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12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1929–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cramergreen1 sentence1978As expressed in Kelley , “It is settled that evidence of other crimes is ordinarily admissible where it tends to show guilty knowledge, motive, intent, or presence of a common design or plan.” ( 66 Cal.2d at p. 239 ; see People v. Cramer, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 129 [exception where there is a “common design, plan, or modus operandi”]; People v. Ing (1967) 65 Cal.2d 603 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 902 , 422 P.2d 590 ] [“common scheme or plan to commit rape”]; Evid. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Adamsongreen2 sentences1978(Cramer, at p. 129 of 67 Cal.2d; Kelley , at pp. 238-239 of 66 Cal.2d.) In brief, although defendant’s prior criminal acts may demonstrate his bad character and his propensity or disposition to commit the crime charged,“. . . a defendant is not to be convicted because the prosecution can prove, on his prior (or subsequent) record, that he is a bad man.” (People v. Adamson (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 74, 79 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 894 ] [sex crimes, as such, do not constitute an exception to the foregoing principle]; see Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 340, p. 299.) There do exist, however, several exce 1978(Cramer, at p. 129 of 67 Cal.2d; Kelley , at pp. 238-239 of 66 Cal.2d.) In brief, although defendant’s prior criminal acts may demonstrate his bad character and his propensity or disposition to commit the crime charged,“. . . a defendant is not to be convicted because the prosecution can prove, on his prior (or subsequent) record, that he is a bad man.” (People v. Adamson (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 74, 79 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 894 ] [sex crimes, as such, do not constitute an exception to the foregoing principle]; see Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 340, p. 299.) There do exist, however, several exce | 1 | 1 |
Simpson v. Stategreen1 sentence1974(See Simp *484 son v. State, supra, 59 Ala. 1, 14; Perkins on Criminal Law, supra, pp. 1022-1025; Model Penal Code, supra, § 3.06, com. 8, pp. 38-41.) “According to the older interpretation of the common law, even extreme force may be used to prevent dispossession [of the dwelling house].” (See Model Penal Code, supra, com. 8.) Also at common law if another attempted to burn a dwelling the owner was privileged to use deadly force if this seemed necessary to defend his “castle” against the threatened harm. | 1 | 1 |
Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co.green2 sentences1974(See Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal.2d 674, 679 [ 59 P.2d 144 ]; People v. Noyo Lumber Co., 99 Cal. 456, 461 [ 34 P. 96 ].) At common law an exception to the foregoing principle that deadly force could not be used solely for the protection of property was recognized where the property was a dwelling'house in some circumstances. 1974(See Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal.2d 674, 679 [ 59 P.2d 144 ]; People v. Noyo Lumber Co., 99 Cal. 456, 461 [ 34 P. 96 ].) At common law an exception to the foregoing principle that deadly force could not be used solely for the protection of property was recognized where the property was a dwelling'house in some circumstances. | 1 | 1 |
