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12 California opinions name it 1 courts 2013–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Poseygreen2 sentences2022(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 218 ; accord, People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 [“The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing whether instructions correctly state the law.”].) 13 CALCRIM No. 315 lists 15 factors for consideration of eyewitness credibility. 2021(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 218 ; accord, People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 [“The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing whether instructions correctly state the law.”].) The California Supreme Court has expressly approved the use of CALJIC No. 2.92, the predecessor to CALCRIM No. 315, against similar due process challenges based on the inclusion of witness certainty as a factor for consideration. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Cartergreen2 sentences2013Hence, the controlling principle is that an objection is not necessary to preserve a claim that a jury instruction violated the defendant‟s substantial rights. (§§ 1176, 1259, 1469; see also People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 683-684 [assertedly coercive instruction was reviewable despite defense counsel‟s statement that he had no objection to it].) “The court may ask jurors to continue deliberating where, in the exercise of its discretion, it finds a „reasonable probability‟ of agreement.” (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 265 , quoting § 1140.) “ „The court must exercise its power, 2013Hence, the controlling principle is that an objection is not necessary to preserve a claim that a jury instruction violated the defendant’s substantial rights. (§§ 1176, 1259, 1469; see also People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 683-684 [assertedly coercive instruction was reviewable despite defense counsel’s statement that he had no objection to it].) “The court may ask jurors to continue deliberating where, in the exercise of its discretion, it finds a ‘reasonable probability’ of agreement.” (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 265 , quoting § 1140.) “ ‘The court must exercise its power, | 2 | 2 |
People v. Sandovalgreen2 sentences2013Hence, the controlling principle is that an objection is not necessary to preserve a claim that a jury instruction violated the defendant‟s substantial rights. (§§ 1176, 1259, 1469; see also People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 683-684 [assertedly coercive instruction was reviewable despite defense counsel‟s statement that he had no objection to it].) “The court may ask jurors to continue deliberating where, in the exercise of its discretion, it finds a „reasonable probability‟ of agreement.” (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 265 , quoting § 1140.) “ „The court must exercise its power, 2013Hence, the controlling principle is that an objection is not necessary to preserve a claim that a jury instruction violated the defendant’s substantial rights. (§§ 1176, 1259, 1469; see also People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 683-684 [assertedly coercive instruction was reviewable despite defense counsel’s statement that he had no objection to it].) “The court may ask jurors to continue deliberating where, in the exercise of its discretion, it finds a ‘reasonable probability’ of agreement.” (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 265 , quoting § 1140.) “ ‘The court must exercise its power, | 2 | 2 |
People v. Breauxgreen2 sentences2013Hence, the controlling principle is that an objection is not necessary to preserve a claim that a jury instruction violated the defendant‟s substantial rights. (§§ 1176, 1259, 1469; see also People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 683-684 [assertedly coercive instruction was reviewable despite defense counsel‟s statement that he had no objection to it].) “The court may ask jurors to continue deliberating where, in the exercise of its discretion, it finds a „reasonable probability‟ of agreement.” (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 265 , quoting § 1140.) “ „The court must exercise its power, 2013Hence, the controlling principle is that an objection is not necessary to preserve a claim that a jury instruction violated the defendant’s substantial rights. (§§ 1176, 1259, 1469; see also People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 683-684 [assertedly coercive instruction was reviewable despite defense counsel’s statement that he had no objection to it].) “The court may ask jurors to continue deliberating where, in the exercise of its discretion, it finds a ‘reasonable probability’ of agreement.” (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 265 , quoting § 1140.) “ ‘The court must exercise its power, | 2 | 2 |
People v. Barrazagreen2 sentences2013Hence, the controlling principle is that an objection is not necessary to preserve a claim that a jury instruction violated the defendant‟s substantial rights. (§§ 1176, 1259, 1469; see also People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 683-684 [assertedly coercive instruction was reviewable despite defense counsel‟s statement that he had no objection to it].) “The court may ask jurors to continue deliberating where, in the exercise of its discretion, it finds a „reasonable probability‟ of agreement.” (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 265 , quoting § 1140.) “ „The court must exercise its power, 2013Hence, the controlling principle is that an objection is not necessary to preserve a claim that a jury instruction violated the defendant’s substantial rights. (§§ 1176, 1259, 1469; see also People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 683-684 [assertedly coercive instruction was reviewable despite defense counsel’s statement that he had no objection to it].) “The court may ask jurors to continue deliberating where, in the exercise of its discretion, it finds a ‘reasonable probability’ of agreement.” (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 265 , quoting § 1140.) “ ‘The court must exercise its power, | 2 | 2 |
People v. Pridegreen2 sentences2013Hence, the controlling principle is that an objection is not necessary to preserve a claim that a jury instruction violated the defendant‟s substantial rights. (§§ 1176, 1259, 1469; see also People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 683-684 [assertedly coercive instruction was reviewable despite defense counsel‟s statement that he had no objection to it].) “The court may ask jurors to continue deliberating where, in the exercise of its discretion, it finds a „reasonable probability‟ of agreement.” (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 265 , quoting § 1140.) “ „The court must exercise its power, 2013Hence, the controlling principle is that an objection is not necessary to preserve a claim that a jury instruction violated the defendant’s substantial rights. (§§ 1176, 1259, 1469; see also People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 683-684 [assertedly coercive instruction was reviewable despite defense counsel’s statement that he had no objection to it].) “The court may ask jurors to continue deliberating where, in the exercise of its discretion, it finds a ‘reasonable probability’ of agreement.” (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 265 , quoting § 1140.) “ ‘The court must exercise its power, | 2 | 2 |
