 The ALJ applied the correct analytic framework.

2007See Kecko-nen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 272 , 705 P.2d 945, 949 (App.1985). ¶38 If the analytic framework suggested by the Third Restatement were applied here, the only issue would be whether' there existed a good policy reason to exempt those who distribute prescription drugs to unauthorized users from the general duty of care.

2007See Kecko-nen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 272 , 705 P.2d 945, 949 (App.1985). ¶38 If the analytic framework suggested by the Third Restatement were applied here, the only issue would be whether' there existed a good policy reason to exempt those who distribute prescription drugs to unauthorized users from the general duty of care.