People ex rel. Eadie v. Noyo Lumber Co.green2 sentences1974(See Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal.2d 674, 679 [ 59 P.2d 144 ]; People v. Noyo Lumber Co., 99 Cal. 456, 461 [ 34 P. 96 ].) At common law an exception to the foregoing principle that deadly force could not be used solely for the protection of property was recognized where the property was a dwelling'house in some circumstances. 1974(See Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal.2d 674, 679 [ 59 P.2d 144 ]; People v. Noyo Lumber Co., 99 Cal. 456, 461 [ 34 P. 96 ].) At common law an exception to the foregoing principle that deadly force could not be used solely for the protection of property was recognized where the property was a dwelling'house in some circumstances. | 1 | 1 |
Phillips v. Hiestandgreen2 sentences1963See Estate of Algee, 158 Cal.App.2d 691, 696-698 [ 323 P.2d 221 ] ; Colden v. Costello, 50 Cal.App. 2d 363, 369-370 [ 122 P.2d 959 ]; Estate of Kurt, 83 Cal.App.2d 681, 684 [ 189 P.2d 528 ] ; Estate of Phillips, 123 Cal.App.2d 570, 574 [ 266 P.2d 954 ]; Estate of Nash, 132 Cal.App.2d 233, 237 [ 283 P.2d 184 ] ; Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.2d 10, 17 [ 285 P.2d 906 ], An exception to the foregoing rule exists where the wife for some reason claims the whole of the community property; in such case she is treated as an adverse claimant and the issue is properly entertained by a court of 1963See Estate of Algee, 158 Cal.App.2d 691, 696-698 [ 323 P.2d 221 ] ; Colden v. Costello, 50 Cal.App. 2d 363, 369-370 [ 122 P.2d 959 ]; Estate of Kurt, 83 Cal.App.2d 681, 684 [ 189 P.2d 528 ] ; Estate of Phillips, 123 Cal.App.2d 570, 574 [ 266 P.2d 954 ]; Estate of Nash, 132 Cal.App.2d 233, 237 [ 283 P.2d 184 ] ; Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.2d 10, 17 [ 285 P.2d 906 ], An exception to the foregoing rule exists where the wife for some reason claims the whole of the community property; in such case she is treated as an adverse claimant and the issue is properly entertained by a court of | 1 | 1 |
Nash v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'ngreen1 sentence1963See Estate of Algee, 158 Cal.App.2d 691, 696-698 [ 323 P.2d 221 ] ; Colden v. Costello, 50 Cal.App. 2d 363, 369-370 [ 122 P.2d 959 ]; Estate of Kurt, 83 Cal.App.2d 681, 684 [ 189 P.2d 528 ] ; Estate of Phillips, 123 Cal.App.2d 570, 574 [ 266 P.2d 954 ]; Estate of Nash, 132 Cal.App.2d 233, 237 [ 283 P.2d 184 ] ; Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.2d 10, 17 [ 285 P.2d 906 ], An exception to the foregoing rule exists where the wife for some reason claims the whole of the community property; in such case she is treated as an adverse claimant and the issue is properly entertained by a court of | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Kurtgreen2 sentences1963See Estate of Algee, 158 Cal.App.2d 691, 696-698 [ 323 P.2d 221 ] ; Colden v. Costello, 50 Cal.App. 2d 363, 369-370 [ 122 P.2d 959 ]; Estate of Kurt, 83 Cal.App.2d 681, 684 [ 189 P.2d 528 ] ; Estate of Phillips, 123 Cal.App.2d 570, 574 [ 266 P.2d 954 ]; Estate of Nash, 132 Cal.App.2d 233, 237 [ 283 P.2d 184 ] ; Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.2d 10, 17 [ 285 P.2d 906 ], An exception to the foregoing rule exists where the wife for some reason claims the whole of the community property; in such case she is treated as an adverse claimant and the issue is properly entertained by a court of 1963See Estate of Algee, 158 Cal.App.2d 691, 696-698 [ 323 P.2d 221 ] ; Colden v. Costello, 50 Cal.App. 2d 363, 369-370 [ 122 P.2d 959 ]; Estate of Kurt, 83 Cal.App.2d 681, 684 [ 189 P.2d 528 ] ; Estate of Phillips, 123 Cal.App.2d 570, 574 [ 266 P.2d 954 ]; Estate of Nash, 132 Cal.App.2d 233, 237 [ 283 P.2d 184 ] ; Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.2d 10, 17 [ 285 P.2d 906 ], An exception to the foregoing rule exists where the wife for some reason claims the whole of the community property; in such case she is treated as an adverse claimant and the issue is properly entertained by a court of | 1 | 1 |
