penalty phase hearing in Connecticut

1999V The defendant moves to preclude the penalty phase hearing on the ground the death penalty violates the Connecticut constitution. "[T]he the death penalty statutes do not facially violate the due process clauses of article first , §§ 8 and 9 [of the Connecticut constitution]." State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389 , 412 , 680 A.2d 147 (1996).

1999The defendant makes three claims: (1) we should overrule our decisions in State v. Webb, supra, 238 Conn. 389 , and Cobb I, supra, 234 Conn. 735 , because the method of comparative proportionality review that we adopted in Webb is ineffective under our statutory scheme; 107 (2) we should conclude, applying the method adopted in Webb, that the defendant’s sentence is disproportionate based on the evidence of mitigation produced during the penalty phase hearing; and (3) we should conclude that the defendant’s sentence is disproportionate because the panel’s finding of an aggravating factor was t

1996State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 286 , 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165 , 115 S. Ct. 1133 , 130 L.

1995Indeed, the state’s construction would be inconsistent with the review we conducted in State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 183 , wherein we concluded that the defendant was entitled to a new penalty phase hearing due to the trial court’s improper exclusion of certain evidence proffered by the defendant in mitigation of the death penalty.

2015His convictions of arson murder, felony murder, murder, sexual assault in the first degree, and sexual assault in the third degree were combined with his capital felony conviction for sentencing purposes ‘‘to comport with constitutional double jeopardy protections.’’ Id., 695 n.1. 2 Because the state sought the death penalty in connection with the capital felony charge, a penalty phase hearing was conducted in accordance with General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 53a-46a.

2011Because we concluded in part II of this opinion that the defendant's characterization of Judge O'Keefe's comments and the voir dire proceedings is inapt, we need not address this argument. [35] Although the defendant cites the due process clauses of both the state and federal constitutions, he has not provided an independent analysis of the state claim as required by State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 685 , 610 A.2d 1225 (1992).

2011Because we concluded in part II of this opinion that the defendant's characterization of Judge O'Keefe's comments and the voir dire proceedings is inapt, we need not address this argument. [35] Although the defendant cites the due process clauses of both the state and federal constitutions, he has not provided an independent analysis of the state claim as required by State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 685 , 610 A.2d 1225 (1992).

2010We reject this claim for the same essential reasons that we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the imposition of the death penalty under our capital sentencing scheme. [1] Such claims include whether: (1) the trial court improperly excluded certain of the defendant's mitigation evidence, including a statement by the defendant expressing remorse for the offense, evidence regarding the reasons for the Waterbury police department's policy against electronically recording confessions, and evidence related to "the insidious allure and unyielding grasp of crack cocaine"; (2) this c

2010We reject this claim for the same essential reasons that we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the imposition of the death penalty under our capital sentencing scheme. [1] Such claims include whether: (1) the trial court improperly excluded certain of the defendant's mitigation evidence, including a statement by the defendant expressing remorse for the offense, evidence regarding the reasons for the Waterbury police department's policy against electronically recording confessions, and evidence related to "the insidious allure and unyielding grasp of crack cocaine"; (2) this c

2004The defendant asserted that the rules of practice, the sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution, and this court’s decision in State v. Strickland, 243 Conn. 339, 354 , 703 A.2d 109 (1997), afforded him the right to make a statement to the jury.

2004The defendant asserted that the rules of practice, the sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution, and this court’s decision in State v. Strickland, 243 Conn. 339, 354 , 703 A.2d 109 (1997), afforded him the right to make a statement to the jury.

2004Additionally, we conclude that, pursuant to our decision in State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171, 242 , 833 A.2d 363 (2003), the trial court did not instruct the jury properly under § 53a-46a (e) and (f) with respect to the process of weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors. 6 Accordingly, we reverse the judg ment of the trial court insofar as it imposes the death penalty and remand the case for a new penalty phase hearing.

