Reyes claim in California

2022“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1062 ; accord, City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 .) “‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’” (Park, at p. 1063; accord Cotati, at pp. 76-77.) “Instead, the focus is on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liabilit

2022“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1062 ; accord, City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 .) “‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’” (Park, at p. 1063; accord Cotati, at pp. 76-77.) “Instead, the focus is on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liabilit

2022(See Benasra v. Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1189 [“Evidence that confidential information was actually used against the former client in litigation would help support damages, but is not the basis for the claim.”].) The trial court therefore erred in finding Reyes’s claim for professional negligence arose from McIntosh’s protected activity.

2022(See Benasra v. Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1189 [“Evidence that confidential information was actually used against the former client in litigation would help support damages, but is not the basis for the claim.”].) The trial court therefore erred in finding Reyes’s claim for professional negligence arose from McIntosh’s protected activity.

2022“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1062 ; accord, City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 .) “‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’” (Park, at p. 1063; accord Cotati, at pp. 76-77.) “Instead, the focus is on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liabilit

2022“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1062 ; accord, City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 .) “‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’” (Park, at p. 1063; accord Cotati, at pp. 76-77.) “Instead, the focus is on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liabilit

2022The elements of a negligence claim are ““a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.’” (Sabetian v. Exxon Mobil Corporation (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1054 , 1070; accord, Day v. Lupo Vine Street L.P. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 62, 69 .) “Recovery in a negligence action depends as a threshold matter on whether the defendant had ‘“a duty to use due care toward an interest of [the plaintiff’s] that enjoys legal protection against unintentional invasion.”’” (Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 397 ; accord, Sabetian, at p. 1070.) The first amende

2022The elements of a negligence claim are ““a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.’” (Sabetian v. Exxon Mobil Corporation (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1054 , 1070; accord, Day v. Lupo Vine Street L.P. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 62, 69 .) “Recovery in a negligence action depends as a threshold matter on whether the defendant had ‘“a duty to use due care toward an interest of [the plaintiff’s] that enjoys legal protection against unintentional invasion.”’” (Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 397 ; accord, Sabetian, at p. 1070.) The first amende

2022The elements of a negligence claim are ““a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.’” (Sabetian v. Exxon Mobil Corporation (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1054 , 1070; accord, Day v. Lupo Vine Street L.P. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 62, 69 .) “Recovery in a negligence action depends as a threshold matter on whether the defendant had ‘“a duty to use due care toward an interest of [the plaintiff’s] that enjoys legal protection against unintentional invasion.”’” (Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 397 ; accord, Sabetian, at p. 1070.) The first amende

2022The elements of a negligence claim are ““a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.’” (Sabetian v. Exxon Mobil Corporation (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1054 , 1070; accord, Day v. Lupo Vine Street L.P. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 62, 69 .) “Recovery in a negligence action depends as a threshold matter on whether the defendant had ‘“a duty to use due care toward an interest of [the plaintiff’s] that enjoys legal protection against unintentional invasion.”’” (Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 397 ; accord, Sabetian, at p. 1070.) The first amende

2024(See Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1385 [“a request for leave to amend a complaint need not be made before a hearing on a motion for summary judgment; rather, it may be made at the hearing or any time before entry of judgment”]; Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 641 [“‘[I]f summary judgment is granted on the ground that the complaint is legally insufficient, but it appears from the materials submitted in opposition to the motion that the plaintiff could state a cause of action, the trial court should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend t

2024(See Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1385 [“a request for leave to amend a complaint need not be made before a hearing on a motion for summary judgment; rather, it may be made at the hearing or any time before entry of judgment”]; Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 641 [“‘[I]f summary judgment is granted on the ground that the complaint is legally insufficient, but it appears from the materials submitted in opposition to the motion that the plaintiff could state a cause of action, the trial court should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend t

2023The Reyes defendant testified that he used controlled substances and that he did not recall when he obtained the stolen items as he had “ ‘trouble when [he] use[d] a lot of drugs remembering things of that nature’ ” and that when he was on drugs, he had a “ ‘compulsion, you know, just to pick, . . . on trash cans.’ ” ( Reyes, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 980-981.)16 The excluded expert testimony was that the defendant’s mental health issues could have rendered it “possible for such a person to lack knowledge of his acts.” ( Reyes, supra, at p. 981 .) In Cortes, the trial court precluded the ex

2020(Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1167 [“ ‘[N]o statute . . . pursues its “broad purpose” at all costs.’ ”]; ibid. [“ ‘ “[I]t frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.” ’ ”].) 16 Pitted against Reyes’s claim that we should not assume the Legislature meant section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1), to cover reports about inchoate future crimes is the People’s appeal to practical consequences: If the statute is not construed to cover reports about ongoing criminal conduct

