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12 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Holland v. Stategreen2 sentences2010In Holland v. State, 773 So.2d 1065, 1073-74 (Fla.2000), the Florida Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Holland's motion to suppress his statements to the police. 2010In Holland v. State, 773 So.2d 1065, 1073-74 (Fla.2000), the Florida Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Holland’s motion to suppress his statements to the police. | 3 | 3 |
Holland v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Holland v. State, 22 So.3d 129, 130 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). 1 The case law regarding this jury instruction has significantly developed since then, and the Florida Supreme Court recently quashed our decision and remanded for reconsideration of the jury instruction issue. 2014See Holland v. State, 22 So. 3d 129, 130 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).1 The case law regarding this jury instruction has significantly developed since then, and the Florida Supreme Court recently quashed our decision and remanded for reconsideration of the jury instruction issue. | 2 | 2 |
Allred v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 , 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (holding that routine booking questions do not violate the constitutional protection against self incrimination as they do not constitute interrogation); Allred v. State, 622 So.2d 984, 987 (Fla.1993) (finding that "routine booking questions do not require Miranda warnings because they are not designed to lead to an incriminating response; rather, they are designed to lead to essential biographical data," and specifying that name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age are ro 2010See also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 , 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (holding that routine booking questions do not violate the constitutional protection against self incrimination as they do not constitute interrogation); Allred v. State, 622 So.2d 984, 987 (Fla.1993) (finding that “routine booking questions do not require Miranda warnings because they are not designed to lead to an incriminating response; rather, they are designed to lead to essential biographical data,” and specifying that name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age are ro | 2 | 2 |
Pennsylvania v. Munizgreen2 sentences2010See also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 , 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (holding that routine booking questions do not violate the constitutional protection against self incrimination as they do not constitute interrogation); Allred v. State, 622 So.2d 984, 987 (Fla.1993) (finding that “routine booking questions do not require Miranda warnings because they are not designed to lead to an incriminating response; rather, they are designed to lead to essential biographical data,” and specifying that name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age are ro 2010See also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 , 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (holding that routine booking questions do not violate the constitutional protection against self incrimination as they do not constitute interrogation); Allred v. State, 622 So.2d 984, 987 (Fla.1993) (finding that “routine booking questions do not require Miranda warnings because they are not designed to lead to an incriminating response; rather, they are designed to lead to essential biographical data,” and specifying that name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age are ro | 2 | 2 |
Avila v. Stategreen2 sentences2010The Florida Supreme Court, relying on this Court's opinion in Avila v. State, 545 So.2d 450, 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (concluding that a question aimed at discovering the real name of a defendant is not an interrogation within the scope of Miranda ) and the Fifth District's opinion in State v. McAdams, 559 So.2d 601, 602 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (holding that basic identification data, such as name, age, current address, and social security number, is not generally subject to Miranda ), concluded that because the detective's contact with Holland was to ascertain his real name, not to speak with him a 2010The Florida Supreme Court, relying on this Court’s opinion in Avila v. State, 545 So.2d 450, 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (concluding that a question aimed at discovering the real name of a defendant is not an interrogation within the scope of Miranda ) and the Fifth District’s opinion in State v. McAdams, 559 So.2d 601, 602 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (holding that basic identification data, such as name, age, current address, and social security number, is not generally subject to Miranda), concluded that because the detective’s contact with Holland was to ascertain his real name, not to speak with him ab | 2 | 2 |
