wrongful termination claim in California

2025(See Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880 , 889–890 [stating that the public policy at issue must be established by constitutional or statutory provision].) The trial court found the wrongful termination claim failed with the summary adjudication of the predicate retaliation claim.

2016(Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 896-897, 909 .) Because plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim is in this sense derivative of his other FEHA-based claims, the authority cited above requires us to assume Juror Nos. 9 and 12 did not vote inconsistently, but instead to assume that they recognized that they were outvoted on the preceding FEHA claims and thereafter “‘accep[ed] th[at] outcome’” when voting on the wrongful termination claim.

2020(See, e.g., Carter v. Escondido Union High School Dist. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 922, 929 [in a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, “[w]hether the policy upon which a wrongful termination claim is based is sufficiently fundamental, well-established and tethered to a statutory or constitutional provision to support liability is a legal question that we review de novo”]; Ling v. P.F.

2020(See, e.g., Carter v. Escondido Union High School Dist. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 922, 929 [in a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, “[w]hether the policy upon which a wrongful termination claim is based is sufficiently fundamental, well-established and tethered to a statutory or constitutional provision to support liability is a legal question that we review de novo”]; Ling v. P.F.

2020In Jersey, the Court of Appeal considered whether an employer “that terminates an at-will employee for bringing [a lawsuit] violates a fundamental public policy that supports a so- called Tameny claim.” (Jersey, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 818 , citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 170 .) The Court of Appeal concluded that it did not ( Jersey, supra, at p. 818 ), reasoning: “While discharging an employee for exercising a right or privilege may in some instances contravene a fundamental public policy, supporting a wrongful termination claim, neither [Gantt v. Sentry Ins

2016He contends “a wrongful termination claim against public policy does not seek to vindicate individual rights, it seeks to vindicate the right of society at large.” Individual rights and societal concerns are equally vindicated by both types of claims. 21 overruled in part on another point in Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66 .) The California Supreme Court has said that “a common law tort claim based on the public policy against age discrimination articulated in the FEHA is subject to the FEHA’s limitations on the nature and scope of the statutory prohibition against age disc

2014(Green, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 71 .) More specifically, to be actionable, the discharge must violate a policy that is “(1) delineated in either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) ‘public’ in the sense that it ‘inures to the benefit of the public’ rather than serving merely the interests of the individual; (3) well established at the time of the discharge; and (4) ‘substantial’ and ‘fundamental.’ ” (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 901-902 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 ] (Stevenson); see id. at pp. 890, 894; see Carter v. Escondido Union High School Dist. (200

2014(Green, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 71 .) More specifically, to be actionable, the discharge must violate a policy that is “(1) delineated in either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) ‘public’ in the sense that it ‘inures to the benefit of the public’ rather than serving merely the interests of the individual; (3) well established at the time of the discharge; and (4) ‘substantial’ and ‘fundamental.’ ” (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 901-902 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 ] (Stevenson); see id. at pp. 890, 894; see Carter v. Escondido Union High School Dist. (200

2020In Jersey, the Court of Appeal considered whether an employer “that terminates an at-will employee for bringing [a lawsuit] violates a fundamental public policy that supports a so- called Tameny claim.” (Jersey, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 818 , citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 170 .) The Court of Appeal concluded that it did not ( Jersey, supra, at p. 818 ), reasoning: “While discharging an employee for exercising a right or privilege may in some instances contravene a fundamental public policy, supporting a wrongful termination claim, neither [Gantt v. Sentry Ins

2014If an employer terminates an employment relationship for a reason that contravenes some fundamental public policy, then the employer breaches a general duty imposed by law upon all employers and the employee’s remedy therefore sounds in tort.” (Miklosy, at p. 900, citing Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 176 .) In Miklosy, the Supreme Court examined the interplay between a common law Tameny claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and a wrongful termination claim based on statute.

2007(See, e.g., Silo v. CHW Medical Foundation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1097, 1110 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 , 45 P.3d 1162 ] [“an employer cannot be held liable for violating a public policy that was not manifest at the time it committed the alleged tortious action”]; Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 668 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 ] (Foley) [the public policy supporting a wrongful termination claim should be “one about which reasonable persons can have little disagreement, and which was ‘firmly established’ at the time of discharge”].) 11 In sum, we are unable to discern from se

2007(See, e.g., Silo v. CHW Medical Foundation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1097, 1110 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 , 45 P.3d 1162 ] [“an employer cannot be held liable for violating a public policy that was not manifest at the time it committed the alleged tortious action”]; Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 668 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 ] (Foley) [the public policy supporting a wrongful termination claim should be “one about which reasonable persons can have little disagreement, and which was ‘firmly established’ at the time of discharge”].) 11 In sum, we are unable to discern from se

2025Co. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 1, 3-4 (Waters).) Both sections are part of the Public Utilities Act (§ 201 et seq.) (the Act).

