Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
7 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Maryland v. Craiggreen2 sentences2020Citing Pesquera, the panel stated that the Confrontation Clause requires the following: (1) a face-to-face-meeting of the defendant and the witnesses against him at trial; (2) the witnesses should be competent to testify and their testimony is to be given under oath or affirmation, thereby impressing upon them the seriousness of the matter; (3) the witnesses are subject to cross- examination; and (4) the trier of fact is afforded the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor. [Jemison, unpub op at 5, citing Pesquera, 244 Mich App at 309 , which in turn cited Craig, 497 US at 846, 851 .] W 2020The court further noted that “[t]he jury was able to observe the expert as he responded.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Manzo v. Petrella & Petrella & Associates, PCgreen1 sentence2019See Manzo v Petrella, 261 Mich App 705, 712 ; 683 NW2d 699 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Newton v. Michigan State Policegreen2 sentences2006For example, a final judgment or order in a civil action is defined, for the purposes of determining whether a governmental defendant has an appeal of right, as "[a]n order denying governmental immunity to a governmental party, including a governmental agency, official, or employee[.]" MCR 7.202(6)(a)(v); see also Newton v. Michigan State Police, 263 Mich.App. 251, 257-259 , 688 N.W.2d 94 (2004). 2006For example, a final judgment or order in a civil action is defined, for the purposes of determining whether a governmental defendant has an appeal of right, as "[a]n order denying governmental immunity to a governmental party, including a governmental agency, official, or employee[.]" MCR 7.202(6)(a)(v); see also Newton v. Michigan State Police, 263 Mich.App. 251, 257-259 , 688 N.W.2d 94 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ronnie Theodore Waltersgreen2 sentences2003Rather, it creates a presumption that the defendant’s request should be granted unless considerations of judicial administration supervene. [Id. at 607 n 3.] See also United States v Walters, 309 F3d 589, 592 (CA 9, 2002), holding that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the counsel of his choice includes the right to have an out-of-state lawyer admitted pro hac vice “unless some countervailing consideration outweighs the defendant’s constitutional interest.” Thus, “ ‘[a] criminal defendant’s exercise of this right cannot unduly hinder the fair, efficient and orderly administration of justi 2003Rather, it creates a presumption that the defendant’s request should be granted unless considerations of judicial administration supervene. [Id. at 607 n 3.] See also United States v Walters, 309 F3d 589, 592 (CA 9, 2002), holding that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the counsel of his choice includes the right to have an out-of-state lawyer admitted pro hac vice “unless some countervailing consideration outweighs the defendant’s constitutional interest.” Thus, “ ‘[a] criminal defendant’s exercise of this right cannot unduly hinder the fair, efficient and orderly administration of justi | 1 | 1 |
Benton v. Marylandgreen2 sentences1984See Benton v Maryland, 395 US 784, 793-796 ; 89 S Ct 2056 ; 23 L Ed 2d 707 (1969). [3] Const 1963, art 1, § 15 provides in pertinent part as follows: "No person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy." [4] Although the right to be free from multiple punishments for the same offense might be better analyzed as a right inherent in due process, US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17, or as a portion of the right to be free from cruel or unusual punishment, US Const, Am VIII; Const 1963, art 1, § 16, or even as one of the non-enumerated individual rights, US Const, Am 1984See Benton v Maryland, 395 US 784, 793-796 ; 89 S Ct 2056 ; 23 L Ed 2d 707 (1969). [3] Const 1963, art 1, § 15 provides in pertinent part as follows: "No person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy." [4] Although the right to be free from multiple punishments for the same offense might be better analyzed as a right inherent in due process, US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17, or as a portion of the right to be free from cruel or unusual punishment, US Const, Am VIII; Const 1963, art 1, § 16, or even as one of the non-enumerated individual rights, US Const, Am | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Pesquera
green
1 sentence2020Citing Pesquera, the panel stated that the Confrontation Clause requires the following: (1) a face-to-face-meeting of the defendant and the witnesses against him at trial; (2) the witnesses should be competent to testify and their testimony is to be given under oath or affirmation, thereby impressing upon them the seriousness of the matter; (3) the witnesses are subject to cross- examination; and (4) the trier of fact is afforded the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor. [Jemison, unpub op at 5, citing Pesquera, 244 Mich App at 309 , which in turn cited Craig, 497 US at 846, 851 .] W | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Ray v. Swager
green
2 sentences2019I primarily write separately to reiterate my concerns with the analytic framework set forth in Ray v Swager, 501 Mich 52 , 74-76; 903 NW2d 366 (2017) (Ray I), which I expressed in Ray v Swager (On Remand), 321 Mich App 755, 762-771 ; 909 NW2d 917 (2017) (Ray II) (BOONSTRA, J., concurring). 2019I primarily write separately to reiterate my concerns with the analytic framework set forth in Ray v Swager, 501 Mich 52 , 74-76; 903 NW2d 366 (2017) (Ray I), which I expressed in Ray v Swager (On Remand), 321 Mich App 755, 762-771 ; 909 NW2d 917 (2017) (Ray II) (BOONSTRA, J., concurring). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Manzo v. Petrella
green
1 sentence2019See Manzo v Petrella, 261 Mich App 705, 712 ; 683 NW2d 699 (2004). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group
green
2 sentences1989In Selective Service System v Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 US 841, 852 ; 104 S Ct 3348 ; 82 L Ed 2d 632 (1984), the United States Supreme Court outlined three specific inquiries necessary to a determination whether a statute inflicts forbidden punishment: (1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute, "viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes”; and (3) whether the legislative record "evinces a congressional intent to 1989In Selective Service System v Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 US 841, 852 ; 104 S Ct 3348 ; 82 L Ed 2d 632 (1984), the United States Supreme Court outlined three specific inquiries necessary to a determination whether a statute inflicts forbidden punishment: (1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute, "viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes”; and (3) whether the legislative record "evinces a congressional intent to | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.