12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1954–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Southern Union Co. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014The trial court imposed a fine of $6 million based upon the “on or about” date range alleged in the indictment and included in the jury’s verdict form. ( 132 S.Ct. at p. 2349 .) The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had violated Apprendi by making “factual findings that increased both the ‘potential and actual’ fine the court imposed,” thereby “enlarg[ing] the maximum punishment . . . beyond what the jury’s verdict or the defendant’s admissions allow[ed].” ( 132 S.Ct. at p. 2352 .) Consistent with Booker, however, the court noted that “the routine practice of judges’ imposing fines 2014(Southern Union Co., supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [ 183 L.Ed.2d at p. 325 ].) The Supreme Court said that criminal fines are penalties, and facts such as the duration of a violation, which determine the amount of a fine, must be submitted to a jury to be determined beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 2 |
Deck v. Missourigreen1 sentence2014(People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290-292 ; see Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 632 ; but see also People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 219-220 [“the unjustified use of restraints could, in a real sense, impair the ability of the defendant to communicate effectively with counsel [citation], or influence witnesses at the preliminary hearing”].) Orrison has not cited any legal authority that requires the trial court to make a finding that a manifest need exists before restraining a criminal defendant (in the form of shackles or being seated in a cage) in the context of a parole revo | 1 | 1 |
People v. Agnewgreen1 sentence2013(See Wilson v. Houston Funeral Home (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1135 [false imprisonment offense does not contain a duration requirement; confinement can be for any “‘“appreciable length of time, however short”’”]; Scofield v. Critical Air Medicine, Inc. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 990, 1001 [same]; see People v. Agnew (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655, 659-660 [“‘[a]ny exercise of force . . . by which in fact the other person is deprived of his liberty or is compelled to remain where he does not wish to remain, or go where he does not wish to go, is [false] imprisonment’”].) Gossett simply has not shown his new | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Houston Funeral Homegreen1 sentence2013(See Wilson v. Houston Funeral Home (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1135 [false imprisonment offense does not contain a duration requirement; confinement can be for any “‘“appreciable length of time, however short”’”]; Scofield v. Critical Air Medicine, Inc. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 990, 1001 [same]; see People v. Agnew (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655, 659-660 [“‘[a]ny exercise of force . . . by which in fact the other person is deprived of his liberty or is compelled to remain where he does not wish to remain, or go where he does not wish to go, is [false] imprisonment’”].) Gossett simply has not shown his new | 1 | 1 |
Scofield v. Critical Air Medicine, Inc.green1 sentence2013(See Wilson v. Houston Funeral Home (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1135 [false imprisonment offense does not contain a duration requirement; confinement can be for any “‘“appreciable length of time, however short”’”]; Scofield v. Critical Air Medicine, Inc. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 990, 1001 [same]; see People v. Agnew (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655, 659-660 [“‘[a]ny exercise of force . . . by which in fact the other person is deprived of his liberty or is compelled to remain where he does not wish to remain, or go where he does not wish to go, is [false] imprisonment’”].) Gossett simply has not shown his new | 1 | 1 |
Lura v. Multaplex, Inc.green2 sentences2000(E.g., Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Employees Union (1968) 69 Cal.2d 713, 729-730 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 213 , 447 P.2d 325 ] [contract included an implied ascertainable term requiring performance as long as there was a possibility that the defendants might undertake to present live stage performances]; Lura v. Multaplex, Inc. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 410, 414-415 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 847 ] [agreement to pay commissions to the plaintiff implicitly would terminate when the defendant ceased making sales]; Wittmann v. Whittingham (1927) 85 Cal.App. 140, 144-145 [ 259 P. 63 ] [employment contra 2000(E.g., Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Employees Union (1968) 69 Cal.2d 713, 729-730 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 213 , 447 P.2d 325 ] [contract included an implied ascertainable term requiring performance as long as there was a possibility that the defendants might undertake to present live stage performances]; Lura v. Multaplex, Inc. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 410, 414-415 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 847 ] [agreement to pay commissions to the plaintiff implicitly would terminate when the defendant ceased making sales]; Wittmann v. Whittingham (1927) 85 Cal.App. 140, 144-145 [ 259 P. 63 ] [employment contra | 1 | 1 |
