12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1887–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Mirendagreen2 sentences2025(Craft v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1540 .) A defendant may meet this burden by demonstrating “that the loss of such evidence . . . makes it difficult or impossible for the defendant to prepare a defense . . . .” (People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1328 (Mirenda).) “The showing of actual prejudice must be made on competent evidence and ‘must be supported by particular facts and not . . . by bare conclusionary statements.’ [Citation.] Speculative arguments are inadequate to establish actual prejudice. [Citations.] Instead, the defendant must affirmatively demonstra 2019(Morris, 46 Cal. 3d at 37 ; People v. Dunn-Gonzalez (1996) 47 Cal. App. 4th 899, 911 ; Ibarra, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 858 ; Serna, 40 Cal. 3d at 251 .) “The overarching theme is that the loss of such evidence, especially when the defendant or victims cannot independently recall details of the crime, makes it difficult or impossible for the defendant to prepare a defense thus showing prejudice.” (People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal. App. 4th 1313, 1328 .) Of course, a defendant’s showing of prejudice must be supported by facts and not just bare conclusions. | 1 | 3 |
Garcia v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2025(Craft v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1540 .) A defendant may meet this burden by demonstrating “that the loss of such evidence . . . makes it difficult or impossible for the defendant to prepare a defense . . . .” (People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1328 (Mirenda).) “The showing of actual prejudice must be made on competent evidence and ‘must be supported by particular facts and not . . . by bare conclusionary statements.’ [Citation.] Speculative arguments are inadequate to establish actual prejudice. [Citations.] Instead, the defendant must affirmatively demonstra | 1 | 1 |
People v. Keenangreen2 sentences2013(People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 525 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 550 , 758 P.2d 1081 ] [§ 190.3 does not require the prosecution to “present evidence on all matters as to which pretrial notice was given.”].) Defendant’s argument that the lack of specificity in the notice deprived him of the opportunity to voir dire prospective jurors is misplaced. “ ‘The purpose behind the notice requirement ... is to permit the defendant to prepare a defense at the penalty trial, not to question prospective jurors about every bit of evidence they might hear.’ ” (People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1016 [ 71 C 2013(People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 525 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 550 , 758 P.2d 1081 ] [§ 190.3 does not require the prosecution to “present evidence on all matters as to which pretrial notice was given.”].) Defendant’s argument that the lack of specificity in the notice deprived him of the opportunity to voir dire prospective jurors is misplaced. “ ‘The purpose behind the notice requirement ... is to permit the defendant to prepare a defense at the penalty trial, not to question prospective jurors about every bit of evidence they might hear.’ ” (People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1016 [ 71 C | 1 | 1 |
People v. Howardgreen2 sentences2013(People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 525 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 550 , 758 P.2d 1081 ] [§ 190.3 does not require the prosecution to “present evidence on all matters as to which pretrial notice was given.”].) Defendant’s argument that the lack of specificity in the notice deprived him of the opportunity to voir dire prospective jurors is misplaced. “ ‘The purpose behind the notice requirement ... is to permit the defendant to prepare a defense at the penalty trial, not to question prospective jurors about every bit of evidence they might hear.’ ” (People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1016 [ 71 C 2013(People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 525 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 550 , 758 P.2d 1081 ] [§ 190.3 does not require the prosecution to “present evidence on all matters as to which pretrial notice was given.”].) Defendant’s argument that the lack of specificity in the notice deprived him of the opportunity to voir dire prospective jurors is misplaced. “ ‘The purpose behind the notice requirement ... is to permit the defendant to prepare a defense at the penalty trial, not to question prospective jurors about every bit of evidence they might hear.’ ” (People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1016 [ 71 C | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pellegrinogreen2 sentences2009If the delay was merely negligent, a greater showing of prejudice would be required to establish a due process violation.” (Id. at p. 1256.) Among other things, “ ‘[prejudice [for due process or speedy trial violation claims] may be shown by loss of material witnesses due to lapse of time [citation] or loss of evidence because of fading memory attributable to the delay.’ [Citation.]” (Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 107 .) The overarching theme is that the loss of such evidence, especially where the defendant or victims cannot independently recall details of the crime, makes it difficult or im 2009If the delay was merely negligent, a greater showing of prejudice would be required to establish a due process violation.” (Id. at p. 1256.) Among other things, “ ‘[prejudice [for due process or speedy trial violation claims] may be shown by loss of material witnesses due to lapse of time [citation] or loss of evidence because of fading memory attributable to the delay.’ [Citation.]” (Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 107 .) The overarching theme is that the loss of such evidence, especially where the defendant or victims cannot independently recall details of the crime, makes it difficult or im | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mitchamgreen1 sentence2003(People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1070.) Finally, defendant argues that the late notice deprived him “of the ability to take key evidence into account during jury selection in the guilt phase of the trial,” and to “question the jurors regarding these subjects during the voir dire process.” The purpose behind the notice requirement, however, is to permit the defendant to prepare a defense at the penalty trial, not to question prospective jurors about every bit of evidence they might hear. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Minahengreen2 sentences1995(People v. Pacini (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 877, 891 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 820 ]; see People v. Minahen (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 180, 186, 189 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 460 ].) Defendant’s original “maximum term of commitment” was slated to end July 1, 1994. (§ 1026.5(a)(1).) Apparently without affording defendant due process, the trial court held an extension trial and ordered defendant’s commitment extended for two years on May 23, 1994. 1995(People v. Pacini (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 877, 891 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 820 ]; see People v. Minahen (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 180, 186, 189 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 460 ].) Defendant’s original “maximum term of commitment” was slated to end July 1, 1994. (§ 1026.5(a)(1).) Apparently without affording defendant due process, the trial court held an extension trial and ordered defendant’s commitment extended for two years on May 23, 1994. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pacinigreen2 sentences1995(People v. Pacini (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 877, 891 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 820 ]; see People v. Minahen (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 180, 186, 189 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 460 ].) Defendant’s original “maximum term of commitment” was slated to end July 1, 1994. (§ 1026.5(a)(1).) Apparently without affording defendant due process, the trial court held an extension trial and ordered defendant’s commitment extended for two years on May 23, 1994. 1995(People v. Pacini (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 877, 891 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 820 ]; see People v. Minahen (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 180, 186, 189 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 460 ].) Defendant’s original “maximum term of commitment” was slated to end July 1, 1994. (§ 1026.5(a)(1).) Apparently without affording defendant due process, the trial court held an extension trial and ordered defendant’s commitment extended for two years on May 23, 1994. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bigelowgreen2 sentences1990(People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 371 , 433 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Mendez (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 302 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 31 ]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]; People v. Fulton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 972 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 327 ]; People v. Morgan (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 523 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 664 ]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 382 ]; see also People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 741, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 , 64 A.L.R.4th 723 ].) In People v. Maddox, 1990(People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 371 , 433 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Mendez (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 302 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 31 ]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]; People v. Fulton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 972 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 327 ]; People v. Morgan (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 523 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 664 ]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 382 ]; see also People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 741, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 , 64 A.L.R.4th 723 ].) In People v. Maddox, | 1 | 1 |
People v. Maddoxgreen2 sentences1990(People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 371 , 433 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Mendez (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 302 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 31 ]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]; People v. Fulton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 972 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 327 ]; People v. Morgan (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 523 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 664 ]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 382 ]; see also People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 741, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 , 64 A.L.R.4th 723 ].) In People v. Maddox, 1990(People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 371 , 433 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Mendez (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 302 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 31 ]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]; People v. Fulton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 972 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 327 ]; People v. Morgan (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 523 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 664 ]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 382 ]; see also People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 741, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 , 64 A.L.R.4th 723 ].) In People v. Maddox, | 1 | 1 |
| Terry v. Sicklesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Crockett v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2019(Crockett v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 433, 442 ; Ibarra, 162 Cal. App. 853 at 858.) What is more, the defendant must show actual prejudice. 2015(Crockett v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 433, 442 .) Where defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice, “the court need not inquire into the justification for the delay since there is nothing to ‘weigh’ such justification against.” (Dunn-Gonzales, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 911 .) Even a minimal showing of prejudice, however, 25 requires the prosecution to explain the reasons for the delay. | 2 | 2015–2019 |
People v. Dunn-Gonzalez
green