Algee v. Eschwiggreen2 sentences1963See Estate of Algee, 158 Cal.App.2d 691, 696-698 [ 323 P.2d 221 ] ; Colden v. Costello, 50 Cal.App. 2d 363, 369-370 [ 122 P.2d 959 ]; Estate of Kurt, 83 Cal.App.2d 681, 684 [ 189 P.2d 528 ] ; Estate of Phillips, 123 Cal.App.2d 570, 574 [ 266 P.2d 954 ]; Estate of Nash, 132 Cal.App.2d 233, 237 [ 283 P.2d 184 ] ; Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.2d 10, 17 [ 285 P.2d 906 ], An exception to the foregoing rule exists where the wife for some reason claims the whole of the community property; in such case she is treated as an adverse claimant and the issue is properly entertained by a court of 1963See Estate of Algee, 158 Cal.App.2d 691, 696-698 [ 323 P.2d 221 ] ; Colden v. Costello, 50 Cal.App. 2d 363, 369-370 [ 122 P.2d 959 ]; Estate of Kurt, 83 Cal.App.2d 681, 684 [ 189 P.2d 528 ] ; Estate of Phillips, 123 Cal.App.2d 570, 574 [ 266 P.2d 954 ]; Estate of Nash, 132 Cal.App.2d 233, 237 [ 283 P.2d 184 ] ; Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.2d 10, 17 [ 285 P.2d 906 ], An exception to the foregoing rule exists where the wife for some reason claims the whole of the community property; in such case she is treated as an adverse claimant and the issue is properly entertained by a court of | 1 | 1 |
Central Bank v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1963See Estate of Algee, 158 Cal.App.2d 691, 696-698 [ 323 P.2d 221 ] ; Colden v. Costello, 50 Cal.App. 2d 363, 369-370 [ 122 P.2d 959 ]; Estate of Kurt, 83 Cal.App.2d 681, 684 [ 189 P.2d 528 ] ; Estate of Phillips, 123 Cal.App.2d 570, 574 [ 266 P.2d 954 ]; Estate of Nash, 132 Cal.App.2d 233, 237 [ 283 P.2d 184 ] ; Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.2d 10, 17 [ 285 P.2d 906 ], An exception to the foregoing rule exists where the wife for some reason claims the whole of the community property; in such case she is treated as an adverse claimant and the issue is properly entertained by a court of 1963See Estate of Algee, 158 Cal.App.2d 691, 696-698 [ 323 P.2d 221 ] ; Colden v. Costello, 50 Cal.App. 2d 363, 369-370 [ 122 P.2d 959 ]; Estate of Kurt, 83 Cal.App.2d 681, 684 [ 189 P.2d 528 ] ; Estate of Phillips, 123 Cal.App.2d 570, 574 [ 266 P.2d 954 ]; Estate of Nash, 132 Cal.App.2d 233, 237 [ 283 P.2d 184 ] ; Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.2d 10, 17 [ 285 P.2d 906 ], An exception to the foregoing rule exists where the wife for some reason claims the whole of the community property; in such case she is treated as an adverse claimant and the issue is properly entertained by a court of | 1 | 1 |
Sieroty v. Silvergreen2 sentences1963(Sieroty v. Silver, 58 Cal.2d 799, 802, 804, 806 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 635 , 376 P.2d 563 ].) But appellant here claims only half of the community property and the general rule of the Colden v. Costello line of cases, supra, applies. 1963(Sieroty v. Silver, 58 Cal.2d 799, 802, 804, 806 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 635 , 376 P.2d 563 ].) But appellant here claims only half of the community property and the general rule of the Colden v. Costello line of cases, supra, applies. | 1 | 1 |
Colden v. Costellogreen2 sentences1963See Estate of Algee, 158 Cal.App.2d 691, 696-698 [ 323 P.2d 221 ] ; Colden v. Costello, 50 Cal.App. 2d 363, 369-370 [ 122 P.2d 959 ]; Estate of Kurt, 83 Cal.App.2d 681, 684 [ 189 P.2d 528 ] ; Estate of Phillips, 123 Cal.App.2d 570, 574 [ 266 P.2d 954 ]; Estate of Nash, 132 Cal.App.2d 233, 237 [ 283 P.2d 184 ] ; Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.2d 10, 17 [ 285 P.2d 906 ], An exception to the foregoing rule exists where the wife for some reason claims the whole of the community property; in such case she is treated as an adverse