Waltreus rule in California

2021While an exception to this rule exists where a trial court acts “in excess of its jurisdiction,” such exception applies only in narrow circumstances where a redetermination of factual matters is unnecessary and is not intended to provide “for the postappeal review of legal issues that requires an appellate court to reopen factual issues already sifted, evaluated, and decided at trial.” (In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 840-841.) In In re Harris, the court “reiterate[d] that a claim a court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, where such issue was raised and rejected on direct appeal (or c

2021While an exception to this rule exists where a trial court acts “in excess of its jurisdiction,” such exception applies only in narrow circumstances where a redetermination of factual matters is unnecessary and is not intended to provide “for the postappeal review of legal issues that requires an appellate court to reopen factual issues already sifted, evaluated, and decided at trial.” (In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 840-841.) In In re Harris, the court “reiterate[d] that a claim a court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, where such issue was raised and rejected on direct appeal (or c

2019The Attorney General devotes several pages of his briefing to discussing the " 'new rule of law' exception to the timeliness rule articulated in Harris ." (Citing In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813 , 841, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 855 P.2d 391 .) In fact, this exception is to the Waltreus rule, not to the timeliness requirement, and we agree with the Attorney General that the exception does not apply here.

2019The Attorney General devotes several pages of his briefing to discussing the " 'new rule of law' exception to the timeliness rule articulated in Harris ." (Citing In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813 , 841, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 855 P.2d 391 .) In fact, this exception is to the Waltreus rule, not to the timeliness requirement, and we agree with the Attorney General that the exception does not apply here.

2012(In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 829-836.) We explained in Harris that the Waltreus rule did not apply to errors that were ―both clear and fundamental, and strike[] at the heart of the trial process.‖ (Harris, at p. 834.) To suggest how such claims differ from the quotidian type of trial errors, we cited Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 309 , which discusses errors amounting to a structural defect for which a harmless error assessment is impossible (id. at pp. 308-310).

2012(In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 829-836.) We explained in Harris that the Waltreus rule did not apply to errors that were ―both clear and fundamental, and strike[] at the heart of the trial process.‖ (Harris, at p. 834.) To suggest how such claims differ from the quotidian type of trial errors, we cited Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 309 , which discusses errors amounting to a structural defect for which a harmless error assessment is impossible (id. at pp. 308-310).

2017First, "where the claimed constitutional error is both clear and fundamental, and strikes at the heart of the trial process ... an opportunity for a third chance at judicial review (trial, appeal, postappeal habeas corpus) [is] justified." ( Harris , supra , 5 Cal.4th at p. 834 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 855 P.2d 391 .) Second, review of a previously litigated claim is justified where the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction and " 'there [was] no material dispute as to the facts.' " ( Id. at p. 840, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 855 P.2d 391 , citing Zerbe , at p. 668, 36 Cal.Rptr. 286 , 388 P.2d 18

2017First, "where the claimed constitutional error is both clear and fundamental, and strikes at the heart of the trial process ... an opportunity for a third chance at judicial review (trial, appeal, postappeal habeas corpus) [is] justified." ( Harris , supra , 5 Cal.4th at p. 834 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 855 P.2d 391 .) Second, review of a previously litigated claim is justified where the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction and " 'there [was] no material dispute as to the facts.' " ( Id. at p. 840, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 855 P.2d 391 , citing Zerbe , at p. 668, 36 Cal.Rptr. 286 , 388 P.2d 18

2012(See, e.g., In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 145 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199 ; Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 188 ; In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 780, fn. 4 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 824 et seq.; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 586, fn. 2 ; In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930 ; In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 781 .) We continued in In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813 , to describe the four exceptions to the Waltreus rule.

2012(See, e.g., In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 145 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199 ; Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 188 ; In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 780, fn. 4 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 824 et seq.; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 586, fn. 2 ; In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930 ; In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 781 .) We continued in In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813 , to describe the four exceptions to the Waltreus rule.

2012(Ylst v. Nunnemaker (1991) 501 U.S. 797, 804, fn. 3 .) In short, even if petitioner‘s ability to exhaust claims for federal purposes were a reason to overlook a procedural default under state law, that purported justification does not apply to claims barred by the Waltreus rule.

2012(Ylst v. Nunnemaker (1991) 501 U.S. 797, 804, fn. 3 .) In short, even if petitioner‘s ability to exhaust claims for federal purposes were a reason to overlook a procedural default under state law, that purported justification does not apply to claims barred by the Waltreus rule.