2004Additionally, we conclude that, pursuant to our decision in State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171, 242 , 833 A.2d 363 (2003), the trial court did not instruct the jury properly under § 53a-46a (e) and (f) with respect to the process of weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors. 6 Accordingly, we reverse the judg ment of the trial court insofar as it imposes the death penalty and remand the case for a new penalty phase hearing.

2003Because the defendant failed to object to the majority of the conduct that he challenges on appeal, 141 he seeks to prevail under State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 233 , 142 the plain error doctrine 143 and this court’s inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice. 144 Although we agree with the defendant that several of the comments made by the state’s attorney were improper, we disagree that those improprieties entitle the defendant to a new penalty phase hearing. 145 Before addressing the merits of the defendant’s claim, we first review the principles that govern our r

2003State v. Breton, 235 Conn. 206, 260 , 663 A.2d 1026 (1995) (Breton II).

2003State v. Breton, 235 Conn. 206, 260 , 663 A.2d 1026 (1995) (Breton II).

2003The issue is whether the prosecutor’s conduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. . . . [MJoreover ... [a defendant is not entitled to prevail under Golding] whe[n] the claimed misconduct was not blatantly egregious and merely consisted of isolated and brief episodes that did not reveal a pattern of conduct repeated throughout the trial.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 256 Conn. 291, 306 , 772 A.2d 1107 , cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1068 , 122 S. Ct. 670 , 151 L.

2003The issue is whether the prosecutor’s conduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. . . . [MJoreover ... [a defendant is not entitled to prevail under Golding] whe[n] the claimed misconduct was not blatantly egregious and merely consisted of isolated and brief episodes that did not reveal a pattern of conduct repeated throughout the trial.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 256 Conn. 291, 306 , 772 A.2d 1107 , cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1068 , 122 S. Ct. 670 , 151 L.

2003In Cobb II, supra, 251 Conn. 285 , which was decided after the penalty phase hearing in the present case, we stated that the aggravating factor of § 53a-46a (h) (4) also could be satisfied by proof that “the defendant was callous or indifferent to the extreme physical or psychological pain, suffering or torture that his intentional conduct in fact inflicted on the victim.” Id., 445.

2003The issue is whether the prosecutor’s conduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. . . . [MJoreover ... [a defendant is not entitled to prevail under Golding] whe[n] the claimed misconduct was not blatantly egregious and merely consisted of isolated and brief episodes that did not reveal a pattern of conduct repeated throughout the trial.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 256 Conn. 291, 306 , 772 A.2d 1107 , cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1068 , 122 S. Ct. 670 , 151 L.

2003The issue is whether the prosecutor’s conduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. . . . [MJoreover ... [a defendant is not entitled to prevail under Golding] whe[n] the claimed misconduct was not blatantly egregious and merely consisted of isolated and brief episodes that did not reveal a pattern of conduct repeated throughout the trial.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 256 Conn. 291, 306 , 772 A.2d 1107 , cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1068 , 122 S. Ct. 670 , 151 L.

2003She did testify, however, at the penalty phase hearing and, in response to a question posed by the state’s attorney as to what she did when the police knocked on her door, Smith responded, “I let them in.” Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436 .

2003As the legislative history of § 53a-46a reflects, this state enacted a revised capital sentencing scheme in 1973 in response to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 , 92 S. Ct. 2726 , 33 L.

2003As the legislative history of § 53a-46a reflects, this state enacted a revised capital sentencing scheme in 1973 in response to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 , 92 S. Ct. 2726 , 33 L.

2003In contrast, when the court is called upon to serve as the fact finder in a murder case, that function is performed by three judges rather than one for good reason, namely, because the legislature has concluded that the “burden of having a murder case tried to the court, when the accused so elect[s], should not be imposed upon a single judge . . . .” McBrien v. Warden, 153 Conn. 320, 329 , 216 A.2d 432 (1966).

2003In contrast, when the court is called upon to serve as the fact finder in a murder case, that function is performed by three judges rather than one for good reason, namely, because the legislature has concluded that the “burden of having a murder case tried to the court, when the accused so elect[s], should not be imposed upon a single judge . . . .” McBrien v. Warden, 153 Conn. 320, 329 , 216 A.2d 432 (1966).

