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12 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Forsyth County v. Martingreen2 sentences2014In addition, OCGA § 13-6-11 expenses of litigation, including attorney fees, “is limited to the amount of attorney fees 19 attributable solely to the [prevailing] claim[,]” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Forsyth County v. Martin, 279 Ga. 215, 219 (2) (c) ( 610 SE2d 512 ) (2005), and for this reason also OCGA § 13-6-11 attorney fees were not recoverable on Sterling United claims for specific performance.5 Accordingly, the fee award is reversed. 5. 2014In addition, OCGA § 13-6-11 expenses of litigation, including attorney fees, “is limited to the amount of attorney fees 19 attributable solely to the [prevailing] claim[,]” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Forsyth County v. Martin, 279 Ga. 215, 219 (2) (c) ( 610 SE2d 512 ) (2005), and for this reason also OCGA § 13-6-11 attorney fees were not recoverable on Sterling United claims for specific performance.5 Accordingly, the fee award is reversed. 5. | 2 | 2 |
Graybill v. Attaway Construction & Associates, LLCgreen2 sentences2018Under the Civil Practice Act, a pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. [Cit.] Graybill v. Attaway Constr. & Assoc. , 341 Ga. App. 805 , 810 (2) (a), 802 S.E.2d 91 (2017) (punctuation omitted). 2018Under the Civil Practice Act, a pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. [Cit.] Graybill v. Attaway Constr. & Assoc. , 341 Ga. App. 805 , 810 (2) (a), 802 S.E.2d 91 (2017) (punctuation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Talbot Construction, Inc. v. Triad Drywall, LLCgreen2 sentences2025As to compulsory counterclaims, under OCGA § 9-11-13, “[a] pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire deprive him of rights which had so thoroughly vested that nothing he could do could deprive him of them.”). 42 We need not—and do not—reach the question of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Ac 2025As to compulsory counterclaims, under OCGA § 9-11-13, “[a] pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire deprive him of rights which had so thoroughly vested that nothing he could do could deprive him of them.”). 42 We need not—and do not—reach the question of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Ac | 1 | 1 |
Boyd v. Johngalt Holdings, LLCgreen2 sentences2025As to compulsory counterclaims, under OCGA § 9-11-13, “[a] pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire deprive him of rights which had so thoroughly vested that nothing he could do could deprive him of them.”). 42 We need not—and do not—reach the question of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Ac 2025As to compulsory counterclaims, under OCGA § 9-11-13, “[a] pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire deprive him of rights which had so thoroughly vested that nothing he could do could deprive him of them.”). 42 We need not—and do not—reach the question of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Ac | 1 | 1 |
Singh v. Sterling United, Inc.green2 sentences2017See also Byers v. McGuire Properties, 285 Ga. 530, 540 (6) ( 679 SE2d 1 ) (2009) (plaintiff-in-counterclaim “cannot recover attorney’s fees under OCGA § 13-6-11 unless [it] asserts a counterclaim which is an independent claim that arose separately from or after the plaintiff’s claim”). 3 “Under the Civil Practice Act, a pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.” (Punctuation omitted.) Singh, 326 2017With these principles in mind, we conclude that Attaway’s counterclaims for breach of contract and quantum meruit arising from Attaway’s work at Graybill’s residence, and which formed the basis for the trial court’s award of attorney fees, were “clearly in the nature of . . . compulsory counterclaim[s] and thus fees were not permitted for [those] claim[s] under OCGA § 13-6-11.” Singh, 326 Ga. App. at 513 (4). | 1 | 1 |
Byers v. McGuire Properties, Inc.green2 sentences2017See also Byers v. McGuire Properties, 285 Ga. 530, 540 (6) ( 679 SE2d 1 ) (2009) (plaintiff-in-counterclaim “cannot recover attorney’s fees under OCGA § 13-6-11 unless [it] asserts a counterclaim which is an independent claim that arose separately from or after the plaintiff’s claim”). 3 “Under the Civil Practice Act, a pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.” (Punctuation omitted.) Singh, 326 2017See also Byers v. McGuire Properties, 285 Ga. 530, 540 (6) ( 679 SE2d 1 ) (2009) (plaintiff-in-counterclaim “cannot recover attorney’s fees under OCGA § 13-6-11 unless [it] asserts a counterclaim which is an independent claim that arose separately from or after the plaintiff’s claim”). 3 “Under the Civil Practice Act, a pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.” (Punctuation omitted.) Singh, 326 | 1 | 1 |
Idowu v. Lestergreen2 sentences1987Idowu v. Lester, 176 Ga. App. 713, 714 ( 337 SE2d 386 ) (1985), quotes OCGA § 9-11-13 (a), the provision of the CPA dealing with compulsory counterclaims, and states the rule of law applicable thereto: “OCGA § 9-11-13 (a) provides: ‘A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.’ The 1987Idowu v. Lester, 176 Ga. App. 713, 714 ( 337 SE2d 386 ) (1985), quotes OCGA § 9-11-13 (a), the provision of the CPA dealing with compulsory counterclaims, and states the rule of law applicable thereto: “OCGA § 9-11-13 (a) provides: ‘A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.’ The | 1 | 1 |