People v. Smitheygreen2 sentences2016When considering a claim that a jury instruction was ambiguous, “we inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood and misapplied the instruction.” (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 963 .) In so doing, we determine the correctness of the jury instructions “‘“from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.”’” (People v. Smithey, supra, at p. 987 .) In other words, we view the instructions in the context of the overall charge. 2016When considering a claim that a jury instruction was ambiguous, “we inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood and misapplied the instruction.” (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 963 .) In so doing, we determine the correctness of the jury instructions “‘“from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.”’” (People v. Smithey, supra, at p. 987 .) In other words, we view the instructions in the context of the overall charge. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Scottgreen1 sentence2016(People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 777 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 390, fn. 2 .) Moreover, a potential ambiguity in the instructions does not require reversal if the prosecution’s argument correctly explained the relevant law. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Floodgreen1 sentence2015Forfeiture As a preliminary matter, we reject the Attorney General's claim that Polina forfeited his claim of instructional error by failing to object to the challenged instructions in the trial court. "'Generally, a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction 20 correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.'" (People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 570 , italics added.) However, a claim that a jury instruction is not "correct in law" and violated the defendant's right to due p | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Buenrostro
green
2 sentences2025(People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 428 .) A defendant may not claim on appeal that a jury instruction which correctly states the law is incomplete, misleading, or too general unless the defendant had requested clarification or amplification of the instruction in the trial court. 2025(People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 428 .) A defendant may not claim on appeal that a jury instruction which correctly states the law is incomplete, misleading, or too general unless the defendant had requested clarification or amplification of the instruction in the trial court. | 3 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Alvarez
green
2 sentences2022(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 218 ; accord, People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 [“The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing whether instructions correctly state the law.”].) 13 CALCRIM No. 315 lists 15 factors for consideration of eyewitness credibility. 2021(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 218 ; accord, People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 [“The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing whether instructions correctly state the law.”].) The California Supreme Court has expressly approved the use of CALJIC No. 2.92, the predecessor to CALCRIM No. 315, against similar due process challenges based on the inclusion of witness certainty as a factor for consideration. | 2 | 2021–2022 |
People v. Hudson
green
2 sentences2015Code, § 1259 [“The appellate court may … review any instruction given, refused or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby”]), and a claim that a jury instruction is legally incorrect may be raised on appeal even in the absence of an objection below (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011-1012 ). 2013He argues, however, that his failure to object did not result in forfeiture because the alleged error affected his substantial rights (§ 1259 [“The appellate court may … review any instruction given, refused or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby”]) and a claim that a jury instruction is legally incorrect may be raised on appeal even in the absence of an objection below (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011-1012 ). | 2 | 2013–2015 |
People v. Gainer
green
2 sentences2013This determination . . . is perhaps best characterized as requiring a generalized assessment of the potential effect of a given instruction on the fact finding process, rather than as an attempted inquiry into the actual 6 volitional quality of a particular jury verdict.” (People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 850 .) Here, defendant‟s premise is that the trial court, in a rather lengthy dialogue, coerced the jury by instructing that it was obligated to order the jury to continue deliberating rather than instructing something akin to that it was choosing to order the jury to continue deliberat 2013This determination . . . is perhaps best characterized as requiring a generalized assessment of the potential effect of a given instruction on the fact finding process, rather than as an attempted inquiry into the actual 6 volitional quality of a particular jury verdict.” (People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 850 .) Here, defendant’s premise is that the trial court, in a rather lengthy dialogue, coerced the jury by instructing that it was obligated to order the jury to continue deliberating rather than instructing something akin to that it was choosing to order the jury to continue deliberat | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Mayfield
green
1 sentence2016(People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 777 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 390, fn. 2 .) Moreover, a potential ambiguity in the instructions does not require reversal if the prosecution’s argument correctly explained the relevant law. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Guiuan
green
1 sentence2015Forfeiture As a preliminary matter, we reject the Attorney General's claim that Polina forfeited his claim of instructional error by failing to object to the challenged instructions in the trial court. "'Generally, a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction 20 correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.'" (People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 570 , italics added.) However, a claim that a jury instruction is not "correct in law" and violated the defendant's right to due p | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.