1999The Supreme Court of Connecticut in State v. Daniels, 207 Conn. 374 , 385 , 542 A.2d 306 (1988), determined that the defendant's burden of proof to establish a mitigating factor is by a preponderance of the evidence, It analogized this burden of proof to the burden a defendant has for an affirmative defense such as extreme emotional disturbance.

1999The Supreme Court of Connecticut in State v. Daniels, 207 Conn. 374 , 385 , 542 A.2d 306 (1988), determined that the defendant's burden of proof to establish a mitigating factor is by a preponderance of the evidence, It analogized this burden of proof to the burden a defendant has for an affirmative defense such as extreme emotional disturbance.

1999The defendant makes three claims: (1) we should overrule our decisions in State v. Webb, supra, 238 Conn. 389 , and Cobb I, supra, 234 Conn. 735 , because the method of comparative proportionality review that we adopted in Webb is ineffective under our statutory scheme; 107 (2) we should conclude, applying the method adopted in Webb, that the defendant’s sentence is disproportionate based on the evidence of mitigation produced during the penalty phase hearing; and (3) we should conclude that the defendant’s sentence is disproportionate because the panel’s finding of an aggravating factor was t

1999The defendant's claim that "the statute embodies a presumption of death once the state proves the existence of an aggravating factor . . . [is] foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court's . . . decision in Walton v. Arizona, [ 497 U.S. 639 , 649-52 , 110 S.Ct. 3047 , 111 L.Ed.2d 511 , reh. denied, 497 U.S. 1050 , 111 S.Ct. 14 , 111 L.Ed.2d 828 (1990)]." State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 241 .

1999The defendant's claim that "the statute embodies a presumption of death once the state proves the existence of an aggravating factor . . . [is] foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court's . . . decision in Walton v. Arizona, [ 497 U.S. 639 , 649-52 , 110 S.Ct. 3047 , 111 L.Ed.2d 511 , reh. denied, 497 U.S. 1050 , 111 S.Ct. 14 , 111 L.Ed.2d 828 (1990)]." State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 241 .

1999The defendant's claim that "the statute embodies a presumption of death once the state proves the existence of an aggravating factor . . . [is] foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court's . . . decision in Walton v. Arizona, [ 497 U.S. 639 , 649-52 , 110 S.Ct. 3047 , 111 L.Ed.2d 511 , reh. denied, 497 U.S. 1050 , 111 S.Ct. 14 , 111 L.Ed.2d 828 (1990)]." State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 241 .

1996State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 286 , 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165 , 115 S. Ct. 1133 , 130 L.

1996State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 286 , 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165 , 115 S. Ct. 1133 , 130 L.

1994See State v. Grant, 221 Conn. 93, 104-107 , 602 A.2d 581 (1992); D’Amico v. Manson, 193 Conn. 144, 153 , 476 A.2d 543 (1984); State v. DePaola, 5 N.J. 1, 19-20 , 73 A.2d 564 (1950).

1994See State v. Grant, 221 Conn. 93, 104-107 , 602 A.2d 581 (1992); D’Amico v. Manson, 193 Conn. 144, 153 , 476 A.2d 543 (1984); State v. DePaola, 5 N.J. 1, 19-20 , 73 A.2d 564 (1950).

1994See State v. Grant, 221 Conn. 93, 104-107 , 602 A.2d 581 (1992); D’Amico v. Manson, 193 Conn. 144, 153 , 476 A.2d 543 (1984); State v. DePaola, 5 N.J. 1, 19-20 , 73 A.2d 564 (1950).

1994See State v. Grant, 221 Conn. 93, 104-107 , 602 A.2d 581 (1992); D’Amico v. Manson, 193 Conn. 144, 153 , 476 A.2d 543 (1984); State v. DePaola, 5 N.J. 1, 19-20 , 73 A.2d 564 (1950).