Vines v. Hibdongreen2 sentences1975In Smith v. Smith, 229 Ga. 580 ( 193 SE2d 599 ) this court held: "When the mother filed a habeas corpus petition in the county of the father's residence, she submitted herself to its jurisdiction and that court could decide the issue *839 raised by the cross complaint seeking a change of custody of the minor child because of a material change of conditions." The Smith case, supra, along with Glover v. Sink, 230 Ga. 81 ( 195 SE2d 443 ) and Padgett v. Penland, 230 Ga. 824 ( 199 SE2d 210 ), was cited as authority for the holding in Vines v. Hibdon, 232 Ga. 539, 540 ( 207 SE2d 503 ) to the effect 1975In Smith v. Smith, 229 Ga. 580 ( 193 SE2d 599 ) this court held: "When the mother filed a habeas corpus petition in the county of the father's residence, she submitted herself to its jurisdiction and that court could decide the issue *839 raised by the cross complaint seeking a change of custody of the minor child because of a material change of conditions." The Smith case, supra, along with Glover v. Sink, 230 Ga. 81 ( 195 SE2d 443 ) and Padgett v. Penland, 230 Ga. 824 ( 199 SE2d 210 ), was cited as authority for the holding in Vines v. Hibdon, 232 Ga. 539, 540 ( 207 SE2d 503 ) to the effect | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Richards v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
green
2 sentences2018Davis'[s] property." 16 (Emphasis in original). 17 See Tenneco Oil Co. v. Templin , 201 Ga. App. 30 , 31 (1), 410 S.E.2d 154 (1991) ("Essentially, a compulsory counterclaim is one which: 1) arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the main claim; and 2) has matured at the time the answer is filed."). 18 See OCGA § 9-11-13 (a) ("A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not re 2018Davis'[s] property." 16 (Emphasis in original). 17 See Tenneco Oil Co. v. Templin , 201 Ga. App. 30 , 31 (1), 410 S.E.2d 154 (1991) ("Essentially, a compulsory counterclaim is one which: 1) arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the main claim; and 2) has matured at the time the answer is filed."). 18 See OCGA § 9-11-13 (a) ("A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not re | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Tenneco Oil Co. v. Templin
green
2 sentences2018Davis'[s] property." 16 (Emphasis in original). 17 See Tenneco Oil Co. v. Templin , 201 Ga. App. 30 , 31 (1), 410 S.E.2d 154 (1991) ("Essentially, a compulsory counterclaim is one which: 1) arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the main claim; and 2) has matured at the time the answer is filed."). 18 See OCGA § 9-11-13 (a) ("A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not re 2018Davis'[s] property." 16 (Emphasis in original). 17 See Tenneco Oil Co. v. Templin , 201 Ga. App. 30 , 31 (1), 410 S.E.2d 154 (1991) ("Essentially, a compulsory counterclaim is one which: 1) arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the main claim; and 2) has matured at the time the answer is filed."). 18 See OCGA § 9-11-13 (a) ("A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not re | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Clairmont Foods, Inc. v. Huddle House, Inc.
green
2 sentences1989Clairmont Foods v. Huddle House, 142 Ga. App. 171 ( 235 SE2d 635 ) (1977). 1989Clairmont Foods v. Huddle House, 142 Ga. App. 171 ( 235 SE2d 635 ) (1977). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Harbin Lumber Co. v. Fowler
green
2 sentences1977Harbin Lumber Co. v. Fowler, 137 Ga. App. 90 ( 222 SE2d 878 ); Myers v. United Services Auto. 1977Harbin Lumber Co. v. Fowler, 137 Ga. App. 90 ( 222 SE2d 878 ); Myers v. United Services Auto. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Padgett v. Penland
green
2 sentences1975In Smith v. Smith, 229 Ga. 580 ( 193 SE2d 599 ) this court held: "When the mother filed a habeas corpus petition in the county of the father's residence, she submitted herself to its jurisdiction and that court could decide the issue *839 raised by the cross complaint seeking a change of custody of the minor child because of a material change of conditions." The Smith case, supra, along with Glover v. Sink, 230 Ga. 81 ( 195 SE2d 443 ) and Padgett v. Penland, 230 Ga. 824 ( 199 SE2d 210 ), was cited as authority for the holding in Vines v. Hibdon, 232 Ga. 539, 540 ( 207 SE2d 503 ) to the effect 1975In Smith v. Smith, 229 Ga. 580 ( 193 SE2d 599 ) this court held: "When the mother filed a habeas corpus petition in the county of the father's residence, she submitted herself to its jurisdiction and that court could decide the issue *839 raised by the cross complaint seeking a change of custody of the minor child because of a material change of conditions." The Smith case, supra, along with Glover v. Sink, 230 Ga. 81 ( 195 SE2d 443 ) and Padgett v. Penland, 230 Ga. 824 ( 199 SE2d 210 ), was cited as authority for the holding in Vines v. Hibdon, 232 Ga. 539, 540 ( 207 SE2d 503 ) to the effect | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Smith v. Smith
