qualifying instruction in California

2024“It is settled that a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law is too general or incomplete unless he had requested an additional or qualifying instruction.” (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 948 [error held forfeited], disapproved on another ground, White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 574, fn. 4 .) Yet plaintiffs make no attempt to demonstrate that they did so.6 their “harm.” The jury was instructed that the court itself would calculate the amount by which plaintiffs’ “damages” would be accordingly reduced. 6 The only “objection” they say they rai

2021(Huffman v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 679, 705-706 [“‘[W]hen a trial court gives a jury instruction which is prejudicially erroneous as given, i.e., which is an incorrect statement of law, the party harmed by that instruction need not have objected to the instruction or proposed a correct instruction of his own in order to preserve the right to complain of the erroneous instruction on appeal.’”]; see § 647 [“All of the following are deemed excepted to: . . . giving an instruction, refusing to give an instruction, or modifying an instruction requested”].) However, “‘[w]here

2024“It is settled that a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law is too general or incomplete unless he had requested an additional or qualifying instruction.” (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 948 [error held forfeited], disapproved on another ground, White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 574, fn. 4 .) Yet plaintiffs make no attempt to demonstrate that they did so.6 their “harm.” The jury was instructed that the court itself would calculate the amount by which plaintiffs’ “damages” would be accordingly reduced. 6 The only “objection” they say they rai

2021(Huffman v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 679, 705-706 [“‘[W]hen a trial court gives a jury instruction which is prejudicially erroneous as given, i.e., which is an incorrect statement of law, the party harmed by that instruction need not have objected to the instruction or proposed a correct instruction of his own in order to preserve the right to complain of the erroneous instruction on appeal.’”]; see § 647 [“All of the following are deemed excepted to: . . . giving an instruction, refusing to give an instruction, or modifying an instruction requested”].) However, “‘[w]here

2025(See Behr, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at pp. 529–530; see also People v Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024 [to preserve a claim of instructional error for appellate review, a party must object in the trial court on the specific grounds raised in the appeal, and cannot complain “that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language”]; accord, People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 218 [same]; Suman v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [“When a trial court gives a

2025(See Suman v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [“When a trial court gives a jury instruction which is correct as far as it goes but which is too general or is incomplete for the state of the evidence, a failure to request an additional or a qualifying instruction will waive [or forfeit] a party’s right to later complain on appeal about the instruction which was given.”].) Finally, unlike the facts of Plotnik, we conclude there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury’s finding that Ditty “committed an act that could or was ‘inten[ded] . . . to inflict immed

2026Where a “ ‘court gives an instruction correct in law, but the party complains that it is too general, lacks clarity, or is incomplete, he must request the additional or qualifying instruction in order to have the error reviewed.” ’ ” (Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1131 .) In any event, it is not probable that Kaiser suffered undue prejudice from the instruction.

2026Where a “ ‘court gives an instruction correct in law, but the party complains that it is too general, lacks clarity, or is incomplete, he must request the additional or qualifying instruction in order to have the error reviewed.” ’ ” (Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1131 .) In any event, it is not probable that Kaiser suffered undue prejudice from the instruction.

2021Co. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 984, 1008 .) When the trial court gives a jury instruction that “is correct as far as it goes but which [the appellant argues] is too general or is incomplete for the state of the evidence, a failure to request an additional or a qualifying instruction [forfeits] a party’s right to later complain on appeal about the instruction which was given.” (Suman v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 ; accord, Scofield v. Critical Air Medicine, Inc. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 990, 1011 ; see Hurley v. Department of Parks & Recreation, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 6

2020First, “[w]hen a trial court gives a jury instruction which is correct as far as it goes but which is too general or is incomplete for the state of the evidence, a failure to request an additional or a qualifying instruction will waive a party’s right to later complain on appeal about the instruction which was given.” (Suman v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 (Suman); see Scofield v. Critical Air Medicine, Inc. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 990 , 1010–1011.) Although plaintiff objected to the instruction below on the ground Wai was her landlord, on appeal she does not dispute tha

2004As our high court observed, “[e]vidence that a qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to all antecedents instead of only to the immediately preceding one may be found in the fact that it is separated from the antecedents by a comma.” (White, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 680 ; People v. Steffens (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1286 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 314 ]; 2A Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction (Singer, 2000) § 47.43, p. 373.) Here, the qualifying phrase “employed and paid for less than 75 percent of a college year” is separated from its antecedents by a comma, evidence that the qualifying cla

2001(White v. County of Sacramento, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 680 .) The use of dashes to connect the words “one- to four-family dwelling units” clearly indicates that it is intended as a single phrase, or antecedent to the qualifying clause.