Wittmann v. Whittinghamgreen2 sentences2000(E.g., Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Employees Union (1968) 69 Cal.2d 713, 729-730 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 213 , 447 P.2d 325 ] [contract included an implied ascertainable term requiring performance as long as there was a possibility that the defendants might undertake to present live stage performances]; Lura v. Multaplex, Inc. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 410, 414-415 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 847 ] [agreement to pay commissions to the plaintiff implicitly would terminate when the defendant ceased making sales]; Wittmann v. Whittingham (1927) 85 Cal.App. 140, 144-145 [ 259 P. 63 ] [employment contra 2000(E.g., Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Employees Union (1968) 69 Cal.2d 713, 729-730 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 213 , 447 P.2d 325 ] [contract included an implied ascertainable term requiring performance as long as there was a possibility that the defendants might undertake to present live stage performances]; Lura v. Multaplex, Inc. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 410, 414-415 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 847 ] [agreement to pay commissions to the plaintiff implicitly would terminate when the defendant ceased making sales]; Wittmann v. Whittingham (1927) 85 Cal.App. 140, 144-145 [ 259 P. 63 ] [employment contra | 1 | 1 |
Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Employees Union, Local 16green2 sentences2000(E.g., Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Employees Union (1968) 69 Cal.2d 713, 729-730 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 213 , 447 P.2d 325 ] [contract included an implied ascertainable term requiring performance as long as there was a possibility that the defendants might undertake to present live stage performances]; Lura v. Multaplex, Inc. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 410, 414-415 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 847 ] [agreement to pay commissions to the plaintiff implicitly would terminate when the defendant ceased making sales]; Wittmann v. Whittingham (1927) 85 Cal.App. 140, 144-145 [ 259 P. 63 ] [employment contra 2000(E.g., Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Employees Union (1968) 69 Cal.2d 713, 729-730 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 213 , 447 P.2d 325 ] [contract included an implied ascertainable term requiring performance as long as there was a possibility that the defendants might undertake to present live stage performances]; Lura v. Multaplex, Inc. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 410, 414-415 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 847 ] [agreement to pay commissions to the plaintiff implicitly would terminate when the defendant ceased making sales]; Wittmann v. Whittingham (1927) 85 Cal.App. 140, 144-145 [ 259 P. 63 ] [employment contra | 1 | 1 |
Public Employees Assn. v. Board of Supervisorsgreen2 sentences1996(See Department of Personnel Administration v. Superior Court (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 155, 188 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 714 ]; Public Employees Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 797, 806-807 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 491 ]; San Joaquin County Employees Assn. v. City of Stockton (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 813, 819 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 876 ].) 4 The duration clause in Kaufman provided: “This agreement shall become effective as of November 13, 1967, and shall remain in effect until November 12, 1970, and from year to year thereafter with the provision that should either party desire to terminate this Agreement 1996(See Department of Personnel Administration v. Superior Court (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 155, 188 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 714 ]; Public Employees Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 797, 806-807 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 491 ]; San Joaquin County Employees Assn. v. City of Stockton (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 813, 819 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 876 ].) 4 The duration clause in Kaufman provided: “This agreement shall become effective as of November 13, 1967, and shall remain in effect until November 12, 1970, and from year to year thereafter with the provision that should either party desire to terminate this Agreement | 1 | 1 |
Department of Personnel Administration v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1996(See Department of Personnel Administration v. Superior Court (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 155, 188 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 714 ]; Public Employees Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 797, 806-807 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 491 ]; San Joaquin County Employees Assn. v. City of Stockton (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 813, 819 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 876 ].) 4 The duration clause in Kaufman provided: “This agreement shall become effective as of November 13, 1967, and shall remain in effect until November 12, 1970, and from year to year thereafter with the provision that should either party desire to terminate this Agreement 1996(See Department of Personnel Administration v. Superior Court (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 155, 188 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 714 ]; Public Employees Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 797, 806-807 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 491 ]; San Joaquin County Employees Assn. v. City of Stockton (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 813, 819 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 876 ].) 4 The duration clause in Kaufman provided: “This agreement shall become effective as of November 13, 1967, and shall remain in effect until November 12, 1970, and from year to year thereafter with the provision that should either party desire to terminate this Agreement | 1 | 1 |
SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY EMPLOYEES v. City of Stocktongreen2 sentences1996(See Department of Personnel Administration v. Superior Court (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 155, 188 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 714 ]; Public Employees Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 797, 806-807 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 491 ]; San Joaquin County Employees Assn. v. City of Stockton (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 813, 819 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 876 ].) 4 The duration clause in Kaufman provided: “This agreement shall become effective as of November 13, 1967, and shall remain in effect until November 12, 1970, and from year to year thereafter with the provision that should either party desire to terminate this Agreement 1996(See Department of Personnel Administration v. Superior Court (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 155, 188 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 714 ]; Public Employees Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 797, 806-807 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 491 ]; San Joaquin County Employees Assn. v. City of Stockton (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 813, 819 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 876 ].) 4 The duration clause in Kaufman provided: “This agreement shall become effective as of November 13, 1967, and shall remain in effect until November 12, 1970, and from year to year thereafter with the provision that should either party desire to terminate this Agreement | 1 | 1 |
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. East Bay Union of MacHinists, Local 1304green2 sentences1996(Ibid.) Consequently, no inference can be drawn by City’s conduct in the meet and conferral process supporting the unions’ position the expired MOU’s would continue indefinitely until successor MOU’s were agreed upon. 7 We note in passing, without agreeing, a contrary interpretation was made of the Fibreboard duration clause by a California Court of Appeal in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. East Bay Union of Machinists (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 675, 725 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 64 ]. 1996(Ibid.) Consequently, no inference can be drawn by City’s conduct in the meet and conferral process supporting the unions’ position the expired MOU’s would continue indefinitely until successor MOU’s were agreed upon. 7 We note in passing, without agreeing, a contrary interpretation was made of the Fibreboard duration clause by a California Court of Appeal in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. East Bay Union of Machinists (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 675, 725 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 64 ]. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Fierrogreen1 sentence2014(People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290-292 ; see Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 632 ; but see also People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 219-220 [“the unjustified use of restraints could, in a real sense, impair the ability of the defendant to communicate effectively with counsel [citation], or influence witnesses at the preliminary hearing”].) Orrison has not cited any legal authority that requires the trial court to make a finding that a manifest need exists before restraining a criminal defendant (in the form of shackles or being seated in a cage) in the context of a parole revo | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. James Allen, II
green
2 sentences2023A partial closure means the court has excluded only a limited number of persons from the courtroom, either for the duration of the proceeding or for a limited period of time (such as during one witness’s testimony).” (United States v. Allen (9th Cir. 2022) 34 F.4th 789, 797 .) Here, the closure was effectively “total.” Although the trial court referred to a defense investigator and “victim advocate” being present, there was no explanation as to their exact functions and no one without a role in the trial was permitted to observe. 2022A partial closure means the court has excluded only a limited number of persons from the courtroom, either for the duration of the proceeding or for a limited period of time (such as during one witness’s testimony). [Citation]. [¶] Before ordering a total closure, the court must determine that there is ‘an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values.’ [Citation.] If there was only a partial closure, there must be a substantial interest, rather than an overriding interest, for the closure.” In United States v. Allen, supra, 34 F.4th at page 797 , th | 2 | 2022–2023 |
