recording claim in Arizona

2009The trial court disagreed, ruling instead that the fulfillment of the Town’s condition for adopting the ordinance — the recording of a waiver by the applicant for the ordinance thirty days later — triggered the time frame for filing a referendum petition. ¶ 7 In Pioneer Trust Co. v. Pima County, 168 Ariz. 61, 66-69 , 811 P.2d 22, 27-30 (1991), our supreme court addressed a nearly identical dispute.

2009The trial court disagreed, ruling instead that the fulfillment of the Town’s condition for adopting the ordinance — the recording of a waiver by the applicant for the ordinance thirty days later — triggered the time frame for filing a referendum petition. ¶ 7 In Pioneer Trust Co. v. Pima County, 168 Ariz. 61, 66-69 , 811 P.2d 22, 27-30 (1991), our supreme court addressed a nearly identical dispute.

2008See State v. Huskie, 202 Ariz. 283, ¶ 5 , 44 P.3d 161, 163 (App.2002) (in determining legislative intent, we consider, inter alia, statute’s “ ‘consequences, spirit and purpose’ ”). quoting Hobson v. Mid-Century Ins.

2008See State v. Huskie, 202 Ariz. 283, ¶ 5 , 44 P.3d 161, 163 (App.2002) (in determining legislative intent, we consider, inter alia, statute’s “ ‘consequences, spirit and purpose’ ”). quoting Hobson v. Mid-Century Ins.

2024He presents this argument without evidence, and the record does not contain any transcripts or a recording of the hearing. “[T]he appellant [has the] burden to ensure that ‘the record on appeal contains all transcripts or other documents necessary for us to consider the issues raised.’” Blair v. Burgener, 226 Ariz. 213 , 217 ¶ 9 (App. 2010) (quoting Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995)). “[I]n the absence of a transcript, we presume the evidence and arguments presented at the hearing support the trial court’s ruling.” Id.

2024He presents this argument without evidence, and the record does not contain any transcripts or a recording of the hearing. “[T]he appellant [has the] burden to ensure that ‘the record on appeal contains all transcripts or other documents necessary for us to consider the issues raised.’” Blair v. Burgener, 226 Ariz. 213 , 217 ¶ 9 (App. 2010) (quoting Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995)). “[I]n the absence of a transcript, we presume the evidence and arguments presented at the hearing support the trial court’s ruling.” Id.

2022We review the court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion, Glissendorf, 235 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 7 , and will not upset its decision “if the result was legally correct for any reason,” State v. Perez, 141 Ariz. 459, 464 (1984) (citations omitted). ¶11 Assuming the State did, in fact, lose or destroy a recording of a law enforcement interview with the witness, Dean was not entitled to a Willits instruction because the value of the recording to the defense was speculative.

2022See Glissendorf, 235 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 9 (“To show that evidence had a ‘tendency to exonerate,’ the defendant must do more than simply speculate about how the evidence might have been helpful.” (citations omitted)).

2022We review the court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion, Glissendorf, 235 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 7 , and will not upset its decision “if the result was legally correct for any reason,” State v. Perez, 141 Ariz. 459, 464 (1984) (citations omitted). ¶11 Assuming the State did, in fact, lose or destroy a recording of a law enforcement interview with the witness, Dean was not entitled to a Willits instruction because the value of the recording to the defense was speculative.

2020In reviewing a superior court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we look solely at the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. 3 State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 396, ¶ 22 (2006); see also State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 384 (1969) (outlining procedures for the trial court in conducting an evidentiary hearing when a pretrial identification is challenged). ¶7 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires pretrial identification procedures be 2 This is a standard admonition given by law enforcement prior to presenting photographic lineups

2020In reviewing a superior court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we look solely at the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. 3 State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 396, ¶ 22 (2006); see also State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 384 (1969) (outlining procedures for the trial court in conducting an evidentiary hearing when a pretrial identification is challenged). ¶7 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires pretrial identification procedures be 2 This is a standard admonition given by law enforcement prior to presenting photographic lineups

2016See Blankenbaker v. Jonovich, 205 Ariz. 383 , 385 ¶ 7, 71 P.3d 910, 912 (2003).

2016See Blankenbaker v. Jonovich, 205 Ariz. 383 , 385 ¶ 7, 71 P.3d 910, 912 (2003).

2010Diaz argues it reflects the absence of a juror, while the State contends it merely suggests one of several other, more likely, scenarios: (1) a polling error (i.e., juror number six, though present, was skipped over without anyone noticing the mistake); (2) a recording error, caused by the reporter’s failure to hear the question to and response from juror number six; or (3) a transcription error, caused by the reporter’s failure to transcribe from her notes the polling of juror number six. ¶ 16 As Judge Howard correctly noted, however, Diaz’s proffered theory is unfounded because “one juror’s

2010Diaz argues it reflects the absence of a juror, while the State contends it merely suggests one of several other, more likely, scenarios: (1) a polling error (i.e., juror number six, though present, was skipped over without anyone noticing the mistake); (2) a recording error, caused by the reporter’s failure to hear the question to and response from juror number six; or (3) a transcription error, caused by the reporter’s failure to transcribe from her notes the polling of juror number six. ¶ 16 As Judge Howard correctly noted, however, Diaz’s proffered theory is unfounded because “one juror’s