1979Agarwal contends Johnson, French, and McKee are precluded from attacking the instruction by their failure to offer an alternative instruction on the subject. (6) It is settled that a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law is too general or incomplete unless he had requested an additional or qualifying instruction. ( Ornales v. Wigger (1950) 35 Cal.2d 474, 479 [ 218 P.2d 531 ], disapproved on another point in Alarid v. Vanier (1958) 50 Cal.2d 617, 622-624 [ 327 P.2d 897 ]; Townsend v. Butterfield (1914) 168 Cal. 564, 569 [ 143 P. 760 ]; Merlo v. Standard Life & Acc.

1979Agarwal contends Johnson, French, and McKee are precluded from attacking the instruction by their failure to offer an alternative instruction on the subject. (6) It is settled that a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law is too general or incomplete unless he had requested an additional or qualifying instruction. ( Ornales v. Wigger (1950) 35 Cal.2d 474, 479 [ 218 P.2d 531 ], disapproved on another point in Alarid v. Vanier (1958) 50 Cal.2d 617, 622-624 [ 327 P.2d 897 ]; Townsend v. Butterfield (1914) 168 Cal. 564, 569 [ 143 P. 760 ]; Merlo v. Standard Life & Acc.

2021(Huffman v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 679, 705-706 [“‘[W]hen a trial court gives a jury instruction which is prejudicially erroneous as given, i.e., which is an incorrect statement of law, the party harmed by that instruction need not have objected to the instruction or proposed a correct instruction of his own in order to preserve the right to complain of the erroneous instruction on appeal.’”]; see § 647 [“All of the following are deemed excepted to: . . . giving an instruction, refusing to give an instruction, or modifying an instruction requested”].) However, “‘[w]here

2021(Huffman v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 679, 705-706 [“‘[W]hen a trial court gives a jury instruction which is prejudicially erroneous as given, i.e., which is an incorrect statement of law, the party harmed by that instruction need not have objected to the instruction or proposed a correct instruction of his own in order to preserve the right to complain of the erroneous instruction on appeal.’”]; see § 647 [“All of the following are deemed excepted to: . . . giving an instruction, refusing to give an instruction, or modifying an instruction requested”].) However, “‘[w]here

2022Searle & Co. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 691 , 701–702.) 11 If a party wants a tailored version of an instruction such as CACI No. 3704 to address a specific concern, that party must identify the problem before the jury is instructed, and then propose whatever clarifying or supplemental language he or she believes is necessary to address the problem. “‘Where, as here, “the court gives an instruction correct in law, but the party complains that it is too general, lacks clarity, or is incomplete, he must request the additional or qualifying instruction in order to have the error reviewed.”’” (Metcalf, supr

2008Searle & Co. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 691, 701-702 , 200 Cal.Rptr. 870 , 677 P.2d 1147 .) "`Instructions in the language of an applicable statute are properly given.' (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Trial, § 280, p. 326.) Where, as here, `the court gives an instruction correct in law, but the party complains that it is too general, lacks clarity, or is incomplete, he must request the additional or qualifying instruction in order to have the error reviewed.' [Citations.]" ( Conservatorship of Gregory (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 514, 520 , 95 Cal. Rptr.2d 336 .) Plaintiffs failure to request any diff

2024(People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 73 .) However, “[a] trial court has no sua sponte duty to revise or improve upon an accurate statement of law without a request from counsel [citation], and failure to request clarification of an otherwise correct instruction forfeits the claim of error for purposes of appeal.” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 638 (Lee); People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 757 [where “the court gives an instruction correct in law, but the party complains that it is too general, lacks clarity, or is incomplete, he must request the additional or qualifying instructio

2024Preponderance Instruction “A trial court has no sua sponte duty to revise or improve upon an accurate statement of law without a request from counsel [citation], and failure to request clarification of an otherwise correct instruction forfeits the claim of error for purposes of appeal [citations].” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 638 (Lee); People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 757 [where “the court gives an instruction correct in law, but the party complains that it is too general, lacks clarity, or is incomplete, he must request the additional or qualifying instruction in order to hav