claimant and the issue is properly entertained by a court of 1963See Estate of Algee, 158 Cal.App.2d 691, 696-698 [ 323 P.2d 221 ] ; Colden v. Costello, 50 Cal.App. 2d 363, 369-370 [ 122 P.2d 959 ]; Estate of Kurt, 83 Cal.App.2d 681, 684 [ 189 P.2d 528 ] ; Estate of Phillips, 123 Cal.App.2d 570, 574 [ 266 P.2d 954 ]; Estate of Nash, 132 Cal.App.2d 233, 237 [ 283 P.2d 184 ] ; Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.2d 10, 17 [ 285 P.2d 906 ], An exception to the foregoing rule exists where the wife for some reason claims the whole of the community property; in such case she is treated as an adverse claimant and the issue is properly entertained by a court of | 1 | 1 |
| Boynton v. McKalesgreen | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Georgegreen2 sentences1962This is the so-called “going and coming rule.” (Robinson v. George, 16 Cal.2d 238, 244 [ 105 P.2d 914 ] ; Boynton v. McKales, 139 Cal.App.2d 777, 788 [ 294 P.2d 733 ].) There is an exception to the foregoing rule known as the “special errand rule” which the court stated in Boynton v. McKales, supra, 139 Cal.App.2d at page 789 , to be as follows: “If the employee is not simply on his way from his home to his normal place of work or returning from said place to his home for his own purpose, but is coming from his home or returning to it on a special errand either as part of his regular duties or 1962This is the so-called “going and coming rule.” (Robinson v. George, 16 Cal.2d 238, 244 [ 105 P.2d 914 ] ; Boynton v. McKales, 139 Cal.App.2d 777, 788 [ 294 P.2d 733 ].) There is an exception to the foregoing rule known as the “special errand rule” which the court stated in Boynton v. McKales, supra, 139 Cal.App.2d at page 789 , to be as follows: “If the employee is not simply on his way from his home to his normal place of work or returning from said place to his home for his own purpose, but is coming from his home or returning to it on a special errand either as part of his regular duties or | 1 | 1 |
| Howe v. Southreygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Gleghorn
green
2 sentences2015A party who initiated a nonfelonious simple assault may use deadly force in self-defense if (1) the victim counterattacked using deadly force; (2) the counterattack was so sudden and perilous that there was no opportunity for the initial aggressor to decline, or make known his 14 willingness to decline, further fighting; and (3) the initial aggressor could not “retreat with safety.” (People v. Hecker, supra, 109 Cal. at p. 464.) Delgado seizes on the use of the phrase “retreat with safety” in Hecker and subsequent cases, such as People v. Gleghorn (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 196 (Gleghorn), in suppo 2015A party who initiated a nonfelonious simple assault may use deadly force in self-defense if (1) the victim counterattacked using deadly force; (2) the counterattack was so sudden and perilous that there was no opportunity for the initial aggressor to decline, or make known his 14 willingness to decline, further fighting; and (3) the initial aggressor could not “retreat with safety.” (People v. Hecker, supra, 109 Cal. at p. 464.) Delgado seizes on the use of the phrase “retreat with safety” in Hecker and subsequent cases, such as People v. Gleghorn (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 196 (Gleghorn), in suppo | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Carr v. Progressive Casualty Insurance
green
1 sentence1986(See to the same effect, Muraoka v. Budget Rent-A-Car, Inc., supra, 160 Cal.App.3d 107 ; Carr v. Progressive Casualty Ins. *555 Co., supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 881 ; Nationwide Ins. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Muraoka v. Budget Rent-A-Car, Inc.