2 sentences2019(Morris, 46 Cal. 3d at 37 ; People v. Dunn-Gonzalez (1996) 47 Cal. App. 4th 899, 911 ; Ibarra, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 858 ; Serna, 40 Cal. 3d at 251 .) “The overarching theme is that the loss of such evidence, especially when the defendant or victims cannot independently recall details of the crime, makes it difficult or impossible for the defendant to prepare a defense thus showing prejudice.” (People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal. App. 4th 1313, 1328 .) Of course, a defendant’s showing of prejudice must be supported by facts and not just bare conclusions. 2015(Crockett v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 433, 442 .) Where defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice, “the court need not inquire into the justification for the delay since there is nothing to ‘weigh’ such justification against.” (Dunn-Gonzales, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 911 .) Even a minimal showing of prejudice, however, 25 requires the prosecution to explain the reasons for the delay. | 2 | 2015–2019 |
Serna v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2019(Morris, 46 Cal. 3d at 37 ; People v. Dunn-Gonzalez (1996) 47 Cal. App. 4th 899, 911 ; Ibarra, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 858 ; Serna, 40 Cal. 3d at 251 .) “The overarching theme is that the loss of such evidence, especially when the defendant or victims cannot independently recall details of the crime, makes it difficult or impossible for the defendant to prepare a defense thus showing prejudice.” (People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal. App. 4th 1313, 1328 .) Of course, a defendant’s showing of prejudice must be supported by facts and not just bare conclusions. 2015(Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239, 251 .) “The overarching theme is that the loss of such evidence, especially where the defendant or victims cannot independently recall details of the crime, makes it difficult or impossible for the defendant to prepare a defense thus showing prejudice.” (People v. Mirenda, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1328 .) The defendant must establish actual prejudice shown by particular facts, not bare conclusory statements. | 2 | 2015–2019 |
Kaikas v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2025(Craft v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1540 .) A defendant may meet this burden by demonstrating “that the loss of such evidence . . . makes it difficult or impossible for the defendant to prepare a defense . . . .” (People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1328 (Mirenda).) “The showing of actual prejudice must be made on competent evidence and ‘must be supported by particular facts and not . . . by bare conclusionary statements.’ [Citation.] Speculative arguments are inadequate to establish actual prejudice. [Citations.] Instead, the defendant must affirmatively demonstra | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Fowler v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2025(Craft v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1540 .) A defendant may meet this burden by demonstrating “that the loss of such evidence . . . makes it difficult or impossible for the defendant to prepare a defense . . . .” (People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1328 (Mirenda).) “The showing of actual prejudice must be made on competent evidence and ‘must be supported by particular facts and not . . . by bare conclusionary statements.’ [Citation.] Speculative arguments are inadequate to establish actual prejudice. [Citations.] Instead, the defendant must affirmatively demonstra | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Craft v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2025(Craft v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1540 .) A defendant may meet this burden by demonstrating “that the loss of such evidence . . . makes it difficult or impossible for the defendant to prepare a defense . . . .” (People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1328 (Mirenda).) “The showing of actual prejudice must be made on competent evidence and ‘must be supported by particular facts and not . . . by bare conclusionary statements.’ [Citation.] Speculative arguments are inadequate to establish actual prejudice. [Citations.] Instead, the defendant must affirmatively demonstra | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Morris
green
1 sentence2019(Morris, 46 Cal. 3d at 37 ; People v. Dunn-Gonzalez (1996) 47 Cal. App. 4th 899, 911 ; Ibarra, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 858 ; Serna, 40 Cal. 3d at 251 .) “The overarching theme is that the loss of such evidence, especially when the defendant or victims cannot independently recall details of the crime, makes it difficult or impossible for the defendant to prepare a defense thus showing prejudice.” (People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal. App. 4th 1313, 1328 .) Of course, a defendant’s showing of prejudice must be supported by facts and not just bare conclusions. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Ibarra v. Municipal Court
green
1 sentence2019(Morris, 46 Cal. 3d at 37 ; People v. Dunn-Gonzalez (1996) 47 Cal. App. 4th 899, 911 ; Ibarra, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 858 ; Serna, 40 Cal. 3d at 251 .) “The overarching theme is that the loss of such evidence, especially when the defendant or victims cannot independently recall details of the crime, makes it difficult or impossible for the defendant to prepare a defense thus showing prejudice.” (People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal. App. 4th 1313, 1328 .) Of course, a defendant’s showing of prejudice must be supported by facts and not just bare conclusions. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Doggett v. United States
green
1 sentence2009In addition, although a federal speedy trial case, the reasoning in Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. 647 , is instmctive on the issue of showing prejudice for analyzing either speedy trial or due process violations as the constitutional guarantees “converge in protecting the same interest of the accused” for a fair adjudication. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Boysen
green
1 sentence2009If the delay was merely negligent, a greater showing of prejudice would be required to establish a due process violation.” (Id. at p. 1256.) Among other things, “ ‘[prejudice [for due process or speedy trial violation claims] may be shown by loss of material witnesses due to lapse of time [citation] or loss of evidence because of fading memory attributable to the delay.’ [Citation.]” (Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 107 .) The overarching theme is that the loss of such evidence, especially where the defendant or victims cannot independently recall details of the crime, makes it difficult or im | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Catlin