1979Agarwal contends Johnson, French, and McKee are precluded from attacking the instruction by their failure to offer an alternative instruction on the subject. (6) It is settled that a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law is too general or incomplete unless he had requested an additional or qualifying instruction. ( Ornales v. Wigger (1950) 35 Cal.2d 474, 479 [ 218 P.2d 531 ], disapproved on another point in Alarid v. Vanier (1958) 50 Cal.2d 617, 622-624 [ 327 P.2d 897 ]; Townsend v. Butterfield (1914) 168 Cal. 564, 569 [ 143 P. 760 ]; Merlo v. Standard Life & Acc.

1979Agarwal contends Johnson, French, and McKee are precluded from attacking the instruction by their failure to offer an alternative instruction on the subject. (6) It is settled that a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law is too general or incomplete unless he had requested an additional or qualifying instruction. ( Ornales v. Wigger (1950) 35 Cal.2d 474, 479 [ 218 P.2d 531 ], disapproved on another point in Alarid v. Vanier (1958) 50 Cal.2d 617, 622-624 [ 327 P.2d 897 ]; Townsend v. Butterfield (1914) 168 Cal. 564, 569 [ 143 P. 760 ]; Merlo v. Standard Life & Acc.

2024(People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 73 .) However, “[a] trial court has no sua sponte duty to revise or improve upon an accurate statement of law without a request from counsel [citation], and failure to request clarification of an otherwise correct instruction forfeits the claim of error for purposes of appeal.” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 638 (Lee); People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 757 [where “the court gives an instruction correct in law, but the party complains that it is too general, lacks clarity, or is incomplete, he must request the additional or qualifying instructio

2024Preponderance Instruction “A trial court has no sua sponte duty to revise or improve upon an accurate statement of law without a request from counsel [citation], and failure to request clarification of an otherwise correct instruction forfeits the claim of error for purposes of appeal [citations].” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 638 (Lee); People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 757 [where “the court gives an instruction correct in law, but the party complains that it is too general, lacks clarity, or is incomplete, he must request the additional or qualifying instruction in order to hav

2023For the qualifying clause to have any meaning, it must be read to modify ‘parent, subsidiary, or other legal affiliate.’ It is this legal affiliate that must be ‘involved in the transaction, contract, or facts that gave rise to the issues subject to the proceeding.’ ” (Hayden v. Robertson Stephens, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 360, 367, 368 [“the statute does not deem a corporation a party to the proceeding based on potential successor liability”].) Lennar Title and Doma Title are not the same party for purposes of section 170.4, subdivision (c)(3).

2023For the qualifying clause to have any meaning, it must be read to modify ‘parent, subsidiary, or other legal affiliate.’ It is this legal affiliate that must be ‘involved in the transaction, contract, or facts that gave rise to the issues subject to the proceeding.’ ” (Hayden v. Robertson Stephens, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 360, 367, 368 [“the statute does not deem a corporation a party to the proceeding based on potential successor liability”].) Lennar Title and Doma Title are not the same party for purposes of section 170.4, subdivision (c)(3).

2013(Secrest, supra, at p. 552 .) Courts, however, “have the power to apply equitable principles to prevent a party from using the statute of frauds where such use would *1058 constitute fraud.” (Juran v. Epstein (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 882, 895 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 588 ].) “Without the qualifying doctrine of estoppel in a proper case the statute would encourage rather than prevent the perpetration of frauds.” (Wilk v. Vencill (1947) 30 Cal.2d 104, 108 [ 180 P.2d 351 ].) Accordingly, equitable estoppel may preclude the use of a statute of frauds defense.

2013(Secrest, supra, at p. 552 .) Courts, however, “have the power to apply equitable principles to prevent a party from using the statute of frauds where such use would *1058 constitute fraud.” (Juran v. Epstein (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 882, 895 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 588 ].) “Without the qualifying doctrine of estoppel in a proper case the statute would encourage rather than prevent the perpetration of frauds.” (Wilk v. Vencill (1947) 30 Cal.2d 104, 108 [ 180 P.2d 351 ].) Accordingly, equitable estoppel may preclude the use of a statute of frauds defense.