green
1 sentence1986(See to the same effect, Muraoka v. Budget Rent-A-Car, Inc., supra, 160 Cal.App.3d 107 ; Carr v. Progressive Casualty Ins. *555 Co., supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 881 ; Nationwide Ins. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Royal Globe Insurance v. Superior Court
red
2 sentences1984Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 23 Cal.3d 880 reasonably has been interpreted as requiring the final determination of an insured’s liability as a condition precedent to the maintenance of an action against an insurer for the violation of Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h)(5), and (2) the instant case presents no factual circumstances which raise policy considerations favoring an exception to the foregoing requirement. 1984Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 23 Cal.3d 880 reasonably has been interpreted as requiring the final determination of an insured's liability as a condition precedent to the maintenance of an action against an insurer for the violation of Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h)(5), and (2) the instant case presents no factual circumstances which raise policy considerations favoring an exception to the foregoing requirement. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. Kelley
green
1 sentence1978As expressed in Kelley , “It is settled that evidence of other crimes is ordinarily admissible where it tends to show guilty knowledge, motive, intent, or presence of a common design or plan.” ( 66 Cal.2d at p. 239 ; see People v. Cramer, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 129 [exception where there is a “common design, plan, or modus operandi”]; People v. Ing (1967) 65 Cal.2d 603 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 902 , 422 P.2d 590 ] [“common scheme or plan to commit rape”]; Evid. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
People v. Ing
green
2 sentences1978As expressed in Kelley , “It is settled that evidence of other crimes is ordinarily admissible where it tends to show guilty knowledge, motive, intent, or presence of a common design or plan.” ( 66 Cal.2d at p. 239 ; see People v. Cramer, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 129 [exception where there is a “common design, plan, or modus operandi”]; People v. Ing (1967) 65 Cal.2d 603 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 902 , 422 P.2d 590 ] [“common scheme or plan to commit rape”]; Evid. 1978As expressed in Kelley , “It is settled that evidence of other crimes is ordinarily admissible where it tends to show guilty knowledge, motive, intent, or presence of a common design or plan.” ( 66 Cal.2d at p. 239 ; see People v. Cramer, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 129 [exception where there is a “common design, plan, or modus operandi”]; People v. Ing (1967) 65 Cal.2d 603 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 902 , 422 P.2d 590 ] [“common scheme or plan to commit rape”]; Evid. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Haulman v. Crumal
green
2 sentences1966(Hoxie v. Bryant, 131 Cal. 85 [ 63 P. 153 ]; Haulman v. Crumal, 13 Cal.App.2d 612 [ 57 P.2d 179 ]; Jubelt v. Sketers, 84 Cal.App.2d 653 [ 191 P.2d 460 ]; Hecht v. Smith, 183 Cal.App.2d 723 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 209 ].) They contend, however, there should be an exception to the foregoing rule when levy is made on personal property that cannot be taken into possession because it is in custodia legis. 1966(Hoxie v. Bryant, 131 Cal. 85 [ 63 P. 153 ]; Haulman v. Crumal, 13 Cal.App.2d 612 [ 57 P.2d 179 ]; Jubelt v. Sketers, 84 Cal.App.2d 653 [ 191 P.2d 460 ]; Hecht v. Smith, 183 Cal.App.2d 723 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 209 ].) They contend, however, there should be an exception to the foregoing rule when levy is made on personal property that cannot be taken into possession because it is in custodia legis. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Jubelt v. Sketers
green
