absence of further inquiry in California

2024(See, e.g., In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1531 [no prejudicial error where “mother does not suggest how the supposed deficiencies she notes would have made a difference given the information that was in the notices”]; In re Charlotte V., supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 58 [no prejudicial error from agency’s failure to gather additional information from family members]; In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 654 [prejudicial error found where reviewing court “[could not] say with any degree of confidence that additional information concerning [a] relative … would not have altered the t

2023(See, e.g., In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1531 [no prejudicial error where “mother does not suggest how the supposed deficiencies she notes would have made a difference given the information that was in the notices”]; In re Charlotte V. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 51, 58 [no prejudicial error from department’s failure to gather additional information from family members]; In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 654 [prejudicial error found where reviewing court “[could not] say with any degree of confidence that additional information concerning [a] relative … would not have altered the

2024(See, e.g., In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1531 [no prejudicial error where “mother does not suggest how the supposed deficiencies she notes would have made a difference given the information that was in the notices”]; In re Charlotte V., supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 58 [no prejudicial error from agency’s failure to gather additional information from family members]; In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 654 [prejudicial error found where reviewing court “[could not] say with any degree of confidence that additional information concerning [a] relative … would not have altered the t

2023(See, e.g., In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1531 [no prejudicial error where “mother does not suggest how the supposed deficiencies she notes would have made a difference given the information that was in the notices”]; In re Charlotte V. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 51, 58 [no prejudicial error from department’s failure to gather additional information from family members]; In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 654 [prejudicial error found where reviewing court “[could not] say with any degree of confidence that additional information concerning [a] relative … would not have altered the

2024(See, e.g., In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1531 [no prejudicial error where “mother does not suggest how the supposed deficiencies she notes would have made a difference given the information that was in the notices”]; In re Charlotte V., supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 58 [no prejudicial error from agency’s failure to gather additional information from family members]; In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 654 [prejudicial error found where reviewing court “[could not] say with any degree of confidence that additional information concerning [a] relative … would not have altered the t

2023(See, e.g., In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1531 [no prejudicial error where “mother does not suggest how the supposed deficiencies she notes would have made a difference given the information that was in the notices”]; In re Charlotte V. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 51, 58 [no prejudicial error from department’s failure to gather additional information from family members]; In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 654 [prejudicial error found where reviewing court “[could not] say with any degree of confidence that additional information concerning [a] relative … would not have altered the

2016Forfeiture The Attorney General argues this case is similar to People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318 (McWhorter), in which the defense counsel requested the defendant be unshackled, but “thereafter acquiesced in the remedy selected by the trial court―removal of the visible waist chains―and made no further objection, thereby waiving any claim on appeal with respect to the absence of further inquiry into the manifest need for the concealed leg restraints.” (Id. at p. 375.) Here, the Attorney General argues, Chu’s shackling argument is forfeited because, as in McWhorter, he “initially objecte

2014When the court asked whether she objected to the restraint, she said, “I don’t.” (See People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 375 [“[A]lthough defense counsel made the request that defendant be unshackled, he thereafter acquiesced in the remedy … and made no further objection, thereby waiving any claim on appeal with respect to the absence of further inquiry into the manifest need for the concealed leg restraints.”]; People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 406 [“‘It is settled that the use of physical restraints in the trial court cannot be challenged for the first time on appeal….’ [N]ot o

2022Lexis 671] (Ezequiel G.) [no reversal on the basis of failure to inquire unless the record suggests the absence of further inquiry was prejudicial]); In re A.R. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 197 , 207 [reversal is required “in all cases where ICWA requirements have been ignored”]; In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735 , 744 (Benjamin M.) [reversal required when “the record indicates that there was readily obtainable information that was likely to bear meaningfully upon whether the child is an Indian child”]; In re Rebecca R. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1431 [in the absence of a representation b

2014When the court asked whether she objected to the restraint, she said, “I don’t.” (See People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 375 [“[A]lthough defense counsel made the request that defendant be unshackled, he thereafter acquiesced in the remedy … and made no further objection, thereby waiving any claim on appeal with respect to the absence of further inquiry into the manifest need for the concealed leg restraints.”]; People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 406 [“‘It is settled that the use of physical restraints in the trial court cannot be challenged for the first time on appeal….’ [N]ot o

2012(In re Suzanna L. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 223, 237 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 860 ]; see In re Francisco W. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695, 705 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 171 ] [“The limited reversal approach is well adapted to dependency cases involving termination of parental rights in which we find the only error is defective ICWA notice.”].) “If the only error requiring reversal of the judgment terminating parental rights is defective ICWA notice and it is ultimately determined on remand that the child is not an Indian child, the matter ordinarily should end at that point, allowing the child to achieve stability

