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12 California opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Roberts v. City of Palmdalegreen2 sentences2014Code, § 954; Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 370 (Roberts).) As the Roberts court explained, the Brown Act “does not purport to abrogate the [attorney-client] privilege as to written legal advice transmitted from counsel to members of the local governing body.” (Roberts, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 381 .) Additionally, Roberts clarified that “a local governing body is the holder of the attorney-client privilege with respect to written legal opinions by the governing body’s attorney, and may assert the privilege under [section 6254] of the [PRA] . . . .” (Id. at p. 373.) Based on u 2014Code, § 954; Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 370 (Roberts).) As the Roberts court explained, the Brown Act “does not purport to abrogate the [attorney-client] privilege as to written legal advice transmitted from counsel to members of the local governing body.” (Roberts, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 381 .) Additionally, Roberts clarified that “a local governing body is the holder of the attorney-client privilege with respect to written legal opinions by the governing body’s attorney, and may assert the privilege under [section 6254] of the [PRA] . . . .” (Id. at p. 373.) Based on u | 1 | 3 |
Mylan Laboratories Inc. v. Soon-Shionggreen2 sentences2015(Mylan Laboratories Inc. v. Soon-Shiong (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 71, 80 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 111 ].) While the holder of the protection from disclosure granted by the attorney work product doctrine is the attorney, the client has standing to assert the work product protection on behalf of the attorney if the attorney is absent. 2015(Mylan Laboratories Inc. v. Soon-Shiong (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 71, 80 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 111 ].) While the holder of the protection from disclosure granted by the attorney work product doctrine is the attorney, the client has standing to assert the work product protection on behalf of the attorney if the attorney is absent. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Laguna Sur Villas Community Ass'ngreen2 sentences2005Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 951, p. 207; cf. Smith v. Laguna Sur Villas Community Assn. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 639, 643 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 321 ] [holding that a condominium association was the holder of the attorney-client privilege and that its individual members could not demand production of privileged documents, except as the association’s board allowed].) While not binding, the Commission’s official comments reflect the intent of the Legislature in enacting the Evidence Code and are entitled to substantial weight in construing it. 2005Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 951, p. 207; cf. Smith v. Laguna Sur Villas Community Assn. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 639, 643 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 321 ] [holding that a condominium association was the holder of the attorney-client privilege and that its individual members could not demand production of privileged documents, except as the association’s board allowed].) While not binding, the Commission’s official comments reflect the intent of the Legislature in enacting the Evidence Code and are entitled to substantial weight in construing it. | 1 | 1 |
Van Arsdale v. Hollingergreen2 sentences2005(Van Arsdale v. Hollinger (1968) 68 Cal.2d 245, 249 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 20 , 437 P.2d 508 ], overruled on another point in Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 702, fn. 4 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 , 854 P.2d 721 ]; see People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667-668 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 888 , 547 P.2d 1000 ].) As MCA points out, each of the three unincorporated organizations the Commission lists is a collective entity that the Internal Revenue Code recognizes as having tax exempt status. 2005(Van Arsdale v. Hollinger (1968) 68 Cal.2d 245, 249 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 20 , 437 P.2d 508 ], overruled on another point in Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 702, fn. 4 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 , 854 P.2d 721 ]; see People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667-668 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 888 , 547 P.2d 1000 ].) As MCA points out, each of the three unincorporated organizations the Commission lists is a collective entity that the Internal Revenue Code recognizes as having tax exempt status. | 1 | 1 |
Privette v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2005(Van Arsdale v. Hollinger (1968) 68 Cal.2d 245, 249 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 20 , 437 P.2d 508 ], overruled on another point in Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 702, fn. 4 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 , 854 P.2d 721 ]; see People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667-668 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 888 , 547 P.2d 1000 ].) As MCA points out, each of the three unincorporated organizations the Commission lists is a collective entity that the Internal Revenue Code recognizes as having tax exempt status. 2005(Van Arsdale v. Hollinger (1968) 68 Cal.2d 245, 249 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 20 , 437 P.2d 508 ], overruled on another point in Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 702, fn. 4 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 , 854 P.2d 721 ]; see People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667-668 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 888 , 547 P.2d 1000 ].) As MCA points out, each of the three unincorporated organizations the Commission lists is a collective entity that the Internal Revenue Code recognizes as having tax exempt status. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2005(Van Arsdale v. Hollinger (1968) 68 Cal.2d 245, 249 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 20 , 437 P.2d 508 ], overruled on another point in Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 702, fn. 4 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 , 854 P.2d 721 ]; see People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667-668 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 888 , 547 P.2d 1000 ].) As MCA points out, each of the three unincorporated organizations the Commission lists is a collective entity that the Internal Revenue Code recognizes as having tax exempt status. 2005(Van Arsdale v. Hollinger (1968) 68 Cal.2d 245, 249 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 20 , 437 P.2d 508 ], overruled on another point in Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 702, fn. 4 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 , 854 P.2d 721 ]; see People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667-668 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 888 , 547 P.2d 1000 ].) As MCA points out, each of the three unincorporated organizations the Commission lists is a collective entity that the Internal Revenue Code recognizes as having tax exempt status. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Travelers Ins. Companies v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1990Companies v. Superior Court, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d 436 , it was argued that the holder of the attorney-client privilege had waived the privilege by signing answers to interrogatories. 1984Companies v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 436 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 871 ], there was a contention that the holder of the attorney-client privilege had waived the privilege by signing answers to interrogatories. | 2 | 1984–1990 |