2 sentences1966(Hoxie v. Bryant, 131 Cal. 85 [ 63 P. 153 ]; Haulman v. Crumal, 13 Cal.App.2d 612 [ 57 P.2d 179 ]; Jubelt v. Sketers, 84 Cal.App.2d 653 [ 191 P.2d 460 ]; Hecht v. Smith, 183 Cal.App.2d 723 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 209 ].) They contend, however, there should be an exception to the foregoing rule when levy is made on personal property that cannot be taken into possession because it is in custodia legis. 1966(Hoxie v. Bryant, 131 Cal. 85 [ 63 P. 153 ]; Haulman v. Crumal, 13 Cal.App.2d 612 [ 57 P.2d 179 ]; Jubelt v. Sketers, 84 Cal.App.2d 653 [ 191 P.2d 460 ]; Hecht v. Smith, 183 Cal.App.2d 723 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 209 ].) They contend, however, there should be an exception to the foregoing rule when levy is made on personal property that cannot be taken into possession because it is in custodia legis. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Hecht v. Smith
green
2 sentences1966(Hoxie v. Bryant, 131 Cal. 85 [ 63 P. 153 ]; Haulman v. Crumal, 13 Cal.App.2d 612 [ 57 P.2d 179 ]; Jubelt v. Sketers, 84 Cal.App.2d 653 [ 191 P.2d 460 ]; Hecht v. Smith, 183 Cal.App.2d 723 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 209 ].) They contend, however, there should be an exception to the foregoing rule when levy is made on personal property that cannot be taken into possession because it is in custodia legis. 1966(Hoxie v. Bryant, 131 Cal. 85 [ 63 P. 153 ]; Haulman v. Crumal, 13 Cal.App.2d 612 [ 57 P.2d 179 ]; Jubelt v. Sketers, 84 Cal.App.2d 653 [ 191 P.2d 460 ]; Hecht v. Smith, 183 Cal.App.2d 723 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 209 ].) They contend, however, there should be an exception to the foregoing rule when levy is made on personal property that cannot be taken into possession because it is in custodia legis. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Hoxie v. Bryant
green
2 sentences1966(Hoxie v. Bryant, 131 Cal. 85 [ 63 P. 153 ]; Haulman v. Crumal, 13 Cal.App.2d 612 [ 57 P.2d 179 ]; Jubelt v. Sketers, 84 Cal.App.2d 653 [ 191 P.2d 460 ]; Hecht v. Smith, 183 Cal.App.2d 723 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 209 ].) They contend, however, there should be an exception to the foregoing rule when levy is made on personal property that cannot be taken into possession because it is in custodia legis. 1966(Hoxie v. Bryant, 131 Cal. 85 [ 63 P. 153 ]; Haulman v. Crumal, 13 Cal.App.2d 612 [ 57 P.2d 179 ]; Jubelt v. Sketers, 84 Cal.App.2d 653 [ 191 P.2d 460 ]; Hecht v. Smith, 183 Cal.App.2d 723 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 209 ].) They contend, however, there should be an exception to the foregoing rule when levy is made on personal property that cannot be taken into possession because it is in custodia legis. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Simone v. McKee
green
2 sentences1963In Simone v. McKee (1956) 142 Cal. App.2d 307 [ 298 P.2d 667 ], the court stated at page 315: “He [appellant-broker] contends that the ‘out of pocket rule’ codified in section 3343 of the Civil Code is here applicable. 1963In Simone v. McKee (1956) 142 Cal. App.2d 307 [ 298 P.2d 667 ], the court stated at page 315: “He [appellant-broker] contends that the ‘out of pocket rule’ codified in section 3343 of the Civil Code is here applicable. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Garrett v. Perry
green
2 sentences1963(Bagdasarian v. Gragnon (1948) 31 Cal.2d 744 [ 192 P.2d 935 ] ; Garrett v. Perry (1959) 53 Cal.2d 178 [ 346 P.2d 758 ]; Lawson v. Town & Country Shops, Inc. (1958) 159 Cal. App.2d 196 [ 323 P.2d 843 ]; Clar v. Board of Trade (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 636 [331 P.2d 89]; McNeill v. Bredberg (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 458 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 580 ] ; Peskin v. Phinney (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 632 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 389 ].) An exception to the foregoing rule is recognized where a fiduciary relationship exists between the fraudulent and the defrauded parties. 1963(Bagdasarian v. Gragnon (1948) 31 Cal.2d 744 [ 192 P.2d 935 ] ; Garrett v. Perry (1959) 53 Cal.2d 178 [ 346 P.2d 758 ]; Lawson v. Town & Country Shops, Inc. (1958) 159 Cal. App.2d 196 [ 323 P.2d 843 ]; Clar v. Board of Trade (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 636 [331 P.2d 89]; McNeill v. Bredberg (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 458 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 580 ] ; Peskin v. Phinney (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 632 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 389 ].) An exception to the foregoing rule is recognized where a fiduciary relationship exists between the fraudulent and the defrauded parties. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Bagdasarian v. Gragnon