2012(In re Suzanna L. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 223, 237 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 860 ]; see In re Francisco W. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695, 705 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 171 ] [“The limited reversal approach is well adapted to dependency cases involving termination of parental rights in which we find the only error is defective ICWA notice.”].) “If the only error requiring reversal of the judgment terminating parental rights is defective ICWA notice and it is ultimately determined on remand that the child is not an Indian child, the matter ordinarily should end at that point, allowing the child to achieve stability

2012(See In re Jonathan D. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 105, 109-111 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 628 ] [minor’s possible Indian heritage is not raised too late at the § 366.26 hearing, and notice is mandatory regardless of how late in the proceedings the Indian heritage is uncovered].) In the absence of further inquiry or information that reliably rebutted father’s representation that Gabriel has specific Cherokee heritage through the paternal grandfather, notice was required to be sent to the three federally recognized Cherokee tribes prior to the court considering termination of parental rights, since father’s c

2012(See In re Jonathan D. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 105, 109-111 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 628 ] [minor’s possible Indian heritage is not raised too late at the § 366.26 hearing, and notice is mandatory regardless of how late in the proceedings the Indian heritage is uncovered].) In the absence of further inquiry or information that reliably rebutted father’s representation that Gabriel has specific Cherokee heritage through the paternal grandfather, notice was required to be sent to the three federally recognized Cherokee tribes prior to the court considering termination of parental rights, since father’s c

2012(In re Suzanna L. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 223, 237 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 860 ]; see In re Francisco W. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695, 705 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 171 ] [“The limited reversal approach is well adapted to dependency cases involving termination of parental rights in which we find the only error is defective ICWA notice.”].) “If the only error requiring reversal of the judgment terminating parental rights is defective ICWA notice and it is ultimately determined on remand that the child is not an Indian child, the matter ordinarily should end at that point, allowing the child to achieve stability

2012(In re Suzanna L. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 223, 237 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 860 ]; see In re Francisco W. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695, 705 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 171 ] [“The limited reversal approach is well adapted to dependency cases involving termination of parental rights in which we find the only error is defective ICWA notice.”].) “If the only error requiring reversal of the judgment terminating parental rights is defective ICWA notice and it is ultimately determined on remand that the child is not an Indian child, the matter ordinarily should end at that point, allowing the child to achieve stability

2009(People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 95 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 793 P.2d 23 ]; People v. Walker (1988) 47 Cal.3d 605, 629 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 765 P.2d 70 ].) Nor do we find any merit to defendant’s further claim that the trial court “highlighted” the fact that he was in concealed leg restraints “by forcing [him] to sit when introduced.” There is no evidence that anyone in the courtroom was aware defendant was in leg restraints when he remained *376 seated at counsel table as counsel stood up to be introduced to the prospective jury panel.

2009(People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 95 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 793 P.2d 23 ]; People v. Walker (1988) 47 Cal.3d 605, 629 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 765 P.2d 70 ].) Nor do we find any merit to defendant’s further claim that the trial court “highlighted” the fact that he was in concealed leg restraints “by forcing [him] to sit when introduced.” There is no evidence that anyone in the courtroom was aware defendant was in leg restraints when he remained *376 seated at counsel table as counsel stood up to be introduced to the prospective jury panel.

2009(People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 95 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 793 P.2d 23 ]; People v. Walker (1988) 47 Cal.3d 605, 629 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 765 P.2d 70 ].) Nor do we find any merit to defendant’s further claim that the trial court “highlighted” the fact that he was in concealed leg restraints “by forcing [him] to sit when introduced.” There is no evidence that anyone in the courtroom was aware defendant was in leg restraints when he remained *376 seated at counsel table as counsel stood up to be introduced to the prospective jury panel.

2009(People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 95 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 793 P.2d 23 ]; People v. Walker (1988) 47 Cal.3d 605, 629 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 765 P.2d 70 ].) Nor do we find any merit to defendant’s further claim that the trial court “highlighted” the fact that he was in concealed leg restraints “by forcing [him] to sit when introduced.” There is no evidence that anyone in the courtroom was aware defendant was in leg restraints when he remained *376 seated at counsel table as counsel stood up to be introduced to the prospective jury panel.

2009“We have consistently found any unjustified or unadmonished shackling harmless where there was no evidence it was seen by the jury.” (People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 583-584 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382 , 842 P.2d 1142 ].) Moreover, although defense counsel made the request that defendant be unshackled, he thereafter acquiesced in the remedy selected by the trial court — removal of the visible waist chains — and made no further objection, thereby waiving any claim on appeal with respect to the absence of further inquiry into the manifest need for the concealed leg restraints.

2009“We have consistently found any unjustified or unadmonished shackling harmless where there was no evidence it was seen by the jury.” (People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 583-584 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382 , 842 P.2d 1142 ].) Moreover, although defense counsel made the request that defendant be unshackled, he thereafter acquiesced in the remedy selected by the trial court — removal of the visible waist chains — and made no further objection, thereby waiving any claim on appeal with respect to the absence of further inquiry into the manifest need for the concealed leg restraints.