qualifying rule in Florida

2025However, in Boatman v Hardee, 254 So. 3d 604 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018), the First District further discussed Siegendorf and pointed out that “[i]n a footnote. . . the Siegendorf [supreme] court distinguished that it reached a different result in cases that ‘dealt with a lack of a basic qualifying requirement, i.e., paying a proper fee, the filing of necessary qualifying papers and registering to vote.’” Id. at 609 (underline emphasis added) (citing Siegendorf, 266 So. 2d at 347 n. 3).

2013One of the “minority view” cases cited in the American Jurisprudence article that Judge Lawson relies on provides a rare example of how the qualifying rule is applied. 7 In Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919 (Tex.1982), the alleged oral contract was between two brothers who worked together in a funeral home owned by one brother.

2013In Kasischke , the analysis involved whether a qualifying clause applied only to the antecedent clause or to the other provisions of the statute, and the determination included the significance in the placement of a comma. 991 So.2d at 812 .

1996The use of the preposition "by" before the term "the sheriff" and before the term "the mayor" but not "chief executive officer" would indicate the qualifying clause requiring approval of the governing body of the county or municipality refers to the phrase "by the mayor or chief executive officer." 4 Moreover, the reference to municipality or county in the qualifying clause would appear to parallel the reference to the "mayor or chief executive officer of the municipality or county." In construing the meaning of a statute, the primary purpose is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.

1996Petersburg v. Siebold, 48 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1950). 6 See, e.g., State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1981); Florida State Racing Commission v. McLaughlin, 102 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1958). 7 See generally, s. 30.53 , Fla. Stat., providing for the independence of the sheriff concerning the purchase of supplies and equipment, selection of personnel and hiring, firing, and setting of salaries of such personnel; s. 274.01 (1), Fla. Stat., defining "governmental unit" for purposes of the ownership and disposal of surplus tangible personal property to include the sheriff. 8 This office has been advised that th

1996Petersburg v. Siebold, 48 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1950). 6 See, e.g., State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1981); Florida State Racing Commission v. McLaughlin, 102 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1958). 7 See generally, s. 30.53 , Fla. Stat., providing for the independence of the sheriff concerning the purchase of supplies and equipment, selection of personnel and hiring, firing, and setting of salaries of such personnel; s. 274.01 (1), Fla. Stat., defining "governmental unit" for purposes of the ownership and disposal of surplus tangible personal property to include the sheriff. 8 This office has been advised that th

1996Petersburg v. Siebold, 48 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1950). 6 See, e.g., State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1981); Florida State Racing Commission v. McLaughlin, 102 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1958). 7 See generally, s. 30.53 , Fla. Stat., providing for the independence of the sheriff concerning the purchase of supplies and equipment, selection of personnel and hiring, firing, and setting of salaries of such personnel; s. 274.01 (1), Fla. Stat., defining "governmental unit" for purposes of the ownership and disposal of surplus tangible personal property to include the sheriff. 8 This office has been advised that th

1980All of the enumerated places and conveyances to which "access" is provided for by subsection (1)(a), are qualified by the clause, "used in the production, manufacture, storage, sale, or transportation within the state of any food product; any agricultural, horticultural, or livestock product; or any article or product with respect to which any authority is conferred by law on the department." If a vehicle or place does not come within the meaning of this qualifying clause, then the departmental officials have no right of "access." Subsection (2) of the statute forbids "any truck or any truck o

1962Later opinions have quoted the rule of the first Benson opinion, 134 So. 493 , that in the case of reserved interest for an agreed term "* * * the legal consequences of such an arrangement must be tested by the results contemplated by the parties on the assumption that both lender and borrower will fully carry out their agreement rather than the special results which may follow, but are not necessarily certain to ensue, when the borrower breaches a covenant which accelerates the maturity of the principal at the option of the lender." Smith v. Midcoast Investment Co., 127 Fla. 455 , 173 So. 348

1962Later opinions have quoted the rule of the first Benson opinion, 134 So. 493 , that in the case of reserved interest for an agreed term "* * * the legal consequences of such an arrangement must be tested by the results contemplated by the parties on the assumption that both lender and borrower will fully carry out their agreement rather than the special results which may follow, but are not necessarily certain to ensue, when the borrower breaches a covenant which accelerates the maturity of the principal at the option of the lender." Smith v. Midcoast Investment Co., 127 Fla. 455 , 173 So. 348

1962Later opinions have quoted the rule of the first Benson opinion, 134 So. 493 , that in the case of reserved interest for an agreed term "* * * the legal consequences of such an arrangement must be tested by the results contemplated by the parties on the assumption that both lender and borrower will fully carry out their agreement rather than the special results which may follow, but are not necessarily certain to ensue, when the borrower breaches a covenant which accelerates the maturity of the principal at the option of the lender." Smith v. Midcoast Investment Co., 127 Fla. 455 , 173 So. 348

1953For in Flynn-Harris-Bullard Co. v. Hampton, 70 Fla. 231 , 70 So. 385, 388 , it is stated: “Where a final judgment or decree is rendered for the defendant on demurrer, the plaintiff is estopped from maintaining a similar or concurrent action or suit for the same cause upon the same grounds that were disclosed in the first suit or action, for the reason that the judgment determines the merits of the cause as presented by the pleadings affected by the demurrer.” See also Prall v. Prall, 58 Fla. 496 , 50 So. 867 , 26 L.R.A.,N.S., 577.

1953For in Flynn-Harris-Bullard Co. v. Hampton, 70 Fla. 231 , 70 So. 385, 388 , it is stated: “Where a final judgment or decree is rendered for the defendant on demurrer, the plaintiff is estopped from maintaining a similar or concurrent action or suit for the same cause upon the same grounds that were disclosed in the first suit or action, for the reason that the judgment determines the merits of the cause as presented by the pleadings affected by the demurrer.” See also Prall v. Prall, 58 Fla. 496 , 50 So. 867 , 26 L.R.A.,N.S., 577.

1953For in Flynn-Harris-Bullard Co. v. Hampton, 70 Fla. 231 , 70 So. 385, 388 , it is stated: “Where a final judgment or decree is rendered for the defendant on demurrer, the plaintiff is estopped from maintaining a similar or concurrent action or suit for the same cause upon the same grounds that were disclosed in the first suit or action, for the reason that the judgment determines the merits of the cause as presented by the pleadings affected by the demurrer.” See also Prall v. Prall, 58 Fla. 496 , 50 So. 867 , 26 L.R.A.,N.S., 577.

1939They support this contention by Liggett Drug Company, Inc., v. Lee, 126 Fla. 171 So. 326; and Lee v. Hector Supply Co., 133 Fla. 95 , 182 So. 613 .

1939They support this contention by Liggett Drug Company, Inc., v. Lee, 126 Fla. 171 So. 326; and Lee v. Hector Supply Co., 133 Fla. 95 , 182 So. 613 .