qualifying clause in Alabama

1903A rule for determining whether an estate bestowed by a will is vested or contingent is, “that where the time of division or payment is of the substance of the gift, the legacy is contingent; when timé is mentioned only as a qualifying clause of the payment or division, then the legacy is vested;” or, in other words, “legacies payable after the death of the testator are either vested, or con tingent; and when the testator annexes time to the payment only, the legacy will be vested, but if of the gift itself, it will be contingent.” — High v. Worley, 32 Ala. 709 ; McLeod v. McDonald, 6 Ala. 236

1890The time when they can come into possession and enjoyment is not merely a qualifying clause of the time.of division, but is attached to the súbject of the gift; is of its essence and substance. —High v. Worley, 32 Ala. 709 ; Marr v. Mc Cullough, 6 Por. 507.

1907The general rule for determining whether a bequst is vested or contingent, is that when time of division is of the substance of the gift, then the legacy is contingent, but when time is mentioned only as a qualifying clause of payment or division, then the legacy is vested. — Marr v. McCullough, 6 Port. 507 .

1903A rule for determining whether an estate bestowed by a will is vested or contingent is, “that where the time of division or payment is of the substance of the gift, the legacy is contingent; when timé is mentioned only as a qualifying clause of the payment or division, then the legacy is vested;” or, in other words, “legacies payable after the death of the testator are either vested, or con tingent; and when the testator annexes time to the payment only, the legacy will be vested, but if of the gift itself, it will be contingent.” — High v. Worley, 32 Ala. 709 ; McLeod v. McDonald, 6 Ala. 236

2003We held that such a qualifying instruction should have been given "because whether [the defendant's] conduct was willful or wanton was an issue submitted to the jury." 789 So.2d at 226 .

1987Ladner Co. , 347 So.2d at 103 ." Hartford relies on Ladner Co. v. Southern Guaranty Insurance Co. , 347 So.2d 100 (Ala. 1977), where the Court considered the issue of "whether the qualifying clause in the definition of occurrence, 'neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured' operates to excuse the insurer's duty to defend where the only theories of recovery alleged in the complaint charge the insured with intentional acts." 347 So.2d at 102 .

1987Ladner Co. , 347 So.2d at 103 ." Hartford relies on Ladner Co. v. Southern Guaranty Insurance Co. , 347 So.2d 100 (Ala. 1977), where the Court considered the issue of "whether the qualifying clause in the definition of occurrence, 'neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured' operates to excuse the insurer's duty to defend where the only theories of recovery alleged in the complaint charge the insured with intentional acts." 347 So.2d at 102 .

1947In the application of such a concept, there is always the danger of falling into the habit of formulating the guarantee into a set of hard and fast rules, the application of which in a given case may be to ignore the qualifying factors therein disclosed.’ Id., at pages 461, 462, of 316 U.S., at page [1252], 1256 of 62 S.Ct., 86 L.Ed. 1595 [1601, 1602].

1947In the application of such a concept, there is always the danger of falling into the habit of formulating the guarantee into a set of hard and fast rules, the application of which in a given case may be to ignore the qualifying factors therein disclosed.’ Id., at pages 461, 462, of 316 U.S., at page [1252], 1256 of 62 S.Ct., 86 L.Ed. 1595 [1601, 1602].

1909Liability Acts, § 25, pp. 35, 36; Connolly v. Waltham, 156 Mass. 368 , 31 N. E. 302 .

1909Liability Acts, § 25, pp. 35, 36; Connolly v. Waltham, 156 Mass. 368 , 31 N. E. 302 .

1909In case of Columbus, etc. v. Bradford, 86 Ala. 574 , 6 South. 90 , it was held that this provision of the statute relates to purely defensive matter — “the contributory negligence of tbe plaintiff.” — Broslin’s Case, 114 Ala. 298, 404 , 21 South. 475 .

1909And in the second place, according to our decisions cited, supra, all matters contained in the qualifying clause of the statute are matters of defense, and must be brought forward by plea.— Columbus, etc., Co. v. Bradford, 86 Ala. 574 , 6 South. 90 ; Broslin’s Case, 114 Ala. 398 , 21 South. 475 ; Reno Emp.

1909And in the second place, according to our decisions cited, supra, all matters contained in the qualifying clause of the statute are matters of defense, and must be brought forward by plea.— Columbus, etc., Co. v. Bradford, 86 Ala. 574 , 6 South. 90 ; Broslin’s Case, 114 Ala. 398 , 21 South. 475 ; Reno Emp.

1907The law inclines to regard legacies as vested, rather than contingent, and the rule is applied when the intention is obscure or doubtful. — Andrews v. Russell, 127 Ala. 195 , 28 South. 703 ; Bethea v. Bethea, 116 Ala. 271 , 22 South. 561 ; Acree v. Dabney, 133 Ala. 437 , 32 South. 127 .

1907The law inclines to regard legacies as vested, rather than contingent, and the rule is applied when the intention is obscure or doubtful. — Andrews v. Russell, 127 Ala. 195 , 28 South. 703 ; Bethea v. Bethea, 116 Ala. 271 , 22 South. 561 ; Acree v. Dabney, 133 Ala. 437 , 32 South. 127 .

1903A rule for determining whether an estate bestowed by a will is vested or contingent is, “that where the time of division or payment is of the substance of the gift, the legacy is contingent; when timé is mentioned only as a qualifying clause of the payment or division, then the legacy is vested;” or, in other words, “legacies payable after the death of the testator are either vested, or con tingent; and when the testator annexes time to the payment only, the legacy will be vested, but if of the gift itself, it will be contingent.” — High v. Worley, 32 Ala. 709 ; McLeod v. McDonald, 6 Ala. 236

1903In Nixon v. Robbins, 24 Ala. 663 , a testator had bequeathed certain slaves to his daughter during her natural life, with the proviso, “that if her son, Thomas, now an infant, should live to be twenty-one years of age,” then he gave' three of said slaves to his said grandson, Thomas, “to him and his heirs forever.” The court in construing this clause said: “The main question in the case is, whether the legacy given to Thomas Nixon is vested or contingent.