century doctrine in California

1999Pointing out that the statutory provision defining robbery (§ 211) raised no issue of ownership of property forcibly taken, but only its possession, Justice Mosk saw no statutory basis for the defense. [Citation.] Moreover, noting that the leading cases permitting forcible recapture of property were all decided before the turn of the century, Justice Mosk concluded that a six-shooter was no longer ‘an acceptable device for do-it-yourself debt collection’ and that the ‘might-makes-right’ doctrine of the previous century was of ‘dubious adaptability’ to modem times. [Citation.] flO Since Butler,

1998Pointing out that the statutory provision defining robbery (§ 211) raised no issue of ownership of property forcibly taken, but only its possession, Justice Mosk saw no statutory basis for the defense. ( Butler, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pp. 576-577, 55 Cal.Rptr. 511 , 421 P.2d 703 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Moreover, noting that the leading cases permitting forcible recapture of property were all decided before the turn of the century, Justice Mosk concluded that a six-shooter was no longer "an acceptable device for do-it-yourself debt collection" and that the "mightmakes-right" doctrine of the prev

2023For these reasons, we do not perceive [plaintiff’s] fraud claim as an ‘insurance claim for damages’ as that term is used in section 340.9.” (20th Century, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1280- 1281.) I find 20th Century’s analysis on point and persuasive and would apply it here.

2023The “crux” of plaintiff’s lawsuit (Jang, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1303 ) is that State Farm is marketing homeowner’s insurance to the public, promising benefits on defined terms, while its claims adjustment 6 process is, by design, so superficial (little to no investigation) and obscure (no communication with insureds about the basis for denials) that it manages to avoid paying out on all but the claims that are obviously covered.

2018Given this state’s strong public policy in favor of pretrial settlements (Fisher v. Superior Court (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 434, 440 ), the trial court did not err in concluding that defendants’ settlement efforts did not render enforcement of the forum selection bylaw unreasonable.

2018Anderson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 784 , 794, fn. 3, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 350 .) Because Drulias has not shown good cause for raising this argument belatedly, we will not consider it. 7 Finally, Drulias argues it would be unreasonable to enforce the forum selection provision because the 1st Century defendants "chose to invoke the benefits and protections of California law and a California court by seeking the entry of a final judgment" here.

2018Anderson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 784 , 794, fn. 3, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 350 .) Because Drulias has not shown good cause for raising this argument belatedly, we will not consider it. 7 Finally, Drulias argues it would be unreasonable to enforce the forum selection provision because the 1st Century defendants "chose to invoke the benefits and protections of California law and a California court by seeking the entry of a final judgment" here.

2006Flood Exclusion Next, Century contends under Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 395 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 770 P.2d 704 ] (Garvey) and Sabella v. Wisler (1963) 59 Cal.2d 21 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 689 , 377 P.2d 889 ] (Sabella), that it reasonably relied on the flood exclusion to deny coverage because there was a genuine dispute as to whether the flood was the “efficient proximate cause” of the loss.

2006Flood Exclusion Next, Century contends under Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 395 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 770 P.2d 704 ] (Garvey) and Sabella v. Wisler (1963) 59 Cal.2d 21 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 689 , 377 P.2d 889 ] (Sabella), that it reasonably relied on the flood exclusion to deny coverage because there was a genuine dispute as to whether the flood was the “efficient proximate cause” of the loss.

2006Flood Exclusion Next, Century contends under Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 395 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 770 P.2d 704 ] (Garvey) and Sabella v. Wisler (1963) 59 Cal.2d 21 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 689 , 377 P.2d 889 ] (Sabella), that it reasonably relied on the flood exclusion to deny coverage because there was a genuine dispute as to whether the flood was the “efficient proximate cause” of the loss.

2006Flood Exclusion Next, Century contends under Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 395 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 770 P.2d 704 ] (Garvey) and Sabella v. Wisler (1963) 59 Cal.2d 21 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 689 , 377 P.2d 889 ] (Sabella), that it reasonably relied on the flood exclusion to deny coverage because there was a genuine dispute as to whether the flood was the “efficient proximate cause” of the loss.

1999Adoption of the proposition would be but one step short of accepting lawless reprisal as an *952 appropriate means of redressing grievances, real or fancied.” ’ [Citations.]” (Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1143-1144.) In Barnett we were not asked by the People “to revisit Butler's increasingly anachronistic authorization of the claim-of-right defense in the context of armed robbery.” (Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1146 .) However, noting “the obvious public policy reasons for strictly circumscribing the circumstances under which persons should be permitted to enforce their debt demands

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1998(E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 ; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654 , 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555 , 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452 , 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481 , 536 P.2d 1392 ; Cotes

1996Throughout this opinion, we refer to either or both companies as Century. 3 There is no evidence in the record that Century ever agreed in writing to this arrangement. 4 Section 339 provides that an “action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writing” must be brought “within two years.” 5 Section 337 provides that an “action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing” must be brought “within four years.” 6 In reviewing Century’s claim, we note “[a] demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading. [Citation.]

1987(National Lawyers Guild v. Attorney General (S.D.N.Y. 1982) 96 F.R.D. 390, 401 .) “It is now well established that the United States, by invoking its state secrets privilege, may block discovery in a lawsuit of any information that, if disclosed, would adversely affect national security.” (Ellsberg v. Mitchell, supra, 709 F.2d at p. 56.) The various secrets for which protection has been given, include those *577 affecting the nation’s defense capabilities (United States v. Reynolds (1953) 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 [ 97 L.Ed. 727, 732-733 , 73 S.Ct. 528 , 32 A.L.R.2d 382 ]), intelligence gathering method

1986Thus, as early as 1858 the California Supreme Court held that in an indictment for murder it was unnecessary to state the degree of the offense. ( People v. Lloyd (1858) 9 Cal. 54, 55 .) About one decade later, the court went even further by concluding that the grand jury, the accusatory body, had no right to determine the degree of murder in the indictment. ( People v. Nichol (1867) 34 Cal. 211, 217 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Gorshen (1959) 51 Cal.2d 716, 732 [ 336 P.2d 492 ].) The cases decided subsequently have clarified that the rule set out above is applicable even if the d

1986Thus, as early as 1858 the California Supreme Court held that in an indictment for murder it was unnecessary to state the degree of the offense. ( People v. Lloyd (1858) 9 Cal. 54, 55 .) About one decade later, the court went even further by concluding that the grand jury, the accusatory body, had no right to determine the degree of murder in the indictment. ( People v. Nichol (1867) 34 Cal. 211, 217 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Gorshen (1959) 51 Cal.2d 716, 732 [ 336 P.2d 492 ].) The cases decided subsequently have clarified that the rule set out above is applicable even if the d