green
2 sentences1975In Smith v. Smith, 229 Ga. 580 ( 193 SE2d 599 ) this court held: "When the mother filed a habeas corpus petition in the county of the father's residence, she submitted herself to its jurisdiction and that court could decide the issue *839 raised by the cross complaint seeking a change of custody of the minor child because of a material change of conditions." The Smith case, supra, along with Glover v. Sink, 230 Ga. 81 ( 195 SE2d 443 ) and Padgett v. Penland, 230 Ga. 824 ( 199 SE2d 210 ), was cited as authority for the holding in Vines v. Hibdon, 232 Ga. 539, 540 ( 207 SE2d 503 ) to the effect 1975In Smith v. Smith, 229 Ga. 580 ( 193 SE2d 599 ) this court held: "When the mother filed a habeas corpus petition in the county of the father's residence, she submitted herself to its jurisdiction and that court could decide the issue *839 raised by the cross complaint seeking a change of custody of the minor child because of a material change of conditions." The Smith case, supra, along with Glover v. Sink, 230 Ga. 81 ( 195 SE2d 443 ) and Padgett v. Penland, 230 Ga. 824 ( 199 SE2d 210 ), was cited as authority for the holding in Vines v. Hibdon, 232 Ga. 539, 540 ( 207 SE2d 503 ) to the effect | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Glover v. Sink
green
2 sentences1975In Smith v. Smith, 229 Ga. 580 ( 193 SE2d 599 ) this court held: "When the mother filed a habeas corpus petition in the county of the father's residence, she submitted herself to its jurisdiction and that court could decide the issue *839 raised by the cross complaint seeking a change of custody of the minor child because of a material change of conditions." The Smith case, supra, along with Glover v. Sink, 230 Ga. 81 ( 195 SE2d 443 ) and Padgett v. Penland, 230 Ga. 824 ( 199 SE2d 210 ), was cited as authority for the holding in Vines v. Hibdon, 232 Ga. 539, 540 ( 207 SE2d 503 ) to the effect 1975In Smith v. Smith, 229 Ga. 580 ( 193 SE2d 599 ) this court held: "When the mother filed a habeas corpus petition in the county of the father's residence, she submitted herself to its jurisdiction and that court could decide the issue *839 raised by the cross complaint seeking a change of custody of the minor child because of a material change of conditions." The Smith case, supra, along with Glover v. Sink, 230 Ga. 81 ( 195 SE2d 443 ) and Padgett v. Penland, 230 Ga. 824 ( 199 SE2d 210 ), was cited as authority for the holding in Vines v. Hibdon, 232 Ga. 539, 540 ( 207 SE2d 503 ) to the effect | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Hillman v. Farmers State Bank
green
1 sentence1971Code § 3-807 provides: "If the defendant, or those under whom he claims, shall have been guilty of a fraud by which the plaintiff shall have been debarred or deterred from his action, the period of limitation shall run only from the time of the discovery of the fraud.” Also see Bryson v. Aven, 32 Ga. App. 721 ( 124 SE 553 ), and Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App. 133 ( 174 SE 365 ) which hold that if the defendant has been guilty of fraud preventing the discovery of the facts, this will toll the running of the statute of limitation. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Bryson v. Aven
green
1 sentence1971Code § 3-807 provides: "If the defendant, or those under whom he claims, shall have been guilty of a fraud by which the plaintiff shall have been debarred or deterred from his action, the period of limitation shall run only from the time of the discovery of the fraud.” Also see Bryson v. Aven, 32 Ga. App. 721 ( 124 SE 553 ), and Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App. 133 ( 174 SE 365 ) which hold that if the defendant has been guilty of fraud preventing the discovery of the facts, this will toll the running of the statute of limitation. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Silvertooth v. Shallenberger
green
2 sentences1971Code § 3-807 provides: "If the defendant, or those under whom he claims, shall have been guilty of a fraud by which the plaintiff shall have been debarred or deterred from his action, the period of limitation shall run only from the time of the discovery of the fraud.” Also see Bryson v. Aven, 32 Ga. App. 721 ( 124 SE 553 ), and Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App. 133 ( 174 SE 365 ) which hold that if the defendant has been guilty of fraud preventing the discovery of the facts, this will toll the running of the statute of limitation. 1971Code § 3-807 provides: "If the defendant, or those under whom he claims, shall have been guilty of a fraud by which the plaintiff shall have been debarred or deterred from his action, the period of limitation shall run only from the time of the discovery of the fraud.” Also see Bryson v. Aven, 32 Ga. App. 721 ( 124 SE 553 ), and Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App. 133 ( 174 SE 365 ) which hold that if the defendant has been guilty of fraud preventing the discovery of the facts, this will toll the running of the statute of limitation. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.