green
1 sentence2009If the delay was merely negligent, a greater showing of prejudice would be required to establish a due process violation.” (Id. at p. 1256.) Among other things, “ ‘[prejudice [for due process or speedy trial violation claims] may be shown by loss of material witnesses due to lapse of time [citation] or loss of evidence because of fading memory attributable to the delay.’ [Citation.]” (Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 107 .) The overarching theme is that the loss of such evidence, especially where the defendant or victims cannot independently recall details of the crime, makes it difficult or im | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Smith
green
2 sentences2008"The purpose behind the notice requirement ... is to permit the defendant to prepare a defense, at the penalty trial, not to question prospective jurors about every bit of evidence they might hear. *277 Defendant's argument would mean that no evidence discovered after the beginning of trial would ever be admissible, which is not the law." ( Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 620 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 68 P.3d 302 .) 2. 2008"The purpose behind the notice requirement ... is to permit the defendant to prepare a defense, at the penalty trial, not to question prospective jurors about every bit of evidence they might hear. *277 Defendant's argument would mean that no evidence discovered after the beginning of trial would ever be admissible, which is not the law." ( Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 620 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 68 P.3d 302 .) 2. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Cruz
green
2 sentences1990(People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 371 , 433 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Mendez (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 302 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 31 ]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]; People v. Fulton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 972 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 327 ]; People v. Morgan (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 523 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 664 ]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 382 ]; see also People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 741, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 , 64 A.L.R.4th 723 ].) In People v. Maddox, 1990(People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 371 , 433 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Mendez (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 302 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 31 ]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]; People v. Fulton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 972 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 327 ]; People v. Morgan (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 523 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 664 ]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 382 ]; see also People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 741, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 , 64 A.L.R.4th 723 ].) In People v. Maddox, | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Morgan
green
2 sentences1990(People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 371 , 433 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Mendez (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 302 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 31 ]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]; People v. Fulton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 972 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 327 ]; People v. Morgan (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 523 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 664 ]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 382 ]; see also People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 741, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 , 64 A.L.R.4th 723 ].) In People v. Maddox, 1990(People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 371 , 433 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Mendez (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 302 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 31 ]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]; People v. Fulton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 972 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 327 ]; People v. Morgan (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 523 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 664 ]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 382 ]; see also People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 741, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 , 64 A.L.R.4th 723 ].) In People v. Maddox, | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Fulton
green
2 sentences1990(People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 371 , 433 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Mendez (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 302 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 31 ]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]; People v. Fulton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 972 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 327 ]; People v. Morgan (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 523 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 664 ]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 382 ]; see also People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 741, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 , 64 A.L.R.4th 723 ].) In People v. Maddox, 1990(People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 371 , 433 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Mendez (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 302 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 31 ]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]; People v. Fulton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 972 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 327 ]; People v. Morgan (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 523 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 664 ]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 382 ]; see also People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 741, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 , 64 A.L.R.4th 723 ].) In People v. Maddox, | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Hill
