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6 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gibson-Lewis Corp. v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.green1 sentence2025Co., 524 N.E.2d 1316, 1319 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), the record here is silent as to whether the sanction was meant to compensate for legal services, punish Holland’s conduct, or serve some other purpose. [20] Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s imposition of the $3,000 sanction and remand so the trial court may further consider and explain the sanction’s basis and amount.2 2 Because we remand, we do not address Holland’s claim that sanctions were erroneously imposed without notice or a hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Hatfield v. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.green1 sentence2019DeBartolo Corp., 676 N.E.2d 395, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See Johnson, 692 N.E.2d at 486-87 (holding that probationer waived appellate argument that conditions of probation were not proven where he failed to object on these grounds at the revocation hearing); Bryce v. State, 545 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (same), trans. denied. [8] Moreover, even if Holland’s issue was not waived, it would have been within the court’s authority to revoke his probation solely because he violated the terms of his community corrections placement. | 1 | 1 |
Crump v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See I.C. § 35-38-2.6-5(4) (2015) (providing that if a person directly placed in a community corrections program violates the placement terms, the community corrections director may request that the court revoke the placement and commit the person to the county jail or department of correction for the remainder of the person’s sentence); McCauley, 22 N.E.3d at 747 (holding that prior version of Section 35-38-2.6-56 provides the 5 Although Holland was on home detention at the time, “the probationary period begins immediately after sentencing and ends at the conclusion of the probationary phases | 1 | 1 |
Bryce v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See Johnson, 692 N.E.2d at 486-87 (holding that probationer waived appellate argument that conditions of probation were not proven where he failed to object on these grounds at the revocation hearing); Bryce v. State, 545 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (same), trans. denied. [8] Moreover, even if Holland’s issue was not waived, it would have been within the court’s authority to revoke his probation solely because he violated the terms of his community corrections placement. | 1 | 1 |
James McCauley v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2016See I.C. § 35-38-2.6-5(4) (2015) (providing that if a person directly placed in a community corrections program violates the placement terms, the community corrections director may request that the court revoke the placement and commit the person to the county jail or department of correction for the remainder of the person’s sentence); McCauley, 22 N.E.3d at 747 (holding that prior version of Section 35-38-2.6-56 provides the 5 Although Holland was on home detention at the time, “the probationary period begins immediately after sentencing and ends at the conclusion of the probationary phases | 1 | 1 |
Alexander v. Dowellgreen1 sentence2013Countrywide argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Holland was automatically entitled to summary judgment as result of Countrywide’s failure to file a response to Holland’s motion for summary judgment. “[T]he lack of opposition to another’s motion for summary judgment does not result in ‘an automatic summary judgment’ because the ‘moving party still bears the burden of showing the propriety of summary judgment.’ ” Alexander v. Dowell, 669 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (quoting Carroll v. Lordy, 431 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ind.Ct.App.1982)). | 1 | 1 |
Carroll v. Lordygreen1 sentence2013Countrywide argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Holland was automatically entitled to summary judgment as result of Countrywide’s failure to file a response to Holland’s motion for summary judgment. “[T]he lack of opposition to another’s motion for summary judgment does not result in ‘an automatic summary judgment’ because the ‘moving party still bears the burden of showing the propriety of summary judgment.’ ” Alexander v. Dowell, 669 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (quoting Carroll v. Lordy, 431 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ind.Ct.App.1982)). | 1 | 1 |
Cole v. Holtgreen1 sentence2013See Cole v. Holt, 725 N.E.2d 145 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. 3 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Tharp
green
2 sentences2018Discussion and Decision [7] Holland raises three issues on appeal, one of which we find dispositive: whether the trial court erred by granting Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment and by denying Holland's motion for summary judgment. 2 [8] Our standard of review on summary judgment is well established: We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court: "Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of ... the non-moving parties, summary judgment is appropriate 'if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact an 2018"A fact is 'material' if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is 'genuine' if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties' differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences." Id. (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Blalock v. State
green
2 sentences1994Blalock v. State (1985), Ind., 483 N.E.2d 439 . 1994Blalock v. State (1985), Ind., 483 N.E.2d 439 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.