qualifying clause in Missouri

1980Joseph, supra, the court sent to the jury after deliberations had commenced a qualifying instruction which included a superfluous reference to one instruction, therefore “interjected a new note on aspect as to which the jury had made no inquiry.” By the very reading of the exchanged communication, it becomes clear no prejudice resulted therefrom.

1964Garrison v. Ryno, supra. Instruction D-7 directs a verdict against Otto upon defendant’s counterclaim upon the hypothesized acts of Otto as negligence in failing to keep a careful and vigilant lookout ahead and laterally for other vehicles on U. S. Highway 61-67, including defendant’s vehicle, and (again) in failing to yield the right of way to defendant’s automobile when it was approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard.

1962Note also-that the instruction on punitive damages in Shepherd, supra, 328 S.W.2d loe. cit. 9, used “may allow,” and that, in Hall v. Martindale, Mo.App., 166 S.W.2d 594 (here cited in both briefs), instruction 2 advised the jurors that “you may award” punitive damages [166 S.W.2d loc. cit. 601] and instruction 6 was saved from the otherwise mandatory blight of “you will also allow” by addition of the qualifying clause “such punitive or exemplary damages on each count, if any, which you may deem proper.” [166 S.W.2d loc. cit. 601, 608] We conclude that instant plaintiff’s instruction 2 offende

1936Neither is the case of Schroeder v. Wells, 310 Mo. 642 , 276 S. W. 60 , controlling here.

1936Neither is the case of Schroeder v. Wells, 310 Mo. 642 , 276 S. W. 60 , controlling here.

1936Co., 331 Mo. 933 , 55 S. W. (2d) 673 .] Cases like Krelitz v. Calcaterra (Mo.), 33 S. W. (2d) 909 , cited by appellant, where only the issue of the defendant’s primary negligence was presented to the jury, are not in point for the obvious reason that the humanitarian doctrine not being an issue an instruction for defendant authorizing a verdict in the absence of primary negligence need not contain a qualifying clause referring to the humanitarian doctrine.

1936Co., 331 Mo. 933 , 55 S. W. (2d) 673 .] Cases like Krelitz v. Calcaterra (Mo.), 33 S. W. (2d) 909 , cited by appellant, where only the issue of the defendant’s primary negligence was presented to the jury, are not in point for the obvious reason that the humanitarian doctrine not being an issue an instruction for defendant authorizing a verdict in the absence of primary negligence need not contain a qualifying clause referring to the humanitarian doctrine.

1929After going through them all the only color of support for it, that we can find among our authorities, is a redundant remark of the learned judge made argtiendo in Maher v. Railroad, 64 Mo. 276 , and paraphrased in Dunkman v. Railroad, 95 Mo. 232 .

1929In both of these cases the remark was foreign to the ruling made, purely obiter, and in which at the same time the well-recognized rule on the subject was stated. ‘ ‘ The. first time the doctrine contained in this qualifying clause came before this court in such a tangible shape as to warrant a ruling upon it, was in the case of Guenther v. Railroad, 95 Mo. 286 , in which it was disapproved.

1929The next was in Kellny v. Railroad, 101 Mo. 67 , and the last in Dlauhi v. Railroad, 105 Mo. 645 , in both of which it was also disapproved.

1929The next was in Kellny v. Railroad, 101 Mo. 67 , and the last in Dlauhi v. Railroad, 105 Mo. 645 , in both of which it was also disapproved.

1929Haley v. Railroad, 197 Mo. 15 , involved, among others, a question of pleading: ordinance negligence and negligence under the humanitarian rule were charged in the same count.