Barber v. State Personnel Board
green
1 sentence2026(Barber, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 405 .) 14 each employee’s discharge caused the employee to lose wages for the duration of the violation. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Oregon v. Ice
green
2 sentences2015The question was ―whether [Apprendi‘s] rule applies to sentences of criminal fines.‖ (Id. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at pp. 2348–2349].) The high court held that although some fines are not substantial enough to trigger the protections of the Sixth Amendment, ―[w]here a fine is substantial enough . . . , Apprendi applies in full.‖ (Southern Union, at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2352].) In so holding, the high court reiterated that ―Apprendi‘s ‗core concern‘ is to reserve to the jury ‗the determination of facts that warrant punishment for a specific statutory offense.‘ Ice, 555 U.S., at 170 .‖ (Id. at p. _ 2015The question was “whether [Apprendi' s] rule applies to sentences of criminal fines.” (Id. at pp. __-__ [132 S.Ct. at pp. 2348-2349].) The high court held that although some fines are not substantial enough to trigger the protections of the Sixth Amendment, “[w]here a fine is substantial enough . . . , Apprendi applies in full.” (Southern Union, at p. _ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2352]].) In so holding, the high court reiterated that “Apprendi’s ‘core concern’ is to reserve to the jury ‘the determination of facts that warrant punishment for a specific statutory offense.’ Ice, 555 U.S., at 170 .” (Id. at | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Racklin
green
1 sentence2014Orrison also argues 5 that “[c]onfining [him], who had not been found guilty of anything, during the hearing 1 hurts the integrity of the system and [his] ability to present his case effectively.” Although the trial court denied Orrison’s counsel’s request that Orrison be seated at his counsel’s table, the court ensured Orrison’s access to, and ability to effectively communicate with, counsel, and thus to defend himself, throughout the hearing by (1) permitting Orrison’s counsel to move counsel’s table closer to the cage and inviting Orrison’s counsel to sit anywhere he wished in the courtroom | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Duran
green
1 sentence2014(People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290-292 ; see Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 632 ; but see also People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 219-220 [“the unjustified use of restraints could, in a real sense, impair the ability of the defendant to communicate effectively with counsel [citation], or influence witnesses at the preliminary hearing”].) Orrison has not cited any legal authority that requires the trial court to make a finding that a manifest need exists before restraining a criminal defendant (in the form of shackles or being seated in a cage) in the context of a parole revo | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. McClellan
green
1 sentence2013(McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 378 .) The motions to withdraw admissions do not complain that the juvenile court failed to advise the minors about the lifetime registration requirement or that the minors were misadvised about the duration of this requirement. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 181 v. Dahlem Const. Co
green
1 sentence1996(International Union of Op. Eng. v. Dahlem Const. Co. (6th Cir. 1951) 193 F.2d 470, 475 .) However, a notice to modify may have the same effect as a notice to terminate where the duration clause within the contract is silent regarding the effect either type of notice would have and essentially treats the notices as functionally equivalent preventing automatic extension. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Kaufman and Broad Home Systems, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, Afl-Cio
green
2 sentences1996Broth, of Firemen, supra, 607 F.2d at page 1111 , agreed with the Dahlem court because the agreement “explicitly stated that the contract was to remain in effect until a new one was reached.” (Ibid.) In distinguishing the duration clause before it, the Fifth Circuit emphasized it contained no statement regarding the effect of a notice to modify. 1996Broth, of Firemen, supra, 607 F.2d at p. 1106 .) 5 We reiterate the parties agree that absent a request to meet and confer the MOU continues in effect for the next fiscal year. 6 The unions urge us to attach significance to the fact that when ECPOA and City were unable to reach agreement on a successor MOU for the 1992-1993 fiscal year, they continued to operate under the terms of the existing contract and City neither tried to unilaterally implement changes nor assert the MOU was terminated based upon ECPOA’s notice to meet and confer. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Brunwin
green
2 sentences1954(People v. Brunwin, 2 Cal. App.2d 287 [ 37 P.2d 1072 ].) Generally speaking, a theft, though prosecution therefor may be barred by the statute of limitations, is no less a theft. 1954(People v. Brunwin, 2 Cal. App.2d 287 [ 37 P.2d 1072 ].) Generally speaking, a theft, though prosecution therefor may be barred by the statute of limitations, is no less a theft. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.