green
2 sentences1990(People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 371 , 433 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Mendez (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 302 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 31 ]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]; People v. Fulton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 972 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 327 ]; People v. Morgan (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 523 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 664 ]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 382 ]; see also People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 741, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 , 64 A.L.R.4th 723 ].) In People v. Maddox, 1990(People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 371 , 433 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Mendez (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 302 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 31 ]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]; People v. Fulton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 972 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 327 ]; People v. Morgan (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 523 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 664 ]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 382 ]; see also People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 741, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 , 64 A.L.R.4th 723 ].) In People v. Maddox, | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Moss
green
2 sentences1990(People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 371 , 433 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Mendez (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 302 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 31 ]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]; People v. Fulton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 972 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 327 ]; People v. Morgan (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 523 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 664 ]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 382 ]; see also People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 741, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 , 64 A.L.R.4th 723 ].) In People v. Maddox, 1990(People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 371 , 433 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Mendez (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 302 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 31 ]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]; People v. Fulton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 972 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 327 ]; People v. Morgan (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 523 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 664 ]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 382 ]; see also People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 741, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 , 64 A.L.R.4th 723 ].) In People v. Maddox, | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Mendez
green
2 sentences1990(People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 371 , 433 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Mendez (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 302 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 31 ]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]; People v. Fulton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 972 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 327 ]; People v. Morgan (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 523 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 664 ]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 382 ]; see also People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 741, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 , 64 A.L.R.4th 723 ].) In People v. Maddox, 1990(People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 371 , 433 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Moss (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 248 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Mendez (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 302 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 31 ]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]; People v. Fulton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 972 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 327 ]; People v. Morgan (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 523 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 664 ]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 382 ]; see also People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 741, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 , 64 A.L.R.4th 723 ].) In People v. Maddox, | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Rost v. Municipal Court
green
1 sentence1972Municipal Court, supra, 184 Cal.App.2d 507, 511-513 .) The analogy to section 1382, subdivision 2, is, of course, imperfect: while the section constitutes a legislative declaration that a delay of more than 60 days after the filing of the information, absent good cause, is a denial of the right to a speedy trial, it is evident that a substantial portion of the 60-day period is usually needed by the defendant to prepare his defense and that in many, if not most, cases it would be a denial of due process to hustle a defendant off to trial immediately after his plea. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| People v. Faust green | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Gregory v. Diggs neutral | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Ex Parte Hansen
green
2 sentences1924(People v. Faust, 113 Cal. 172 [ 45 Pac. 261 ]; Ex parte Hansen, 158 Cal. 494 [ 111 Pac. 528 ].) While the decisions in other jurisdictions are not uniform, the weight of authority is contrary to appellant’s contention. 1924(People v. Faust, 113 Cal. 172 [ 45 Pac. 261 ]; Ex parte Hansen, 158 Cal. 494 [ 111 Pac. 528 ].) While the decisions in other jurisdictions are not uniform, the weight of authority is contrary to appellant’s contention. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.