Hart analysis in California

2017This court also granted MID's request for judicial notice of the same legislative history in a writ proceeding involving HART's motion for summary adjudication. ( Merced Irrigation District v. Superior Court , supra , 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 923 , 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 .) The concept of property varies from context to context.

2017This court also granted MID's request for judicial notice of the same legislative history in a writ proceeding involving HART's motion for summary adjudication. ( Merced Irrigation District v. Superior Court , supra , 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 923 , 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 .) The concept of property varies from context to context.

2015(Hart, at pp. 672-673.) Our high court expressly rejected Hart’s analysis and holding in Favor. ( Favor, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 879-880.) The Favor court wrote, “Hart’s analysis rested on the distinction between greater and lesser included offenses in general and on the general rule that a trial court has a duty to instruct on lesser included offenses if the evidence supports a conviction on the lesser offense.

2013(Favor, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 879 & fn. 3.) We do not read Favor as abrogating Woods or Hart insofar as they hold the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the lesser included nontarget offenses. 50 Error regarding the “equally guilty” language is measured by the harmless- beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman. ( Nero, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 518-519; Samaniego, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165 .) As to the omission of simple mayhem from the natural and probable consequence instruction, this court has observed, “Error in instructing the jury concerning lesser forms

2026(In re Champion, 58 Cal.4th at p. 986 .) In response to Hart’s claim that “[n]o other evidence was submitted” aside from the value of and debt against his home, Sanchez points to Hart’s testimony that his law practice averages a monthly income of about $25,000 and he owns a $125,000 airplane.

2025DISCUSSION In People v. Faial, supra, 18 Cal.5th at page 220, our Supreme Court held that “in amending section 1203.1, the Legislature has authorized courts, consistent with [In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 ] principles, to retroactively shorten probation terms . . . . [Citation.] Thus, if a probation term is shortened . . . under amended section 1203.1, conduct that would have constituted a probation violation, but is now deemed to have occurred outside [the new statutory] term may not be the basis for terminating that probation.” The court’s “ ‘power to impose a sentence over the defendan

2021(See Saucedo, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d 309 ; Wilhite v. Callihan (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 295 (Wilhite).) But the instrument at issue in both of those cases also included other language that triggered Civil Code section 1717, so the courts did not have occasion to determine whether paragraph 9 alone could do so.

2021(See Saucedo, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d 309 ; Wilhite v. Callihan (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 295 (Wilhite).) But the instrument at issue in both of those cases also included other language that triggered Civil Code section 1717, so the courts did not have occasion to determine whether paragraph 9 alone could do so.

2021(See Saucedo, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d 309 ; Wilhite v. Callihan (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 295 (Wilhite).) But the instrument at issue in both of those cases also included other language that triggered Civil Code section 1717, so the courts did not have occasion to determine whether paragraph 9 alone could do so.

2021It then provides . . . that ‘[a]ny amounts disbursed by lender under this section 9 shall become additional debt of borrower secured by this security instrument.’ This is not a provision that attorney’s fees ‘shall be awarded’; it is, instead, a provision that attorney’s fees, like any other expenses the lender may incur to protect its interest, will be added to the secured debt.” ( Hart, supra, at p. 327 , capitalization omitted.) We agree with Hart’s conclusion that paragraph 9 does not contain an attorney fees provision that triggers Civil Code section 1717.14 (See also Chacker v. JPMorgan

2018We have long "require[d] full *338 disclosure to the jury of any agreement bearing on the witness's credibility, including the consequences to the witness of failure to testify truthfully." ( **520 People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792 , 823, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24 , 831 P.2d 249 ; see also People v. Frye , supra , 18 Cal.4th at p. 971 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 , 959 P.2d 183 [ruling that prosecutor properly read to the jury the terms of a witness's immunity agreement, which stated that defendant had "promised to tell the truth in exchange for the district attorney's promise to refrain from charging her w

2018We have long "require[d] full *338 disclosure to the jury of any agreement bearing on the witness's credibility, including the consequences to the witness of failure to testify truthfully." ( **520 People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792 , 823, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24 , 831 P.2d 249 ; see also People v. Frye , supra , 18 Cal.4th at p. 971 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 , 959 P.2d 183 [ruling that prosecutor properly read to the jury the terms of a witness's immunity agreement, which stated that defendant had "promised to tell the truth in exchange for the district attorney's promise to refrain from charging her w

2015However, Hart’s reliance on the principles relating to lesser included offenses is inapplicable in light of Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th 652….

2015However, Hart’s reliance on the principles relating to lesser included offenses is inapplicable in light of Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th 652….

2013(See Dimock v. Emerald Properties, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 877-878 [sale void when defect is on face of deed; otherwise voidable]; West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 802 [failure to comply with notice requirements for postponing trustee sale does not make sale void; any notice defects are deemed voidable and plaintiff was required to allege prejudice and tender of the indebtedness or excusal from tender requirement].) The lack of any proof of prejudice is fatal to Hart’s claim to set aside the sale. d.

2013(Hart, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 672 .) In Favor, our high court disapproved Hart’s analysis to the extent it viewed attempted unpremeditated murder as a lesser offense of attempted premeditated murder.

2013(Favor, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 879 & fn. 3.) We do not read Favor as abrogating Woods or Hart insofar as they hold the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the lesser included nontarget offenses. 50 Error regarding the “equally guilty” language is measured by the harmless- beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman. ( Nero, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 518-519; Samaniego, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165 .) As to the omission of simple mayhem from the natural and probable consequence instruction, this court has observed, “Error in instructing the jury concerning lesser forms

2013(Favor, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 879 & fn. 3.) We do not read Favor as abrogating Woods or Hart insofar as they hold the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the lesser included nontarget offenses. 50 Error regarding the “equally guilty” language is measured by the harmless- beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman. ( Nero, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 518-519; Samaniego, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165 .) As to the omission of simple mayhem from the natural and probable consequence instruction, this court has observed, “Error in instructing the jury concerning lesser forms

2013(Favor, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 879 & fn. 3.) We do not read Favor as abrogating Woods or Hart insofar as they hold the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the lesser included nontarget offenses. 50 Error regarding the “equally guilty” language is measured by the harmless- beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman. ( Nero, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 518-519; Samaniego, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165 .) As to the omission of simple mayhem from the natural and probable consequence instruction, this court has observed, “Error in instructing the jury concerning lesser forms

2013(Favor, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 879 & fn. 3.) We do not read Favor as abrogating Woods or Hart insofar as they hold the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the lesser included nontarget offenses. 50 Error regarding the “equally guilty” language is measured by the harmless- beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman. ( Nero, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 518-519; Samaniego, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165 .) As to the omission of simple mayhem from the natural and probable consequence instruction, this court has observed, “Error in instructing the jury concerning lesser forms

1991(Id. at pp. 1103-1104.) Rejecting this contention, the Semore court reaffirmed its adherence to the Hart analysis, stating: “Plaintiff contends that [Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist, supra, 43 Cal.3d 148 ] is inapplicable because he did not allege a physical injury ....

1991(Id. at pp. 1103-1104.) Rejecting this contention, the Semore court reaffirmed its adherence to the Hart analysis, stating: “Plaintiff contends that [Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist, supra, 43 Cal.3d 148 ] is inapplicable because he did not allege a physical injury ....