2012Thus, a citation to Waltreus does not prevent federal habeas review.‖]; Fields v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1997) 125 F.3d 757, 762, fn. 5 [same]; cf. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel (1999) 526 U.S. 838, 845 [for federal exhaustion purposes, ―state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State‘s established appellate review process.‖].) We note the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that invocation of the Waltreus rule when denying a claim means further state review of the claim is precluded, and that federa

2012Thus, a citation to Waltreus does not prevent federal habeas review.‖]; Fields v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1997) 125 F.3d 757, 762, fn. 5 [same]; cf. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel (1999) 526 U.S. 838, 845 [for federal exhaustion purposes, ―state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State‘s established appellate review process.‖].) We note the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that invocation of the Waltreus rule when denying a claim means further state review of the claim is precluded, and that federa

2012(See, e.g., In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 145 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199 ; Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 188 ; In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 780, fn. 4 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 824 et seq.; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 586, fn. 2 ; In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930 ; In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 781 .) We continued in In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813 , to describe the four exceptions to the Waltreus rule.

2012(See, e.g., In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 145 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199 ; Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 188 ; In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 780, fn. 4 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 824 et seq.; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 586, fn. 2 ; In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930 ; In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 781 .) We continued in In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813 , to describe the four exceptions to the Waltreus rule.

2012Thus, a citation to Waltreus does not prevent federal habeas review.‖]; Fields v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1997) 125 F.3d 757, 762, fn. 5 [same]; cf. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel (1999) 526 U.S. 838, 845 [for federal exhaustion purposes, ―state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State‘s established appellate review process.‖].) We note the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that invocation of the Waltreus rule when denying a claim means further state review of the claim is precluded, and that federa

2012Thus, a citation to Waltreus does not prevent federal habeas review.‖]; Fields v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1997) 125 F.3d 757, 762, fn. 5 [same]; cf. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel (1999) 526 U.S. 838, 845 [for federal exhaustion purposes, ―state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State‘s established appellate review process.‖].) We note the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that invocation of the Waltreus rule when denying a claim means further state review of the claim is precluded, and that federa

2012(See, e.g., In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 145 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199 ; Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 188 ; In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 780, fn. 4 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 824 et seq.; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 586, fn. 2 ; In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930 ; In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 781 .) We continued in In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813 , to describe the four exceptions to the Waltreus rule.

2012(See, e.g., In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 145 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199 ; Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 188 ; In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 780, fn. 4 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 824 et seq.; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 586, fn. 2 ; In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930 ; In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 781 .) We continued in In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813 , to describe the four exceptions to the Waltreus rule.

2012(See People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1030 [―Having found no errors and certainly no prejudicial ones,‖ appellate claim that the ―cumulative effect of the errors‖ requires reversal rejected]); People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 1005 [same].) This affirmative pleading rule is similar to the rule followed in other states that have a death penalty.

2012(See People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1030 [―Having found no errors and certainly no prejudicial ones,‖ appellate claim that the ―cumulative effect of the errors‖ requires reversal rejected]); People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 1005 [same].) This affirmative pleading rule is similar to the rule followed in other states that have a death penalty.

2012(See People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1030 [―Having found no errors and certainly no prejudicial ones,‖ appellate claim that the ―cumulative effect of the errors‖ requires reversal rejected]); People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 1005 [same].) This affirmative pleading rule is similar to the rule followed in other states that have a death penalty.

2012(See People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1030 [―Having found no errors and certainly no prejudicial ones,‖ appellate claim that the ―cumulative effect of the errors‖ requires reversal rejected]); People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 1005 [same].) This affirmative pleading rule is similar to the rule followed in other states that have a death penalty.

2012(See In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 814, fn. 34 ; People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 267 .) 24 Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (―No person shall be . . . subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . .‖); Benton v. Maryland (1969) 395 U.S. 784 (federal double jeopardy clause applicable to the states); People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 646 (recognizing same); California Constitution, article 1, section 15; Penal Code section 1023. 53 renewed claims.

2012(See In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 814, fn. 34 ; People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 267 .) 24 Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (―No person shall be . . . subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . .‖); Benton v. Maryland (1969) 395 U.S. 784 (federal double jeopardy clause applicable to the states); People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 646 (recognizing same); California Constitution, article 1, section 15; Penal Code section 1023. 53 renewed claims.

