penalty phase hearing in Florida

2018This Court affirmed the conviction but vacated Robinson's death sentence and remanded to the trial court "to conduct a new penalty phase hearing before the judge alone " with instructions to "consider and weigh all the available mitigating evidence in the record as required by Farr ." Id. at 180 (emphasis added).

2018This Court affirmed the conviction but vacated Robinson's death sentence and remanded to the trial court "to conduct a new penalty phase hearing before the judge alone " with instructions to "consider and weigh all the available mitigating evidence in the record as required by Farr ." Id. at 180 (emphasis added).

2001I cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that this Court would not have reversed the jury override under Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975), had such mental mitigating evidence been presented during the penalty phase hearing.

1992I cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that this Court would not have reversed the jury override under Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), had such mental mitigating evidence been presented during the penalty phase hearing.

2010Id. 1 After the new penalty phase hearing, the jury unanimously recommended death.

1996See Geralds v. State, 601 So.2d 1157 (Fla.1992). [1] After the new penalty phase hearing, the jury recommended death by a twelve-to-zero vote.

2008See Lightbourne v. State, 742 So.2d 238, 249 (Fla.1999) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether newly recanted testimony, when considered cumulatively with all of the post-trial evidence indicated that other witnesses testified falsely, required a new penalty-phase hearing).

2008This is not a case where an important witness has recanted his or her testimony, see Lightbourne v. State, 742 So.2d 238 (Fla.1999) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether newly recanted testimony, when considered cumulatively with all of the post-trial evidence that indicated other witnesses testified falsely, required a new penalty phase hearing), or where the defense has credible new evidence that another person may have committed the murder.

2026This is contrary to the reasoning in Hitchcock, where this Court cautioned that “[m]aking the present jury aware that a prior jury recommended death and reemphasizing this fact as the trial judge did here could have the effect of preconditioning the present jury to a death recommendation.” Hitchcock, 673 So. 2d at 863 (emphasis added). - 85 - Second, the majority “underscore[s] that the judge instructed the jury to consider only the evidence it received at the penalty- phase hearing in determining the proper sentencing recommendation.” Majority op. at 19.

2026Because “no evidence of Kaczmar’s prior sentence was introduced at the penalty phase,” the majority argues that “we may presume that the jury followed that instruction and based its sentencing verdict on the penalty-phase evidence alone, not an isolated statement uttered prior to jury selection.” Id.

2022“Penalty phase claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed under the two-prong test established by Strickland.” Salazar v. State, 188 So. 3d 799, 814 (Fla. 2016). - 10 - Thus, to succeed on a penalty-phase claim, a defendant must prove both deficient performance and prejudice: First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards.

2021Nothing in the record suggests that any of the inquiries were prompted by new concerns about [the defendant’s] behavior or competency.”); see also United States v. Nunez, 137 F. App’x 214, 215 (11th Cir. 2005) (“If we were to place upon the district court an obligation to reassess its Faretta hearing decision, we would do so only on a showing of a substantial change in circumstances since the initial hearing.”). 9 In this case, when Noetzel rejected the renewed offer of counsel at the final penalty-phase hearing, there had been no 9.

2021To the extent the First District Court of Appeal held to the contrary in Howard v. State, 147 So. 3d 1040, 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), when it stated (emphasis ours) that “[f]ailure to renew the offer of counsel at a critical stage and conduct a Faretta inquiry if the defendant rejects the renewed offer is per se reversible error,” we disapprove Howard. - 44 - change of circumstances that should have caused the trial court to question its finding from the January 21, 2020, motion hearing that Noetzel knowingly, intelligently, and voluntary exercised his right to self-representation under Faretta

2016See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 44 So. 3d 51 (Fla. 2010) (vacating the sentences of death and remanding for a new penalty phase hearing on a conviction - 68 - fundamental fairness in Florida’s capital sentencing, our opinion in Hurst should be applied retroactively to all death sentences.

2016See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 44 So.3d 51 (Fla. 2010) (vacating the sentences of death and remanding for a new penalty phase hearing on a conviction from a murder in 1981).

2015Ferrell v. State CFerrell II), 29 So.3d 959, 964-65 (Fla.2010).

2012In order to succeed in this ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Farr must establish that Slaughter’s ineffectiveness “deprived [him] of a reliable penalty phase proceeding.” Henry v. State, 937 So.2d 563, 569 (Fla.2006) (quoting Asay v. State, 769 So.2d 974, 985 (Fla.2000)).

2012In order to succeed in this ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Farr must establish that Slaughter’s ineffectiveness “deprived [him] of a reliable penalty phase proceeding.” Henry v. State, 937 So.2d 563, 569 (Fla.2006) (quoting Asay v. State, 769 So.2d 974, 985 (Fla.2000)).

2010Geralds v. State (Geralds II), 674 So.2d 96, 98 (Fla.1996).

2007Preston v. State, 564 So.2d 120 *794 (Fla.1990) [( Preston IV )].[ [4] ] The circuit court held a new penalty phase hearing after which the jury recommended the death sentence by a vote of nine to three.

2005See Dufour, 495 So.2d at 163 .

2003Furthermore, we explained that in conducting a cumulative error analysis, the trial court must "`consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible' at trial. " Id. at 247 (quoting Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512, 521-22 (Fla.1998)) (emphasis supplied).

2002See id. at 1023 .

2001Mills, 603 So.2d at 486-87 (Barkett, J., dissenting).

2001See id. at 257 .

2001See Correll v. Dugger, 558 So.2d 422, 425 (Fla.1990) (holding appellate counsel not ineffective for failing to argue on appeal that trial court had failed to give a specific penalty phase instruction that the jury could consider mercy during the course of its deliberations).