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12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rawlings v. D. M. Oliver, Inc.green2 sentences1999Oliver, Inc. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 890 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 119 ].) MBII argues there is no significant difference between a plaintiff injured by a defective product and one harmed by corporate negligence and urges us to broaden the Ray exception. 1999Oliver, Inc. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 890 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 119 ].) MBII argues there is no significant difference between a plaintiff injured by a defective product and one harmed by corporate negligence and urges us to broaden the Ray exception. | 1 | 3 |
Darrel Franklin v. USX Corp.green2 sentences2017ConAgra suggests that the "product line exception" to the Ray test applied, but it also failed to provide any evidentiary support for the application of that exception, even if it were the case that this exception could be applied outside the strict products liability context in this public nuisance abatement action. 83 (See Franklin v. USX Corp. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 615 , 628, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 11 [describing the requirements for product line exception and refusing to extend it beyond the strict liability context]; *162 Monarch Bay II v. Professional Service Industries, Inc. (1999) 75 Cal.App. 2017ConAgra suggests that the "product line exception" to the Ray test applied, but it also failed to provide any evidentiary support for the application of that exception, even if it were the case that this exception could be applied outside the strict products liability context in this public nuisance abatement action. 83 (See Franklin v. USX Corp. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 615 , 628, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 11 [describing the requirements for product line exception and refusing to extend it beyond the strict liability context]; *162 Monarch Bay II v. Professional Service Industries, Inc. (1999) 75 Cal.App. | 1 | 2 |
Mbii v. Psigreen2 sentences2017ConAgra suggests that the "product line exception" to the Ray test applied, but it also failed to provide any evidentiary support for the application of that exception, even if it were the case that this exception could be applied outside the strict products liability context in this public nuisance abatement action. 83 (See Franklin v. USX Corp. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 615 , 628, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 11 [describing the requirements for product line exception and refusing to extend it beyond the strict liability context]; *162 Monarch Bay II v. Professional Service Industries, Inc. (1999) 75 Cal.App. 2017ConAgra suggests that the "product line exception" to the Ray test applied, but it also failed to provide any evidentiary support for the application of that exception, even if it were the case that this exception could be applied outside the strict products liability context in this public nuisance abatement action. 83 (See Franklin v. USX Corp. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 615 , 628, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 11 [describing the requirements for product line exception and refusing to extend it beyond the strict liability context]; *162 Monarch Bay II v. Professional Service Industries, Inc. (1999) 75 Cal.App. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Henry S.green2 sentences2016(See In re Henry S. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 248, 256 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 418 ] [Juvenile court’s finding treating minor “as a ward under section 600 was an interim order that affected his subsequent treatment by [the juvenile court],” which may be reviewed on appeal from the subsequent jurisdictional and dispositional judgment.].) The Department asserts there is “no express statutory authority [or] case law to support [Ray’s] assertion that the Imperial County juvenile courts had the authority to overturn Kern County[ juvenile court’s s]ection 241.1 determination.” The Department also suggests Ray 2016(See In re Henry S. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 248, 256 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 418 ] [Juvenile court’s finding treating minor “as a ward under section 600 was an interim order that affected his subsequent treatment by [the juvenile court],” which may be reviewed on appeal from the subsequent jurisdictional and dispositional judgment.].) The Department asserts there is “no express statutory authority [or] case law to support [Ray’s] assertion that the Imperial County juvenile courts had the authority to overturn Kern County[ juvenile court’s s]ection 241.1 determination.” The Department also suggests Ray | 1 | 1 |
Maryland v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2015(Id. at pp. 1053-1054.) Applying the Ray requirement for reasonableness to these facts, the Madrid court held that “[t]he stop of appellant’s vehicle fail[ed] the reasonableness test.” (Madrid, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1059 .) The Madrid court noted that “ ‘reasonableness “depends ‘on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers,’ ” [citation].’ (Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 519 U.S. 408, 412 [ 137 L.Ed.2d 41 ].)” (Id. at p. 1058) Citing Ray, it emphasized that “[i]n engaging in this weighing process, co 2015(Id. at pp. 1053-1054.) Applying the Ray requirement for reasonableness to these facts, the Madrid court held that “[t]he stop of appellant’s vehicle fail[ed] the reasonableness test.” (Madrid, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1059 .) The Madrid court noted that “ ‘reasonableness “depends ‘on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers,’ ” [citation].’ (Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 519 U.S. 408, 412 [ 137 L.Ed.2d 41 ].)” (Id. at p. 1058) Citing Ray, it emphasized that “[i]n engaging in this weighing process, co | 1 | 1 |
Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc.green2 sentences1996Proc. § 1008; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 177-180 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 626 , 681 P.2d 893 ].) The matter having been fully briefed, issuance of an alternative writ would add nothing to the exposition of the issues. 5 Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the superior court to vacate its order of January 17, 1996, granting plaintiff Ray’s motion to compel further answers to interrogatories, and issue a new and different order denying the motion. 1996Proc. § 1008; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 177-180 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 626 , 681 P.2d 893 ].) The matter having been fully briefed, issuance of an alternative writ would add nothing to the exposition of the issues. 5 Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the superior court to vacate its order of January 17, 1996, granting plaintiff Ray’s motion to compel further answers to interrogatories, and issue a new and different order denying the motion. | 1 | 1 |
Minton v. Cavaneygreen2 sentences1965(Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal.2d 576, 581 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 364 P.2d 473 ].) Captioned “ Tebmination of Lease By Mebgeb with Fee Simple Intebest,” it is assertedly an action to quiet title possessing the essential characteristics of the old legal action of ejectment. 1965(Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal.2d 576, 581 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 364 P.2d 473 ].) Captioned “ Tebmination of Lease By Mebgeb with Fee Simple Intebest,” it is assertedly an action to quiet title possessing the essential characteristics of the old legal action of ejectment. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ray v. Alad Corp.
green
2 sentences1988Ray v. Alad Corp., supra, 19 Cal.3d at page 31 states, “Justification for imposing strict liability upon a successor to a manufacturer under the circumstances here presented rests upon (1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff’s remedies against the original manufacturer caused by the successor’s acquisition of the business, (2) the successor’s ability to assume the original manufacturer’s risk-spreading role, and (3) the fairness of requiring the successor to assume a responsibility for defective products that was a burden necessarily attached to the original manufacturer’s good will being 1988Ray v. Alad Corp., supra, 19 Cal.3d at page 31 states, “Justification for imposing strict liability upon a successor to a manufacturer under the circumstances here presented rests upon (1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff’s remedies against the original manufacturer caused by the successor’s acquisition of the business, (2) the successor’s ability to assume the original manufacturer’s risk-spreading role, and (3) the fairness of requiring the successor to assume a responsibility for defective products that was a burden necessarily attached to the original manufacturer’s good will being | 4 | 1987–1999 |
Benach v. County of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2023This opinion will address only the order issued in trial court case No. 21CV000532. 2 authority, we treat the point as waived. [Citation.]” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 .) Ms. Ray’s brief does not comply with these requirements. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Bennett
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 124 ; People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577 , 611-612 & fn. 14.) However, Ray’s motion for mistrial was triggered by the second reference, which he claims implied he had a probation officer. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Valdez
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 124 ; People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577 , 611-612 & fn. 14.) However, Ray’s motion for mistrial was triggered by the second reference, which he claims implied he had a probation officer. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Madrid
green
2 sentences2015(Id. at pp. 1053-1054.) Applying the Ray requirement for reasonableness to these facts, the Madrid court held that “[t]he stop of appellant’s vehicle fail[ed] the reasonableness test.” (Madrid, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1059 .) The Madrid court noted that “ ‘reasonableness “depends ‘on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers,’ ” [citation].’ (Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 519 U.S. 408, 412 [ 137 L.Ed.2d 41 ].)” (Id. at p. 1058) Citing Ray, it emphasized that “[i]n engaging in this weighing process, co 2015(Id. at pp. 1053-1054.) Applying the Ray requirement for reasonableness to these facts, the Madrid court held that “[t]he stop of appellant’s vehicle fail[ed] the reasonableness test.” (Madrid, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1059 .) The Madrid court noted that “ ‘reasonableness “depends ‘on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers,’ ” [citation].’ (Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 519 U.S. 408, 412 [ 137 L.Ed.2d 41 ].)” (Id. at p. 1058) Citing Ray, it emphasized that “[i]n engaging in this weighing process, co | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.