1987(See White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 676, 680 [183 CaLRptr. 520, 646 P.2d 191 ]; People v. Corey (1978) 21 Cal.3d 738, 742 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 639 , 581 P.2d 644 ]; People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 242 , 526 P.2d 250 ].)” (170 Cal.App.3d at p.1052.) We adopt the reasoning of Foley and hold the modifying clause “by force, violence, duress, menace or threat of great bodily harm” of section 667.6, subdivision (c), only applies to violation of sections 286 and subdivision (c) *233 of 288a.

1987(See White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 676, 680 [183 CaLRptr. 520, 646 P.2d 191 ]; People v. Corey (1978) 21 Cal.3d 738, 742 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 639 , 581 P.2d 644 ]; People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 242 , 526 P.2d 250 ].)” (170 Cal.App.3d at p.1052.) We adopt the reasoning of Foley and hold the modifying clause “by force, violence, duress, menace or threat of great bodily harm” of section 667.6, subdivision (c), only applies to violation of sections 286 and subdivision (c) *233 of 288a.

1987(See White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 676, 680 [183 CaLRptr. 520, 646 P.2d 191 ]; People v. Corey (1978) 21 Cal.3d 738, 742 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 639 , 581 P.2d 644 ]; People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 242 , 526 P.2d 250 ].)” (170 Cal.App.3d at p.1052.) We adopt the reasoning of Foley and hold the modifying clause “by force, violence, duress, menace or threat of great bodily harm” of section 667.6, subdivision (c), only applies to violation of sections 286 and subdivision (c) *233 of 288a.

1987(See White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 676, 680 [183 CaLRptr. 520, 646 P.2d 191 ]; People v. Corey (1978) 21 Cal.3d 738, 742 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 639 , 581 P.2d 644 ]; People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 242 , 526 P.2d 250 ].)” (170 Cal.App.3d at p.1052.) We adopt the reasoning of Foley and hold the modifying clause “by force, violence, duress, menace or threat of great bodily harm” of section 667.6, subdivision (c), only applies to violation of sections 286 and subdivision (c) *233 of 288a.

1953“However, this court in the case of Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Cal.App.2d 404 [ 119 P.2d 736 ], held that the qualifying clause of subsection (2) of said section 138, ‘other things being equal, ’ leaves a large measure of discretion with the trial court.

1953“However, this court in the case of Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Cal.App.2d 404 [ 119 P.2d 736 ], held that the qualifying clause of subsection (2) of said section 138, ‘other things being equal, ’ leaves a large measure of discretion with the trial court.

2023When “ ‘the court gives an instruction correct in law, but the party complains that it is too general, lacks clarity, or is incomplete, he must request the additional or qualifying instruction in order to have the error reviewed.’ ” (Conservatorship of Gregory (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 514, 520 ; see People v. Franco (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 713, 719 [“a party forfeits any challenge to a jury instruction that was correct in law and responsive to the evidence if the party fails to object in the trial court”].) Hill never requested the court specifically instruct the jury on the date of valuation.

2008Searle & Co. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 691, 701-702 , 200 Cal.Rptr. 870 , 677 P.2d 1147 .) "`Instructions in the language of an applicable statute are properly given.' (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Trial, § 280, p. 326.) Where, as here, `the court gives an instruction correct in law, but the party complains that it is too general, lacks clarity, or is incomplete, he must request the additional or qualifying instruction in order to have the error reviewed.' [Citations.]" ( Conservatorship of Gregory (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 514, 520 , 95 Cal. Rptr.2d 336 .) Plaintiffs failure to request any diff

2019The City has not carried its heavy burden to demonstrate that the court's carefully reasoned ruling was an abuse of its discretion. ( Neal, supra , 21 Cal.3d at pp. 932-933, 148 Cal.Rptr. 389 , 582 P.2d 980 ; cf. Neumann v. Bishop, supra , 59 Cal.App.3d at p. 492 , 130 Cal.Rptr. 786 ["[t]he question of misconduct was argued before the trial judge, and it must be assumed that he [or she] considered all cognizable claims now made by defendant in appraising the propriety of the verdict"; " 'defendant is confronted with the rule that where the matter is presented to the trial court in support of a