2020(Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1167 [“ ‘[N]o statute . . . pursues its “broad purpose” at all costs.’ ”]; ibid. [“ ‘ “[I]t frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.” ’ ”].) 16 Pitted against Reyes’s claim that we should not assume the Legislature meant section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1), to cover reports about inchoate future crimes is the People’s appeal to practical consequences: If the statute is not construed to cover reports about ongoing criminal conduct

2020(See People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998-999 [defendant has a right “to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value to his or her defense”]; People v. Reardon (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 727, 737 [same]; People v. Williams (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1777 [“a trial court’s authority to exclude relevant evidence must yield to a defendant’s right to a fair trial”]; People v. Burrell-Hart (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 593, 599 [“all of [the defendant’s] pertinent evidence should be considered by the trier of fact”]; People v. De Larco (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 294, 305 [“Inclusion of r

2020(See People v. Hernandez (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 715, 722 [the “‘right to be heard does not depend upon an advance showing that one will surely prevail at the hearing’”]; Fidelity Creditor Service, Inc. v. Browne (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 195, 205 [“‘“it is no answer to say . . . due process of law would have led to the same result”’”].) Because the trial court did not allow Reyes to call even one of the witnesses he 15 anticipated (and twice represented in response to requests for an offer of proof) would testify on highly probative issues, we cannot say the constitutional violations here were har

2020(See People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998-999 [defendant has a right “to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value to his or her defense”]; People v. Reardon (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 727, 737 [same]; People v. Williams (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1777 [“a trial court’s authority to exclude relevant evidence must yield to a defendant’s right to a fair trial”]; People v. Burrell-Hart (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 593, 599 [“all of [the defendant’s] pertinent evidence should be considered by the trier of fact”]; People v. De Larco (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 294, 305 [“Inclusion of r

2020(E.g., People v. Torres (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 849 , 858 [in case involving conviction under § 136.1, subd. (b)(1), appellate court stated: “Section 136.1 contemplates a continuous course of conduct or a series of acts over a period of time.”]; People v. Salvato (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 872, 883 [construing any “act” of dissuasion accompanied by force or by the express or implied threat of force to include a course of conduct].) We acknowledge the force of this argument.

2020(See People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998-999 [defendant has a right “to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value to his or her defense”]; People v. Reardon (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 727, 737 [same]; People v. Williams (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1777 [“a trial court’s authority to exclude relevant evidence must yield to a defendant’s right to a fair trial”]; People v. Burrell-Hart (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 593, 599 [“all of [the defendant’s] pertinent evidence should be considered by the trier of fact”]; People v. De Larco (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 294, 305 [“Inclusion of r

2020(See People v. Hernandez (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 715, 722 [the “‘right to be heard does not depend upon an advance showing that one will surely prevail at the hearing’”]; Fidelity Creditor Service, Inc. v. Browne (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 195, 205 [“‘“it is no answer to say . . . due process of law would have led to the same result”’”].) Because the trial court did not allow Reyes to call even one of the witnesses he 15 anticipated (and twice represented in response to requests for an offer of proof) would testify on highly probative issues, we cannot say the constitutional violations here were har

2020(See People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998-999 [defendant has a right “to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value to his or her defense”]; People v. Reardon (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 727, 737 [same]; People v. Williams (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1777 [“a trial court’s authority to exclude relevant evidence must yield to a defendant’s right to a fair trial”]; People v. Burrell-Hart (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 593, 599 [“all of [the defendant’s] pertinent evidence should be considered by the trier of fact”]; People v. De Larco (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 294, 305 [“Inclusion of r

2020(See People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998-999 [defendant has a right “to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value to his or her defense”]; People v. Reardon (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 727, 737 [same]; People v. Williams (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1777 [“a trial court’s authority to exclude relevant evidence must yield to a defendant’s right to a fair trial”]; People v. Burrell-Hart (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 593, 599 [“all of [the defendant’s] pertinent evidence should be considered by the trier of fact”]; People v. De Larco (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 294, 305 [“Inclusion of r

2005On appeal, the Attorney General references the trial court’s concern over the issue but again fails to attack defendant’s standing, demonstrating acquiescence in the trial court’s implied finding that defendant does have standing to raise the issue. 3 Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected the Reyes standard (United States v. Crawford (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 700, 716 ), this court is bound to follow the rulings of the California Supreme Court (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]). 4 Section 3067, subdivision

2005On appeal, the Attorney General references the trial court’s concern over the issue but again fails to attack defendant’s standing, demonstrating acquiescence in the trial court’s implied finding that defendant does have standing to raise the issue. 3 Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected the Reyes standard (United States v. Crawford (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 700, 716 ), this court is bound to follow the rulings of the California Supreme Court (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]). 4 Section 3067, subdivision