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6 Delaware opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Capano v. Stategreen1 sentence2016This is “because of the possibility that the jury will give special weight to the prosecutor’s arguments . . . because of the prestige associated with the prosecutor’s office.”236 Ultimately, the trial judge determines whether the defendant will live or die only after giving substantial weight to the jury’s recommendation.237 As such, the “jury’s recommendation is significant, and therefore the conduct of the penalty phase hearing must be conducted fairly.”238 234 ABA Standards, Prosecution and Defense Functions, 3-1.2(c) (“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.” | 1 | 1 |
Brokenbrough v. Stategreen1 sentence2016This is “because of the possibility that the jury will give special weight to the prosecutor’s arguments . . . because of the prestige associated with the prosecutor’s office.”236 Ultimately, the trial judge determines whether the defendant will live or die only after giving substantial weight to the jury’s recommendation.237 As such, the “jury’s recommendation is significant, and therefore the conduct of the penalty phase hearing must be conducted fairly.”238 234 ABA Standards, Prosecution and Defense Functions, 3-1.2(c) (“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.” | 1 | 1 |
Trump v. Stategreen1 sentence2016This is “because of the possibility that the jury will give special weight to the prosecutor’s arguments . . . because of the prestige associated with the prosecutor’s office.”236 Ultimately, the trial judge determines whether the defendant will live or die only after giving substantial weight to the jury’s recommendation.237 As such, the “jury’s recommendation is significant, and therefore the conduct of the penalty phase hearing must be conducted fairly.”238 234 ABA Standards, Prosecution and Defense Functions, 3-1.2(c) (“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.” | 1 | 1 |
Kirkley v. Stategreen1 sentence2016This is “because of the possibility that the jury will give special weight to the prosecutor’s arguments . . . because of the prestige associated with the prosecutor’s office.”236 Ultimately, the trial judge determines whether the defendant will live or die only after giving substantial weight to the jury’s recommendation.237 As such, the “jury’s recommendation is significant, and therefore the conduct of the penalty phase hearing must be conducted fairly.”238 234 ABA Standards, Prosecution and Defense Functions, 3-1.2(c) (“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.” | 1 | 1 |
Whittle v. Stategreen1 sentence2016This is “because of the possibility that the jury will give special weight to the prosecutor’s arguments . . . because of the prestige associated with the prosecutor’s office.”236 Ultimately, the trial judge determines whether the defendant will live or die only after giving substantial weight to the jury’s recommendation.237 As such, the “jury’s recommendation is significant, and therefore the conduct of the penalty phase hearing must be conducted fairly.”238 234 ABA Standards, Prosecution and Defense Functions, 3-1.2(c) (“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.” | 1 | 1 |
Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomergreen1 sentence1994See also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 790-95 , 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3123-26 , 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 3d Cir., 923 F.2d 284, 299-300 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Burger v. Kempgreen2 sentences1994See also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 790-95 , 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3123-26 , 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 3d Cir., 923 F.2d 284, 299-300 (1991). 1994See also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 790-95 , 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3123-26 , 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 3d Cir., 923 F.2d 284, 299-300 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2015“When a [movant] challenges a death sentence such as the one at issue in this case, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer – including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence – would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”17 The movant must establish “‘ a reasonable probability that a competent attorney, aware of the available mitigating evidence, would have introduced it at sentencing,’ and ‘that had the [sentencer] been confronted 16 Stricklan 2015“When a [movant] challenges a death sentence such as the one at issue in this case, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer – including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence – would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”17 The movant must establish “‘ a reasonable probability that a competent attorney, aware of the available mitigating evidence, would have introduced it at sentencing,’ and ‘that had the [sentencer] been confronted 16 Stricklan | 1 | 2015–2015 |
DeShields v. Snyder
green
1 sentence1994The State further argues that “[t]he determination of what evidence to present in a penalty phase hearing is a strategic decision.” DeShields, 830 F.Supp. at 825 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Blystone v. Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences1990This requirement conforms to recent United States Supreme Court guidance on capital sentencing, “[T]he requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence.” Blystone v. Pennsylvania, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 1083 , 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990). 1990This requirement conforms to recent United States Supreme Court guidance on capital sentencing, “[T]he requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence.” Blystone v. Pennsylvania, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 1083 , 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Whalen v. State
green
1 sentence1990II We first take up Riley’s claim that the jury instructions in the penalty phase hearing were constitutionally inadequate and not in compliance with 11 Del.C. § 4209, as construed and applied by this Court in Whalen v. State, Del.Supr., 492 A.2d 552 (1985). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Bailey v. State
green
1 sentence1987We next address another defense contention first raised on appeal: that the prosecutor’s opening summation during the penalty phase hearing constituí: ed “sandbagging” in violation of this Court’s holding in Bailey v. State, Del.Supr., 440 A.2d 997 (1982). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.