State v. McAdamsgreen2 sentences2010The Florida Supreme Court, relying on this Court's opinion in Avila v. State, 545 So.2d 450, 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (concluding that a question aimed at discovering the real name of a defendant is not an interrogation within the scope of Miranda ) and the Fifth District's opinion in State v. McAdams, 559 So.2d 601, 602 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (holding that basic identification data, such as name, age, current address, and social security number, is not generally subject to Miranda ), concluded that because the detective's contact with Holland was to ascertain his real name, not to speak with him a 2010The Florida Supreme Court, relying on this Court’s opinion in Avila v. State, 545 So.2d 450, 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (concluding that a question aimed at discovering the real name of a defendant is not an interrogation within the scope of Miranda ) and the Fifth District’s opinion in State v. McAdams, 559 So.2d 601, 602 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (holding that basic identification data, such as name, age, current address, and social security number, is not generally subject to Miranda), concluded that because the detective’s contact with Holland was to ascertain his real name, not to speak with him ab | 2 | 2 |
Haygood v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Haygood v. State, 109 So. 3d 735, 740 (Fla. 2013); Montgomery, 39 So. 3d at 258-59 . 1 We also rejected Holland's challenge to the admission of certain evidence, and we do not address that issue further. -2- Because defense counsel failed to object to the erroneous manslaughter instruction at trial, we must determine whether it gave rise to fundamental error. | 1 | 1 |
Maxwell v. Wainwrightgreen1 sentence2005See Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986). | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence2000In issue nine, Holland claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Holland's motion for judgment of acquittal as to the premeditation element *1075 of first-degree murder. "[A] motion for judgment of acquittal should not be granted unless there is no view of the evidence which the jury might take favorable to the opposite party that can be sustained under the law." Davis v. State, 703 So.2d 1055, 1059 (Fla.1997). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morgan v. State
neutral
2 sentences1987Holland appeals, contending that he was entitled to a hearing under authority of Morgan v. State, 475 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1985). 1986Holland appeals, contending that he was entitled to a hearing under authority of Morgan v. State, 475 So.2d 681 (Fla.1985). | 2 | 1986–1987 |
State v. Montgomery
green
1 sentence2014See Haygood v. State, 109 So. 3d 735, 740 (Fla. 2013); Montgomery, 39 So. 3d at 258-59 . 1 We also rejected Holland's challenge to the admission of certain evidence, and we do not address that issue further. -2- Because defense counsel failed to object to the erroneous manslaughter instruction at trial, we must determine whether it gave rise to fundamental error. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Florida v. Nixon
green
2 sentences2005He bases this argument on this Court's decision in Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172 (Fla.2003), rev'd, 543 U.S. 175 , 125 S.Ct. 551 , 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004), in which we held that Cronic , rather than Strickland , provided the standard for assessing ineffectiveness of counsel when a defendant's attorney concedes guilt to the crime charged without the defendant's express consent. 2005He bases this argument on this Court's decision in Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172 (Fla.2003), rev'd, 543 U.S. 175 , 125 S.Ct. 551 , 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004), in which we held that Cronic , rather than Strickland , provided the standard for assessing ineffectiveness of counsel when a defendant's attorney concedes guilt to the crime charged without the defendant's express consent. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2005NOTES [1] These facts are taken from Holland v. State, 773 So.2d 1065, 1068 (Fla.2000). [2] Holland raised the following twenty-two issues on direct appeal from his second trial: (1) the trial court erred in denying Holland the opportunity to represent himself; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of felony murder and attempted sexual battery; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Holland's motion to exclude the testimony of the State's mental health experts; (4) the trial court erred in failing to disqualify the state attorney and the state a 2005NOTES [1] These facts are taken from Holland v. State, 773 So.2d 1065, 1068 (Fla.2000). [2] Holland raised the following twenty-two issues on direct appeal from his second trial: (1) the trial court erred in denying Holland the opportunity to represent himself; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of felony murder and attempted sexual battery; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Holland's motion to exclude the testimony of the State's mental health experts; (4) the trial court erred in failing to disqualify the state attorney and the state a | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2005NOTES [1] These facts are taken from Holland v. State, 773 So.2d 1065, 1068 (Fla.2000). [2] Holland raised the following twenty-two issues on direct appeal from his second trial: (1) the trial court erred in denying Holland the opportunity to represent himself; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of felony murder and attempted sexual battery; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Holland's motion to exclude the testimony of the State's mental health experts; (4) the trial court erred in failing to disqualify the state attorney and the state a 2005NOTES [1] These facts are taken from Holland v. State, 773 So.2d 1065, 1068 (Fla.2000). [2] Holland raised the following twenty-two issues on direct appeal from his second trial: (1) the trial court erred in denying Holland the opportunity to represent himself; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of felony murder and attempted sexual battery; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Holland's motion to exclude the testimony of the State's mental health experts; (4) the trial court erred in failing to disqualify the state attorney and the state a | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Nixon v. State