2025Co. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 1, 3-4 (Waters).) Both sections are part of the Public Utilities Act (§ 201 et seq.) (the Act).

2022(See Wilkin, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 831; Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 229 [because the plaintiff’s FEHA claim failed, the plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim also failed].) 1.

2014(Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 229 [when plaintiff does not argue an independent basis to support claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, that claim fails when underlying FEHA claim fails].) 8 “At trial, the McDonnell Douglas test places on the plaintiff the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

2020Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1252 [“In determining whether an arbitration award contravenes 19 public policy, we review the trial court’s decision de novo”]; Bickel v. Sunrise Assisted Living (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [“the issue of whether the waiver of statutory rights [in an arbitration agreement] violated public policy presents a legal issue that we review de novo.”]; Tunstall v. Wells (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 554, 561 [“we review de novo whether the Trust’s no contest clause violates public policy”].) The two cases holding otherwise provide no analysis for utili

2020Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1252 [“In determining whether an arbitration award contravenes 19 public policy, we review the trial court’s decision de novo”]; Bickel v. Sunrise Assisted Living (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [“the issue of whether the waiver of statutory rights [in an arbitration agreement] violated public policy presents a legal issue that we review de novo.”]; Tunstall v. Wells (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 554, 561 [“we review de novo whether the Trust’s no contest clause violates public policy”].) The two cases holding otherwise provide no analysis for utili

2020Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1252 [“In determining whether an arbitration award contravenes 19 public policy, we review the trial court’s decision de novo”]; Bickel v. Sunrise Assisted Living (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [“the issue of whether the waiver of statutory rights [in an arbitration agreement] violated public policy presents a legal issue that we review de novo.”]; Tunstall v. Wells (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 554, 561 [“we review de novo whether the Trust’s no contest clause violates public policy”].) The two cases holding otherwise provide no analysis for utili

2020Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1252 [“In determining whether an arbitration award contravenes 19 public policy, we review the trial court’s decision de novo”]; Bickel v. Sunrise Assisted Living (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [“the issue of whether the waiver of statutory rights [in an arbitration agreement] violated public policy presents a legal issue that we review de novo.”]; Tunstall v. Wells (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 554, 561 [“we review de novo whether the Trust’s no contest clause violates public policy”].) The two cases holding otherwise provide no analysis for utili

2020Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1252 [“In determining whether an arbitration award contravenes 19 public policy, we review the trial court’s decision de novo”]; Bickel v. Sunrise Assisted Living (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [“the issue of whether the waiver of statutory rights [in an arbitration agreement] violated public policy presents a legal issue that we review de novo.”]; Tunstall v. Wells (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 554, 561 [“we review de novo whether the Trust’s no contest clause violates public policy”].) The two cases holding otherwise provide no analysis for utili

2020Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1252 [“In determining whether an arbitration award contravenes 19 public policy, we review the trial court’s decision de novo”]; Bickel v. Sunrise Assisted Living (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [“the issue of whether the waiver of statutory rights [in an arbitration agreement] violated public policy presents a legal issue that we review de novo.”]; Tunstall v. Wells (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 554, 561 [“we review de novo whether the Trust’s no contest clause violates public policy”].) The two cases holding otherwise provide no analysis for utili

2020(Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1247 .) In interpreting a statute, we attempt “to ascertain and effectuate the law’s 3 The statute also prohibits an employer from seeking or using as a factor in an employment decision any record that concerns a conviction that has been judicially dismissed. (§ 432.7, subd. (a)(1).) The parties did not raise this as a basis for the wrongful termination claim. 8 intended purpose.” (Id. at p. 1246.) Our “ ‘fundamental task’ ” is “ ‘to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ ” (Carson Citizens for Reform