Dickerson v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2004(Dickerson v. Superior Court, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at p. 98 .) This is because section 953, subdivision (d), provides that the successor of a disappeared corporation becomes the holder of the attorney-client privilege. 2004(Dickerson v. Superior Court, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at p. 98 .) The privilege may be claimed by “[t]he person who was the lawyer at the time of the confidential communication, but such person may not claim the privilege if there is no holder of the privilege in existence or if [s]he is otherwise instructed by a person authorized to permit disclosure.” (§ 954, subd. (c).) 2 Thus, “[a]s long as there is a holder of the privilege in existence at the time disclosure is sought, the attorney has the duty to exercise the privilege unless the holder of the privilege instmcts [her] not to do so.” (Dick | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Moeller v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2004Code, §§ 8524, 9820, 10801.) 5 The second is our decision in Moeller, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1124, 1129-1135 , in which we held that a successor fiduciary, upon taking office, becomes the holder of the attorney-client privilege for certain confidential communications between the predecessor fiduciary and an attorney on the subject of trust administration. 2004A successor fiduciary becomes the holder of the attorney-client privilege “only as to those confidential communications that occurred when the predecessor, in [his or her] fiduciary capacity, sought the attorney’s advice for guidance in administering the trust.” ( Moeller, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1124, 1134 , first italics added.) Conversely, a successor fiduciary does not become the holder of the privilege for confidential communications that occurred when a predecessor fiduciary in his or her personal capacity sought an attorney’s advice. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Shaffery v. WEMED
green
2 sentences2002The client is the holder of the attorney-client privilege (Evid.Code, § 952), and [the client] expressly preserved the privilege as to Paris & Paris by choosing not to sue it for malpractice. [Citation.] If the indemnity action were allowed, Paris & Paris would be unable to defend itself to the extent that its actions depended on client communications." ( Kroll & Tract, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 1544, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 78 .) "Where there is doubt about [the application of the attorney-client privilege], we will construe it liberally. [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 1545, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 78 .) In Shaff 2002The client is the holder of the attorney-client privilege (Evid.Code, § 952), and [the client] expressly preserved the privilege as to Paris & Paris by choosing not to sue it for malpractice. [Citation.] If the indemnity action were allowed, Paris & Paris would be unable to defend itself to the extent that its actions depended on client communications." ( Kroll & Tract, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 1544, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 78 .) "Where there is doubt about [the application of the attorney-client privilege], we will construe it liberally. [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 1545, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 78 .) In Shaff | 1 | 2002–2002 |
KROLL & TRACK v. Paris & Paris
green
2 sentences2002The client is the holder of the attorney-client privilege (Evid.Code, § 952), and [the client] expressly preserved the privilege as to Paris & Paris by choosing not to sue it for malpractice. [Citation.] If the indemnity action were allowed, Paris & Paris would be unable to defend itself to the extent that its actions depended on client communications." ( Kroll & Tract, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 1544, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 78 .) "Where there is doubt about [the application of the attorney-client privilege], we will construe it liberally. [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 1545, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 78 .) In Shaff 2002The client is the holder of the attorney-client privilege (Evid.Code, § 952), and [the client] expressly preserved the privilege as to Paris & Paris by choosing not to sue it for malpractice. [Citation.] If the indemnity action were allowed, Paris & Paris would be unable to defend itself to the extent that its actions depended on client communications." ( Kroll & Tract, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 1544, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 78 .) "Where there is doubt about [the application of the attorney-client privilege], we will construe it liberally. [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 1545, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 78 .) In Shaff | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Terry
green
2 sentences2000As this court noted in People v. Terry (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 97 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 729 ]: “The district attorney is constituted by statute to conduct *397 all prosecutions on behalf of the state (Gov. 2000As this court noted in People v. Terry (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 97 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 729 ]: “The district attorney is constituted by statute to conduct *397 all prosecutions on behalf of the state (Gov. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Mitchell v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1999The client is the holder of the attorney-client privilege (Evid.Code, § 952), and San Jose Crane expressly preserved the privilege as to Paris & Paris by choosing not to sue it for malpractice. ( Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 591, 599 , 208 Cal.Rptr. 886 , 691 P.2d 642 .) If the indemnity action were allowed, Paris & Paris would be unable to defend itself to the extent that its actions depended on client communications. 1999The client is the holder of the attorney-client privilege (Evid.Code, § 952), and San Jose Crane expressly preserved the privilege as to Paris & Paris by choosing not to sue it for malpractice. ( Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 591, 599 , 208 Cal.Rptr. 886 , 691 P.2d 642 .) If the indemnity action were allowed, Paris & Paris would be unable to defend itself to the extent that its actions depended on client communications. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Fleschler v. Strauss
green
2 sentences1999Kroll & Tract claims the client communications relevant to the joint representation could only be instructions or authority from San Jose Crane to Paris & Paris, which are communications excluded from the privilege. ( Fleschler v. Strauss (1936) 15 Cal.App.2d 735 , 60 P.2d 193 .) Fleschler merely stands for the proposition that the privilege does not attach to communications that were not intended to be confidential. 1999Kroll & Tract claims the client communications relevant to the joint representation could only be instructions or authority from San Jose Crane to Paris & Paris, which are communications excluded from the privilege. ( Fleschler v. Strauss (1936) 15 Cal.App.2d 735 , 60 P.2d 193 .) Fleschler merely stands for the proposition that the privilege does not attach to communications that were not intended to be confidential. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.