green
2 sentences1963(Bagdasarian v. Gragnon (1948) 31 Cal.2d 744 [ 192 P.2d 935 ] ; Garrett v. Perry (1959) 53 Cal.2d 178 [ 346 P.2d 758 ]; Lawson v. Town & Country Shops, Inc. (1958) 159 Cal. App.2d 196 [ 323 P.2d 843 ]; Clar v. Board of Trade (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 636 [331 P.2d 89]; McNeill v. Bredberg (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 458 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 580 ] ; Peskin v. Phinney (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 632 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 389 ].) An exception to the foregoing rule is recognized where a fiduciary relationship exists between the fraudulent and the defrauded parties. 1963(Bagdasarian v. Gragnon (1948) 31 Cal.2d 744 [ 192 P.2d 935 ] ; Garrett v. Perry (1959) 53 Cal.2d 178 [ 346 P.2d 758 ]; Lawson v. Town & Country Shops, Inc. (1958) 159 Cal. App.2d 196 [ 323 P.2d 843 ]; Clar v. Board of Trade (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 636 [331 P.2d 89]; McNeill v. Bredberg (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 458 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 580 ] ; Peskin v. Phinney (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 632 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 389 ].) An exception to the foregoing rule is recognized where a fiduciary relationship exists between the fraudulent and the defrauded parties. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Lawson v. Town & Country Shops, Inc.
green
2 sentences1963(Bagdasarian v. Gragnon (1948) 31 Cal.2d 744 [ 192 P.2d 935 ] ; Garrett v. Perry (1959) 53 Cal.2d 178 [ 346 P.2d 758 ]; Lawson v. Town & Country Shops, Inc. (1958) 159 Cal. App.2d 196 [ 323 P.2d 843 ]; Clar v. Board of Trade (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 636 [331 P.2d 89]; McNeill v. Bredberg (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 458 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 580 ] ; Peskin v. Phinney (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 632 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 389 ].) An exception to the foregoing rule is recognized where a fiduciary relationship exists between the fraudulent and the defrauded parties. 1963(Bagdasarian v. Gragnon (1948) 31 Cal.2d 744 [ 192 P.2d 935 ] ; Garrett v. Perry (1959) 53 Cal.2d 178 [ 346 P.2d 758 ]; Lawson v. Town & Country Shops, Inc. (1958) 159 Cal. App.2d 196 [ 323 P.2d 843 ]; Clar v. Board of Trade (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 636 [331 P.2d 89]; McNeill v. Bredberg (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 458 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 580 ] ; Peskin v. Phinney (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 632 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 389 ].) An exception to the foregoing rule is recognized where a fiduciary relationship exists between the fraudulent and the defrauded parties. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
McNeill v. Bredberg
green
2 sentences1963(Bagdasarian v. Gragnon (1948) 31 Cal.2d 744 [ 192 P.2d 935 ] ; Garrett v. Perry (1959) 53 Cal.2d 178 [ 346 P.2d 758 ]; Lawson v. Town & Country Shops, Inc. (1958) 159 Cal. App.2d 196 [ 323 P.2d 843 ]; Clar v. Board of Trade (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 636 [331 P.2d 89]; McNeill v. Bredberg (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 458 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 580 ] ; Peskin v. Phinney (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 632 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 389 ].) An exception to the foregoing rule is recognized where a fiduciary relationship exists between the fraudulent and the defrauded parties. 