duration requirement (Texas) · Go Syfert
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duration requirement in Texas

7 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2026 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
Jeffrey Todd Dean v. The City of Shreveportgreen
ca5 · 2006 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 93.002(b), 103.002(b-1). - Page 52 Circuit has emphasized, the “central theme of a duration analysis is that the shorter the lifespan of the remedy, the more likely it is narrowly tailored.” Dean, 438 F.3d at 460.

11
Jones v. Stategreen
texapp · 2007 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025But the prosecutor also asked the prospective jurors if they could consider the minimum punishment for a defendant that had committed only two acts of sexual abuse “right in that [thirty-one] days.” And Tidbeaux’s counsel further clarified the duration requirement during voir dire by explaining that for CSA, “[y]ou [must] have two instances of conduct [thirty] days apart from each other at least.” Thus, as with the State’s closing argument, while the prosecutor’s use of the phrase “within a period of [thirty] days or more” might appear confusing or ambiguous when viewed in isolation, the attor

11
Lane v. Stategreen
texapp · 1997 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025But the prosecutor also asked the prospective jurors if they could consider the minimum punishment for a defendant that had committed only two acts of sexual abuse “right in that [thirty-one] days.” And Tidbeaux’s counsel further clarified the duration requirement during voir dire by explaining that for CSA, “[y]ou [must] have two instances of conduct [thirty] days apart from each other at least.” Thus, as with the State’s closing argument, while the prosecutor’s use of the phrase “within a period of [thirty] days or more” might appear confusing or ambiguous when viewed in isolation, the attor

11
Vasquez v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 2012 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023See Fields v. State, No. 01-20-00280-CR, 2022 WL 3268525 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 11, 2022, pet. ref’d) (citing Vasquez, 389 S.W.3d at 366 , and noting that the abstract portion of a charge sets out the offense’s elements).

11
in the Estate of Edythe A. Millergreen
texapp · 2014 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018See Miller, 446 S.W.3d at 450 . 12 purpose of the contract at issue was the grant of reciprocal access easements, the trial court reasonably could have found this duration clause to be a helpful guide in determining what a reasonable period of nonuse might be or when such a period might commence.

11
In Re CCJgreen
texapp · 2008 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018See In re C.C.J., 244 S.W.3d 911, 921 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.).

11
Adamo v. State Farm Lloyds Co.green
texapp · 1993 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
1 sentence

1997See, e.g., Adamo v. State Farm Lloyd's Co. , 853 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (granting the opportunity for oral argument on a motion for summary judgment is purely within the discretion of the trial court); Owen Elec.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (2)

CaseCitedYears
Dowthitt v. State green
texcrimapp · 1996
1 sentence

2014Custody is not established in the fourth situation “unless the manifestation of probable cause ‘combined with other circumstances’ of the interview, such as the duration or factors of ‘the exercise of police control over [a suspect],’ would lead a reasonable person to believe that he is under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest.” Saenz, 411 S.W.3d at 496 (quoting Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255–57).

12014–2014
State of Texas v. Saenz, Clint green
texcrimapp · 2013
1 sentence

2014Custody is not established in the fourth situation “unless the manifestation of probable cause ‘combined with other circumstances’ of the interview, such as the duration or factors of ‘the exercise of police control over [a suspect],’ would lead a reasonable person to believe that he is under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest.” Saenz, 411 S.W.3d at 496 (quoting Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255–57).

12014–2014

Where else courts name it

CA 12 (1954–2026) PA 11 (1955–2024) WA 9 (1977–2023) TX 7 (1997–2026) NM 5 (2009–2013) NY 5 (1981–2024) ID 5 (1986–2000) AZ 5 (1995–2023) IN 4 (1991–2025) OH 4 (1998–2022) MD 3 (1973–2013) MI 3 (2004–2012) DC 3 (1999–2020) MO 3 (1969–1994) IA 3 (2017–2020) TN 2 (2001–2002) CO 2 (2005–2006) ME 2 (1981–2016) RI 2 (2007–2022) DE 2 (1966–1966) LA 2 (2012–2017) MN 2 (1936–2012)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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