reason behind rule in California

1989Discussion Plaintiff’s contentions on appeal all relate to whether the September 29th stipulation precluded defendant from relying on the five-year dismissal statute. 2 Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310 directs that “[a]n action shall be brought to trial within five years after the action is commenced . . . .” Section 583.330 provides that “[t]he parties may extend the time within *883 which an action must be brought to trial pursuant to this article by the following means: “(a) By written stipulation. . . . “(b) By oral agreement made in open court, ...” As stated in Taylor v. Shultz (1

1989Discussion Plaintiff’s contentions on appeal all relate to whether the September 29th stipulation precluded defendant from relying on the five-year dismissal statute. 2 Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310 directs that “[a]n action shall be brought to trial within five years after the action is commenced . . . .” Section 583.330 provides that “[t]he parties may extend the time within *883 which an action must be brought to trial pursuant to this article by the following means: “(a) By written stipulation. . . . “(b) By oral agreement made in open court, ...” As stated in Taylor v. Shultz (1

1989Discussion Plaintiff’s contentions on appeal all relate to whether the September 29th stipulation precluded defendant from relying on the five-year dismissal statute. 2 Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310 directs that “[a]n action shall be brought to trial within five years after the action is commenced . . . .” Section 583.330 provides that “[t]he parties may extend the time within *883 which an action must be brought to trial pursuant to this article by the following means: “(a) By written stipulation. . . . “(b) By oral agreement made in open court, ...” As stated in Taylor v. Shultz (1

1989Discussion Plaintiff’s contentions on appeal all relate to whether the September 29th stipulation precluded defendant from relying on the five-year dismissal statute. 2 Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310 directs that “[a]n action shall be brought to trial within five years after the action is commenced . . . .” Section 583.330 provides that “[t]he parties may extend the time within *883 which an action must be brought to trial pursuant to this article by the following means: “(a) By written stipulation. . . . “(b) By oral agreement made in open court, ...” As stated in Taylor v. Shultz (1

2005(Zavala v. Arce, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 924, fn. 7 .) The reason behind this rule, however, does not clearly apply to an order under section 662 denying a new trial, vacating the judgment, and reopening the case for further *80 proceedings.

1999Finally, although the prosecution must always prove the existence of a policy supporting an inventory search ( Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at pp. 4-5 [ 110 S.Ct. at p. 1635 ]; Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 374, fn. 6 [ 107 S.Ct. at p. 742 ]), the facts of this case underscore forcefully the reason behind this rule.

1999Finally, although the prosecution must always prove the existence of a policy supporting an inventory search ( Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at pp. 4-5 [ 110 S.Ct. at p. 1635 ]; Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 374, fn. 6 [ 107 S.Ct. at p. 742 ]), the facts of this case underscore forcefully the reason behind this rule.

1997In Scott , our Supreme Court first enunciated the rule that “complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356.) “Included [within the waiver doctrine] are cases in which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor, misweighed the various factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of val

1985Citing Martin v. Cook (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 799, 806 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 434 ], the Bewley firm contends it was plaintiffs duty to obtain a waiver.

1985Citing Martin v. Cook (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 799, 806 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 434 ], the Bewley firm contends it was plaintiffs duty to obtain a waiver.

1983(See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 535, fn. 5 ; Rest.2d Torts, supra, § 652D, com. e.) [20] (9b) However, the extent to which Diaz voluntarily acceded to a position of public notoriety and the degree to which she opened her private life are questions of fact. ( Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 541 .) As student body president, Diaz was a public figure for some purposes.

1983(See Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc., supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 535, fn. 5 ; Rest.2d Torts, supra, § 652D, com. e.) 20 However, the extent to which Diaz voluntarily acceded to a position of public notoriety and the degree to which she opened her private life are questions of fact.

1978(Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal.3d 288, 292 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]; In re Johnson, 62 Cal.2d 325, 336 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ].) The particular rule here under examination also was fashioned to serve a valid governmental purpose, although the reason behind the rule is not what defendant supposes.

1978(Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal.3d 288, 292 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]; In re Johnson, 62 Cal.2d 325, 336 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ].) The particular rule here under examination also was fashioned to serve a valid governmental purpose, although the reason behind the rule is not what defendant supposes.

1978(Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal.3d 288, 292 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]; In re Johnson, 62 Cal.2d 325, 336 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ].) The particular rule here under examination also was fashioned to serve a valid governmental purpose, although the reason behind the rule is not what defendant supposes.

1978(Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal.3d 288, 292 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]; In re Johnson, 62 Cal.2d 325, 336 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ].) The particular rule here under examination also was fashioned to serve a valid governmental purpose, although the reason behind the rule is not what defendant supposes.

1968“Even if the trial court should have excluded the statement [s], however, we conclude that the People have proved ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ [Citation.]” {People v. Flores, 68 Cal.2d 563, 568 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 440 P.2d 233 ].) In fact, the admissi *889 ble evidence against each of the appellants, as hereinabove described, was overwhelming.

1968The language of our Supreme Court in Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi Corp., 63 Cal.2d 199 at pp. 218-219 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 878 , 404 P.2d 486 ], is particularly appropriate to the facts of the case at bench: “There is no doubt that the general rule requires the courts to withhold relief under the terms of an illegal contract or agreement which is violative of public policy.

1968The language of our Supreme Court in Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi Corp., 63 Cal.2d 199 at pp. 218-219 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 878 , 404 P.2d 486 ], is particularly appropriate to the facts of the case at bench: “There is no doubt that the general rule requires the courts to withhold relief under the terms of an illegal contract or agreement which is violative of public policy.