2020(Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1247 .) In interpreting a statute, we attempt "to ascertain and effectuate the law's intended purpose." (Id. at p. 1246.) Our " 'fundamental task' " is " 'to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose.' " (Carson Citizens for Reform v. Kawagoe (2009) 178 3 The statute also prohibits an employer from seeking or using as a factor in an employment decision any record that concerns a conviction that has been judicially dismissed. (§ 432.7, subd. (a)(1).) The parties did not raise this as a basis for the wrongfu

2016He contends “a wrongful termination claim against public policy does not seek to vindicate individual rights, it seeks to vindicate the right of society at large.” Individual rights and societal concerns are equally vindicated by both types of claims. 13 See also Stevenson v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.4th at page 904 (“[W]hen a plaintiff relies upon a statutory prohibition to support a common law cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, the common law claim is subject to statutory limitations affecting the nature and scope of the statutory prohibition . . . .

2016He contends “a wrongful termination claim against public policy does not seek to vindicate individual rights, it seeks to vindicate the right of society at large.” Individual rights and societal concerns are equally vindicated by both types of claims. 13 See also Stevenson v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.4th at page 904 (“[W]hen a plaintiff relies upon a statutory prohibition to support a common law cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, the common law claim is subject to statutory limitations affecting the nature and scope of the statutory prohibition . . . .

2016We review the first claim independently (Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1242 (Taylor)), although plaintiff arguably forfeited this claim by not raising it below (Crawford v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1274 [“[m]atters not raised in the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal”]).

2014Typically, “[w]hen a cause of action for which attorney fees are provided by statute is joined with other causes of action for which attorney fees are not permitted, the prevailing party may recover only on the statutory cause of action.” (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133 .) However, “[s]uch fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation of an issue common to both a cause of action for which fees are permitted and one for which they are not.” (Ibid.) In a FEHA action, the trial court can award attorney fees and costs incurred defending both FEH

2020In Jersey, the Court of Appeal considered whether an employer “that terminates an at-will employee for bringing [a lawsuit] violates a fundamental public policy that supports a so- called Tameny claim.” (Jersey, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 818 , citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 170 .) The Court of Appeal concluded that it did not ( Jersey, supra, at p. 818 ), reasoning: “While discharging an employee for exercising a right or privilege may in some instances contravene a fundamental public policy, supporting a wrongful termination claim, neither [Gantt v. Sentry Ins

2002In general, an employer who discharges an employee for refusing to do something public policy condemns may be subject to a wrongful termination claim. ( Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 , 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 ( Tameny ); Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1100 , 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 ["The obligation to refrain from ... conduct [that violates public policy] is a `duty imposed by law upon all employers to implement the fundamental public policies' of the state [citation]; it cannot be bargained away [citation] ..."].) In order to preva

2010(LAMTA, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 682 .) As the California Supreme Court noted in Vacanti, courts have exempted wrongful termination claims from exclusivity and thus have allowed “an employee to recover economic damages on a wrongful termination claim because the damages arose out of the act of termination—and not out of an injury to the employee’s person.” (Vacanti, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 814 ; see also Pichon v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 488, 500-501 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 677 ] (Pichon).) We also reject SunLine’s contention that the arbitration award creates the possibil

2010(LAMTA, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 682 .) As the California Supreme Court noted in Vacanti, courts have exempted wrongful termination claims from exclusivity and thus have allowed “an employee to recover economic damages on a wrongful termination claim because the damages arose out of the act of termination—and not out of an injury to the employee’s person.” (Vacanti, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 814 ; see also Pichon v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 488, 500-501 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 677 ] (Pichon).) We also reject SunLine’s contention that the arbitration award creates the possibil

2000Our Supreme Court first recognized that an at-will employee may bring a tort cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 , 9 A.L.R.4th 314 ], (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 888 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 ].) Appellate decisions predating Tameny had suggested that an at-will employee could maintain a wrongful termination claim (Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 184, 188 [ 344 P.2d 25 ]), but Taylor identifi

2000Our Supreme Court first recognized that an at-will employee may bring a tort cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 , 9 A.L.R.4th 314 ], (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 888 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 ].) Appellate decisions predating Tameny had suggested that an at-will employee could maintain a wrongful termination claim (Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 184, 188 [ 344 P.2d 25 ]), but Taylor identifi

2025(Arteaga v. Brinks, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 355 [“The wrongful termination claim is . . . based on the FEHA’s prohibition of physical disability discrimination.

2013"As a 9 result, the wrongful termination claim fails for the same reasons as the FEHA claim[s.]" (Arteaga v. Brink's, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 355 .) IV.