2019The City has not carried its heavy burden to demonstrate that the court's carefully reasoned ruling was an abuse of its discretion. ( Neal, supra , 21 Cal.3d at pp. 932-933, 148 Cal.Rptr. 389 , 582 P.2d 980 ; cf. Neumann v. Bishop, supra , 59 Cal.App.3d at p. 492 , 130 Cal.Rptr. 786 ["[t]he question of misconduct was argued before the trial judge, and it must be assumed that he [or she] considered all cognizable claims now made by defendant in appraising the propriety of the verdict"; " 'defendant is confronted with the rule that where the matter is presented to the trial court in support of a

2019Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 602 , 610, 39 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 394 P.2d 561 [failure to timely object to improper statements in closing argument forfeits any appellate challenge premised on such misconduct]; Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383 , 403, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453 , 981 P.2d 79 [" '[w]here a party by his conduct induces the commission of error, he is estopped from asserting it as a ground for reversal' on appeal"]; Suman v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1 , 9, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 133 ["[w]hen a trial court gives a jury instruction which is correct as far as it goes but which is

2019Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 602 , 610, 39 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 394 P.2d 561 [failure to timely object to improper statements in closing argument forfeits any appellate challenge premised on such misconduct]; Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383 , 403, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453 , 981 P.2d 79 [" '[w]here a party by his conduct induces the commission of error, he is estopped from asserting it as a ground for reversal' on appeal"]; Suman v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1 , 9, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 133 ["[w]hen a trial court gives a jury instruction which is correct as far as it goes but which is

2019Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 602 , 610, 39 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 394 P.2d 561 [failure to timely object to improper statements in closing argument forfeits any appellate challenge premised on such misconduct]; Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383 , 403, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453 , 981 P.2d 79 [" '[w]here a party by his conduct induces the commission of error, he is estopped from asserting it as a ground for reversal' on appeal"]; Suman v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1 , 9, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 133 ["[w]hen a trial court gives a jury instruction which is correct as far as it goes but which is

2019Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 602 , 610, 39 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 394 P.2d 561 [failure to timely object to improper statements in closing argument forfeits any appellate challenge premised on such misconduct]; Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383 , 403, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453 , 981 P.2d 79 [" '[w]here a party by his conduct induces the commission of error, he is estopped from asserting it as a ground for reversal' on appeal"]; Suman v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1 , 9, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 133 ["[w]hen a trial court gives a jury instruction which is correct as far as it goes but which is

1999Defendant further claims that the voluntary intoxication instruction quoted above was not sufficiently specific, and the jury might have been unclear as to what the trial court referred when it stated "you may consider his state of intoxication, if any, in determining that defendant had such required mental states." But given that this injunction was preceded by a reference "to the specific mental state which we just talked about" and given that the trial court had just instructed on premeditation and deliberation, such confusion is exceedingly unlikely. *240 Moreover, "`"`[i]f the court gives

1999Defendant further claims that the voluntary intoxication instruction quoted above was not sufficiently specific, and the jury might have been unclear as to what the trial court referred when it stated "you may consider his state of intoxication, if any, in determining that defendant had such required mental states." But given that this injunction was preceded by a reference "to the specific mental state which we just talked about" and given that the trial court had just instructed on premeditation and deliberation, such confusion is exceedingly unlikely. *240 Moreover, "`"`[i]f the court gives

2013(Secrest, supra, at p. 552 .) Courts, however, “have the power to apply equitable principles to prevent a party from using the statute of frauds where such use would *1058 constitute fraud.” (Juran v. Epstein (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 882, 895 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 588 ].) “Without the qualifying doctrine of estoppel in a proper case the statute would encourage rather than prevent the perpetration of frauds.” (Wilk v. Vencill (1947) 30 Cal.2d 104, 108 [ 180 P.2d 351 ].) Accordingly, equitable estoppel may preclude the use of a statute of frauds defense.

2013(Secrest, supra, at p. 552 .) Courts, however, “have the power to apply equitable principles to prevent a party from using the statute of frauds where such use would *1058 constitute fraud.” (Juran v. Epstein (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 882, 895 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 588 ].) “Without the qualifying doctrine of estoppel in a proper case the statute would encourage rather than prevent the perpetration of frauds.” (Wilk v. Vencill (1947) 30 Cal.2d 104, 108 [ 180 P.2d 351 ].) Accordingly, equitable estoppel may preclude the use of a statute of frauds defense.