green
1 sentence2005He bases this argument on this Court's decision in Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172 (Fla.2003), rev'd, 543 U.S. 175 , 125 S.Ct. 551 , 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004), in which we held that Cronic , rather than Strickland , provided the standard for assessing ineffectiveness of counsel when a defendant's attorney concedes guilt to the crime charged without the defendant's express consent. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Cronic
green
2 sentences2005NOTES [1] These facts are taken from Holland v. State, 773 So.2d 1065, 1068 (Fla.2000). [2] Holland raised the following twenty-two issues on direct appeal from his second trial: (1) the trial court erred in denying Holland the opportunity to represent himself; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of felony murder and attempted sexual battery; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Holland's motion to exclude the testimony of the State's mental health experts; (4) the trial court erred in failing to disqualify the state attorney and the state a 2005NOTES [1] These facts are taken from Holland v. State, 773 So.2d 1065, 1068 (Fla.2000). [2] Holland raised the following twenty-two issues on direct appeal from his second trial: (1) the trial court erred in denying Holland the opportunity to represent himself; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of felony murder and attempted sexual battery; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Holland's motion to exclude the testimony of the State's mental health experts; (4) the trial court erred in failing to disqualify the state attorney and the state a | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Faretta v. California
green
2 sentences2000NOTES [1] Holland raises the following issues: (1) the trial court erred in denying Holland the opportunity to represent himself; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of felony murder and attempted sexual battery; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Holland's motion to exclude the testimony of the State's mental health experts; (4) the trial court erred in failing to disqualify state attorney Michael Satz and the state attorney's office; (5) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Holland's motion to re-depose certain witnesses; (6) 2000NOTES [1] Holland raises the following issues: (1) the trial court erred in denying Holland the opportunity to represent himself; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of felony murder and attempted sexual battery; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Holland's motion to exclude the testimony of the State's mental health experts; (4) the trial court erred in failing to disqualify state attorney Michael Satz and the state attorney's office; (5) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Holland's motion to re-depose certain witnesses; (6) | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Whren v. United States
green
2 sentences1997On appeal, the district court noted that the United States Supreme Court had recently decided Whren v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), which applied a different test from the one established by this Court's decision in State v. Daniel, 665 So.2d 1040 (Fla.1995), to determine the reasonableness of a stop under search and seizure law. 1997On appeal, the district court noted that the United States Supreme Court had recently decided Whren v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), which applied a different test from the one established by this Court's decision in State v. Daniel, 665 So.2d 1040 (Fla.1995), to determine the reasonableness of a stop under search and seizure law. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Daniel
green
1 sentence1997On appeal, the district court noted that the United States Supreme Court had recently decided Whren v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), which applied a different test from the one established by this Court's decision in State v. Daniel, 665 So.2d 1040 (Fla.1995), to determine the reasonableness of a stop under search and seizure law. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Mendez v. State
green
1 sentence1996Holland v. State, 672 So.2d 566 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 678 So.2d 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Kehoe v. State
red
1 sentence1996The trial court ruled that the stop of the vehicle was pretextual under Kehoe v. State, 521 So.2d 1094 (Fla.1988). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Holland v. State
green
1 sentence1996Holland v. State, 672 So.2d 566 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 678 So.2d 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Powell v. Texas
green
2 sentences1994I find that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680 , 109 S.Ct. 3146 , 106 L.Ed.2d 551 (1989), *1294 is absolutely controlling on Strauss's testimony at the trial on the merits as a state expert on Holland's claim of insanity at the time of the offense. 1994I find that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680 , 109 S.Ct. 3146 , 106 L.Ed.2d 551 (1989), *1294 is absolutely controlling on Strauss's testimony at the trial on the merits as a state expert on Holland's claim of insanity at the time of the offense. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.