1963(Bagdasarian v. Gragnon (1948) 31 Cal.2d 744 [ 192 P.2d 935 ] ; Garrett v. Perry (1959) 53 Cal.2d 178 [ 346 P.2d 758 ]; Lawson v. Town & Country Shops, Inc. (1958) 159 Cal. App.2d 196 [ 323 P.2d 843 ]; Clar v. Board of Trade (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 636 [331 P.2d 89]; McNeill v. Bredberg (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 458 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 580 ] ; Peskin v. Phinney (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 632 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 389 ].) An exception to the foregoing rule is recognized where a fiduciary relationship exists between the fraudulent and the defrauded parties. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Clar v. Board of Trade of San Francisco
green
2 sentences1963(Bagdasarian v. Gragnon (1948) 31 Cal.2d 744 [ 192 P.2d 935 ] ; Garrett v. Perry (1959) 53 Cal.2d 178 [ 346 P.2d 758 ]; Lawson v. Town & Country Shops, Inc. (1958) 159 Cal. App.2d 196 [ 323 P.2d 843 ]; Clar v. Board of Trade (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 636 [331 P.2d 89]; McNeill v. Bredberg (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 458 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 580 ] ; Peskin v. Phinney (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 632 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 389 ].) An exception to the foregoing rule is recognized where a fiduciary relationship exists between the fraudulent and the defrauded parties. 1963(Bagdasarian v. Gragnon (1948) 31 Cal.2d 744 [ 192 P.2d 935 ] ; Garrett v. Perry (1959) 53 Cal.2d 178 [ 346 P.2d 758 ]; Lawson v. Town & Country Shops, Inc. (1958) 159 Cal. App.2d 196 [ 323 P.2d 843 ]; Clar v. Board of Trade (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 636 [331 P.2d 89]; McNeill v. Bredberg (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 458 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 580 ] ; Peskin v. Phinney (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 632 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 389 ].) An exception to the foregoing rule is recognized where a fiduciary relationship exists between the fraudulent and the defrauded parties. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Peskin v. Phinney
green
2 sentences1963(Bagdasarian v. Gragnon (1948) 31 Cal.2d 744 [ 192 P.2d 935 ] ; Garrett v. Perry (1959) 53 Cal.2d 178 [ 346 P.2d 758 ]; Lawson v. Town & Country Shops, Inc. (1958) 159 Cal. App.2d 196 [ 323 P.2d 843 ]; Clar v. Board of Trade (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 636 [331 P.2d 89]; McNeill v. Bredberg (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 458 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 580 ] ; Peskin v. Phinney (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 632 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 389 ].) An exception to the foregoing rule is recognized where a fiduciary relationship exists between the fraudulent and the defrauded parties. 1963(Bagdasarian v. Gragnon (1948) 31 Cal.2d 744 [ 192 P.2d 935 ] ; Garrett v. Perry (1959) 53 Cal.2d 178 [ 346 P.2d 758 ]; Lawson v. Town & Country Shops, Inc. (1958) 159 Cal. App.2d 196 [ 323 P.2d 843 ]; Clar v. Board of Trade (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 636 [331 P.2d 89]; McNeill v. Bredberg (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 458 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 580 ] ; Peskin v. Phinney (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 632 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 389 ].) An exception to the foregoing rule is recognized where a fiduciary relationship exists between the fraudulent and the defrauded parties. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| People v. Raven green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| People v. Lima green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| People v. Conrad green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Fernández Ramírez v. Registrar of Property of Guayama neutral | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Barber v. Mulford green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Moreing v. Shields neutral | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.