1998Finally, Baker & McKenzie, which not only failed to request clarifying instructions but stipulated to those given, is in no position to claim that the instructions failed adequately to distinguish between the evidence necessary to support each of Weeks's claims. "[I]f the court gives an instruction correct in law, but the party complains that it is too general, lacks clarity, or is incomplete, he must request the additional or qualifying instruction in order to have the error reviewed." ( Dorsic v. Kurtin (1971) 19 Cal. App.3d 226, 239 , 96 Cal.Rptr. 528 ; and see Finn v. G.D.

1998Finally, Baker & McKenzie, which not only failed to request clarifying instructions but stipulated to those given, is in no position to claim that the instructions failed adequately to distinguish between the evidence necessary to support each of Weeks's claims. "[I]f the court gives an instruction correct in law, but the party complains that it is too general, lacks clarity, or is incomplete, he must request the additional or qualifying instruction in order to have the error reviewed." ( Dorsic v. Kurtin (1971) 19 Cal. App.3d 226, 239 , 96 Cal.Rptr. 528 ; and see Finn v. G.D.

1985Co. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 5, 13 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 416 ]; see also Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 59 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 529 P.2d 608 , 65 A.L.R.3d 878 ] [“[I]t remains the duty of a party to propose complete and comprehensive instructions in accordance with his theory of the litigation”]; Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 948 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ] [“It is settled that a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law is too general or incomplete unless he had requested an additional or qualifying instruction.”].) Furthermore, ther

1985Co. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 5, 13 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 416 ]; see also Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 59 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 529 P.2d 608 , 65 A.L.R.3d 878 ] [“[I]t remains the duty of a party to propose complete and comprehensive instructions in accordance with his theory of the litigation”]; Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 948 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ] [“It is settled that a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law is too general or incomplete unless he had requested an additional or qualifying instruction.”].) Furthermore, ther

1969Similarly, if the court gives an instruction correct in law, but the party complains that it is too general, lacks clarity, or is incomplete, he must request the additional or qualifying instruction in order to have the error reviewed. ’ ’ See also Phillips v. Noble, 50 Cal.2d 163, 166 [323 P.2d 385]; Barrera v. De La Torre, 48 Cal.2d 166, 172 [ 308 P.2d 724 ]; Ornales v. Wigger, 35 Cal.2d 474, 478-479 [ 218 P.2d 531 ]; Lahti v. McMenamin, 204 Cal. 415, 421 [ 268 P. 644 ]; Wirthman v. Isenstein, 182 Cal. 108, 110 [ 187 P. 12 ]; Townsend v. Butterfield, 168 Cal. 564, 569 [ 143 P. 760 ]; O’Conno

1969Similarly, if the court gives an instruction correct in law, but the party complains that it is too general, lacks clarity, or is incomplete, he must request the additional or qualifying instruction in order to have the error reviewed. ’ ’ See also Phillips v. Noble, 50 Cal.2d 163, 166 [323 P.2d 385]; Barrera v. De La Torre, 48 Cal.2d 166, 172 [ 308 P.2d 724 ]; Ornales v. Wigger, 35 Cal.2d 474, 478-479 [ 218 P.2d 531 ]; Lahti v. McMenamin, 204 Cal. 415, 421 [ 268 P. 644 ]; Wirthman v. Isenstein, 182 Cal. 108, 110 [ 187 P. 12 ]; Townsend v. Butterfield, 168 Cal. 564, 569 [ 143 P. 760 ]; O’Conno

1962If the court finds that other things are not equal, as it evidently did here, and there is any substantial evidence to support such a finding, our inquiry is at an end.” (Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Cal.App.2d 404, 407 [ 119 P.2d 736 ]; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 149 Cal.App.2d 409, 412 [ 308 P.2d 921 ]; Hamilton v. Hamilton, 104 Cal.App.2d 111, 117 [ 231 P.2d 69 ].) ‘‘In determining whether other things are equal within the meaning of the above code section, the trial court is necessarily allowed a wide latitude in the exercise of its discretion.

1962If the court finds that other things are not equal, as it evidently did here, and there is any substantial evidence to support such a finding, our inquiry is at an end.” (Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Cal.App.2d 404, 407 [ 119 P.2d 736 ]; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 149 Cal.App.2d 409, 412 [ 308 P.2d 921 ]; Hamilton v. Hamilton, 104 Cal.App.2d 111, 117 [ 231 P.2d 69 ].) ‘‘In determining whether other things are equal within the meaning of the above code section, the trial court is necessarily allowed a wide latitude in the exercise of its discretion.