2020(In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 763-764 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808 .) One such rule “has come to be known as the Waltreus rule; that is, legal claims that have previously been raised and rejected on direct appeal ordinarily cannot be reraised in a collateral attack by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” (Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 476 .) This rule is “consistent with the very nature of habeas corpus” as “an extraordinary remedy applicable when the usual channels for vindicating rights—trial and appeal—have failed

2020(In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 763-764 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808 .) One such rule “has come to be known as the Waltreus rule; that is, legal claims that have previously been raised and rejected on direct appeal ordinarily cannot be reraised in a collateral attack by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” (Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 476 .) This rule is “consistent with the very nature of habeas corpus” as “an extraordinary remedy applicable when the usual channels for vindicating rights—trial and appeal—have failed

2020(In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 763-764 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808 .) One such rule “has come to be known as the Waltreus rule; that is, legal claims that have previously been raised and rejected on direct appeal ordinarily cannot be reraised in a collateral attack by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” (Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 476 .) This rule is “consistent with the very nature of habeas corpus” as “an extraordinary remedy applicable when the usual channels for vindicating rights—trial and appeal—have failed

2020(In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 763-764 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808 .) One such rule “has come to be known as the Waltreus rule; that is, legal claims that have previously been raised and rejected on direct appeal ordinarily cannot be reraised in a collateral attack by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” (Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 476 .) This rule is “consistent with the very nature of habeas corpus” as “an extraordinary remedy applicable when the usual channels for vindicating rights—trial and appeal—have failed

2012Relying on Byrnes, we later refined the concept, opining that habeas corpus ―will not lie ordinarily as a substitute for an appeal [citation] nor as a second appeal.‖ (In re Winchester (1960) 53 Cal.2d 528, 532 , italics added.) These authorities led to the decision from which the Waltreus rule draws its name.

2012Relying on Byrnes, we later refined the concept, opining that habeas corpus ―will not lie ordinarily as a substitute for an appeal [citation] nor as a second appeal.‖ (In re Winchester (1960) 53 Cal.2d 528, 532 , italics added.) These authorities led to the decision from which the Waltreus rule draws its name.

1993Thus, we explained that habeas corpus is not a “substitute for a writ of error” (In re Bell (1942) 19 Cal.2d 488, 492 [ 122 P.2d 22 ]), and that “It is well settled that a writ of habeas corpus ordinarily may not be employed as a substitute for an appeal.” (In re Byrnes (1945) 26 Cal.2d 824, 827 [ 161 P.2d 376 ]; see also In re Seeley (1946) 29 Cal.2d 294, 296 [ 176 P.2d 24 ] [habeas corpus generally unavailable where there exists a remedy by appeal]; 36 Cal.Jur.3d, Habeas Corpus, § 6, p. 11 [same].) The wisdom of the judicially created Waltreus rule is manifest: the Legislature has establishe

1993Thus, we explained that habeas corpus is not a “substitute for a writ of error” (In re Bell (1942) 19 Cal.2d 488, 492 [ 122 P.2d 22 ]), and that “It is well settled that a writ of habeas corpus ordinarily may not be employed as a substitute for an appeal.” (In re Byrnes (1945) 26 Cal.2d 824, 827 [ 161 P.2d 376 ]; see also In re Seeley (1946) 29 Cal.2d 294, 296 [ 176 P.2d 24 ] [habeas corpus generally unavailable where there exists a remedy by appeal]; 36 Cal.Jur.3d, Habeas Corpus, § 6, p. 11 [same].) The wisdom of the judicially created Waltreus rule is manifest: the Legislature has establishe

2017We hold that such a habeas corpus petitioner is in the same position as a defendant raising this type of error on direct appeal, and the same rule should apply: The "first degree murder conviction must be reversed unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury based its verdict on the legally valid theory that defendant directly aided and abetted the premeditated murder." ( Chiu , supra , 59 Cal.4th at p. 167 , 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 438 , 325 P.3d 972 .) We express no view on whether the same rule would apply to an individual asserting the same claim in a habeas corpus petition when ther

2017We hold that such a habeas corpus petitioner is in the same position as a defendant raising this type of error on direct appeal, and the same rule should apply: The "first degree murder conviction must be reversed unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury based its verdict on the legally valid theory that defendant directly aided and abetted the premeditated murder." ( Chiu , supra , 59 Cal.4th at p. 167 , 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 438 , 325 P.3d 972 .) We express no view on whether the same rule would apply to an individual asserting the same claim in a habeas corpus petition when ther

2012(See, e.g., In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 145 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199 ; Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 188 ; In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 780, fn. 4 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 824 et seq.; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 586, fn. 2 ; In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930 ; In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 781 .) We continued in In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813 , to describe the four exceptions to the Waltreus rule.

2012(See, e.g., In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 145 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199 ; Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 188 ; In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 780, fn. 4 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 824 et seq.; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 586, fn. 2 ; In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930 ; In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 781 .) We continued in In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813 , to describe the four exceptions to the Waltreus rule.

2012This rule is firmly established in law (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 536 ; In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 169 ; In re Seaton, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 199 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 267 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 825, fn. 3 ; People v. Jones (1973) 9 Cal.3d 546, 556, fn. 7 ) and is subject to the same four exceptions that apply to the Waltreus rule (Robbins, at p. 814, fn. 34, fifth par.; Harris, at p. 825, fn. 3).

2012This rule is firmly established in law (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 536 ; In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 169 ; In re Seaton, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 199 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 267 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 825, fn. 3 ; People v. Jones (1973) 9 Cal.3d 546, 556, fn. 7 ) and is subject to the same four exceptions that apply to the Waltreus rule (Robbins, at p. 814, fn. 34, fifth par.; Harris, at p. 825, fn. 3).

2012In the present petition, petitioner raises numerous claims subject to the Waltreus rule and for which no exception applies.23 Claim No. 8, in which he alleges 22 Abelleira gave these examples of situations in which a court fundamentally lacks jurisdiction: ―A state court has no jurisdiction to determine title to land located outside its territorial borders, for the subject matter is entirely beyond its authority or power. [Citation.] A court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the marital status of persons when neither is domiciled within the state. [Citations.] A court has no jurisdiction

2012In the present petition, petitioner raises numerous claims subject to the Waltreus rule and for which no exception applies.23 Claim No. 8, in which he alleges 22 Abelleira gave these examples of situations in which a court fundamentally lacks jurisdiction: ―A state court has no jurisdiction to determine title to land located outside its territorial borders, for the subject matter is entirely beyond its authority or power. [Citation.] A court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the marital status of persons when neither is domiciled within the state. [Citations.] A court has no jurisdiction

2012In the present petition, petitioner raises numerous claims subject to the Waltreus rule and for which no exception applies.23 Claim No. 8, in which he alleges 22 Abelleira gave these examples of situations in which a court fundamentally lacks jurisdiction: ―A state court has no jurisdiction to determine title to land located outside its territorial borders, for the subject matter is entirely beyond its authority or power. [Citation.] A court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the marital status of persons when neither is domiciled within the state. [Citations.] A court has no jurisdiction

2012In the present petition, petitioner raises numerous claims subject to the Waltreus rule and for which no exception applies.23 Claim No. 8, in which he alleges 22 Abelleira gave these examples of situations in which a court fundamentally lacks jurisdiction: ―A state court has no jurisdiction to determine title to land located outside its territorial borders, for the subject matter is entirely beyond its authority or power. [Citation.] A court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the marital status of persons when neither is domiciled within the state. [Citations.] A court has no jurisdiction

2012(See, e.g., In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 145 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199 ; Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 188 ; In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 780, fn. 4 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 824 et seq.; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 586, fn. 2 ; In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930 ; In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 781 .) We continued in In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813 , to describe the four exceptions to the Waltreus rule.

2012(See, e.g., In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 145 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199 ; Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 188 ; In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 780, fn. 4 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 824 et seq.; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 586, fn. 2 ; In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930 ; In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 781 .) We continued in In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813 , to describe the four exceptions to the Waltreus rule.

2012(See, e.g., In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 145 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199 ; Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 188 ; In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 780, fn. 4 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 824 et seq.; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 586, fn. 2 ; In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930 ; In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 781 .) We continued in In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813 , to describe the four exceptions to the Waltreus rule.

2012(See, e.g., In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 145 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199 ; Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 188 ; In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 780, fn. 4 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 824 et seq.; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 586, fn. 2 ; In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930 ; In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 781 .) We continued in In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813 , to describe the four exceptions to the Waltreus rule.

2012(See, e.g., In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 145 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199 ; Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 188 ; In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 780, fn. 4 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 824 et seq.; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 586, fn. 2 ; In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930 ; In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 781 .) We continued in In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813 , to describe the four exceptions to the Waltreus rule.

2012(See, e.g., In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 145 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199 ; Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 188 ; In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 780, fn. 4 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 824 et seq.; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 586, fn. 2 ; In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930 ; In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 781 .) We continued in In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813 , to describe the four exceptions to the Waltreus rule.

2012This rule is firmly established in law (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 536 ; In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 169 ; In re Seaton, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 199 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 267 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 825, fn. 3 ; People v. Jones (1973) 9 Cal.3d 546, 556, fn. 7 ) and is subject to the same four exceptions that apply to the Waltreus rule (Robbins, at p. 814, fn. 34, fifth par.; Harris, at p. 825, fn. 3).

2012This rule is firmly established in law (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 536 ; In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 169 ; In re Seaton, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 199 ; In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1 ; People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 267 ; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 825, fn. 3 ; People v. Jones (1973) 9 Cal.3d 546, 556, fn. 7 ) and is subject to the same four exceptions that apply to the Waltreus rule (Robbins, at p. 814, fn. 34, fifth par.; Harris, at p. 825, fn. 3).