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11 Florida opinions name it 1 courts 1969–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Londono v. Turkey Creek, Inc.green2 sentences2009Under Londono v. Turkey Creek, Inc., 609 So.2d 14, 20 (Fla.1992), the “logical relationship” test determines whether a counterclaim is compulsory: A claim has a logical relationship to the original claim if it arises out of the same aggregate of operative facts as the original claim in two senses: (1) that the same aggregate of operative facts serves as the basis for both claims; or (2) that the aggregate core of facts upon which the original claim rests activates additional legal rights in a party defendant that would otherwise remain dormant. 2007A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim In Londono v. Turkey Creek, Inc., 609 So.2d 14, 20 (Fla.1992), our supreme court adopted the "logical relationships" test for determining whether a claim was compulsory: A claim has a logical relationship to the original claim if it arises out of the same aggregate of operative facts as the original claim in two senses: (1) that the same aggregate of operative facts serves as the basis of both claims; or (2) that th | 4 | 4 |
Neil v. South Florida Auto Painters, Inc.green1 sentence2017Constr., Inc., 662 So.2d 413, 415 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (holding that under the logical relationship test, a compulsory counterclaim exists “when the same aggregate of operative facts serves as the basis of both claims.” (quoting Neil v. South Fla. Auto Painters, Inc., 397 So.2d 1160, 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981))). | 1 | 1 |
B & V Ltd. v. All Dade General Construction, Inc.green1 sentence2017Constr., Inc., 662 So.2d 413, 415 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (holding that under the logical relationship test, a compulsory counterclaim exists “when the same aggregate of operative facts serves as the basis of both claims.” (quoting Neil v. South Fla. Auto Painters, Inc., 397 So.2d 1160, 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981))). | 1 | 1 |
Stein v. Feingoldgreen1 sentence2002See Stein v. Feingold, 629 So.2d 998, 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.170(a) requires a party to state as a counterclaim any claim that "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim...." A counterclaim not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim is deemed permissive. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Revere Copper and Brass Incorporated v. The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, and Third-Party v. George A. Fuller Company, Inc., Third-Party
green
1 sentence1999Rule 1.170(a) provides in pertinent part as follows: A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, provided it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction... (emphasis added) The Florida Supreme Court has held that the logical relationship test propounded in Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 426 F.2d 709 | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange
green
2 sentences1990In Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 610 , 46 S.Ct. 367, 371 , 70 L.Ed. 750 (1926), the court stated: Transaction is a word of flexible meaning. 1990In Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 610 , 46 S.Ct. 367, 371 , 70 L.Ed. 750 (1926), the court stated: Transaction is a word of flexible meaning. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pough
green
1 sentence1982In Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pough, 392 So.2d 590 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), a case factually similar to the case at bar, the Third District found a counterclaim for contribution was permissive, not compulsory. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Gatto v. Publix Supermarket, Inc.
green
1 sentence1981A malicious prosecution action requires as one of its essential elements a bona fide termination of the "prosecution." Gatto v. Publix Supermarket, Inc., 387 So.2d 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
McCreary v. Lake Boulevard Sponge Exchange Co., Inc.
neutral
2 sentences1975NOTES [1] Although appellee questioned the right of appellants to construct the house on the disputed land prior to completion, he also admitted that he led appellants to believe that they could "work out a deal later" if the land was later proved to belong to him. [2] See McCreary v. Lake Boulevard Sponge Exchange Co., 1938, 133 Fla. 740 , 183 So. 7 ; Hedges v. Lysek, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1955, 84 So.2d 28 . [3] See Chapter 66, Florida Statutes. [4] Cowgill v. Hopkins, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1951, 52 So.2d 343 ; Bridgehead Land Co. v. Hale, 1940, 145 Fla. 389 , 199 So. 361 . [5] F.S. 66.041-66.101. [6] See McCre 1975NOTES [1] Although appellee questioned the right of appellants to construct the house on the disputed land prior to completion, he also admitted that he led appellants to believe that they could "work out a deal later" if the land was later proved to belong to him. [2] See McCreary v. Lake Boulevard Sponge Exchange Co., 1938, 133 Fla. 740 , 183 So. 7 ; Hedges v. Lysek, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1955, 84 So.2d 28 . [3] See Chapter 66, Florida Statutes. [4] Cowgill v. Hopkins, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1951, 52 So.2d 343 ; Bridgehead Land Co. v. Hale, 1940, 145 Fla. 389 , 199 So. 361 . [5] F.S. 66.041-66.101. [6] See McCre | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Bridgehead Land Co. Ex Rel. River's Edge, Inc. v. Hale
green
2 sentences1975NOTES [1] Although appellee questioned the right of appellants to construct the house on the disputed land prior to completion, he also admitted that he led appellants to believe that they could "work out a deal later" if the land was later proved to belong to him. [2] See McCreary v. Lake Boulevard Sponge Exchange Co., 1938, 133 Fla. 740 , 183 So. 7 ; Hedges v. Lysek, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1955, 84 So.2d 28 . [3] See Chapter 66, Florida Statutes. [4] Cowgill v. Hopkins, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1951, 52 So.2d 343 ; Bridgehead Land Co. v. Hale, 1940, 145 Fla. 389 , 199 So. 361 . [5] F.S. 66.041-66.101. [6] See McCre 1975NOTES [1] Although appellee questioned the right of appellants to construct the house on the disputed land prior to completion, he also admitted that he led appellants to believe that they could "work out a deal later" if the land was later proved to belong to him. [2] See McCreary v. Lake Boulevard Sponge Exchange Co., 1938, 133 Fla. 740 , 183 So. 7 ; Hedges v. Lysek, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1955, 84 So.2d 28 . [3] See Chapter 66, Florida Statutes. [4] Cowgill v. Hopkins, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1951, 52 So.2d 343 ; Bridgehead Land Co. v. Hale, 1940, 145 Fla. 389 , 199 So. 361 . [5] F.S. 66.041-66.101. [6] See McCre | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Hedges v. Lysek
green
2 sentences1975NOTES [1] Although appellee questioned the right of appellants to construct the house on the disputed land prior to completion, he also admitted that he led appellants to believe that they could "work out a deal later" if the land was later proved to belong to him. [2] See McCreary v. Lake Boulevard Sponge Exchange Co., 1938, 133 Fla. 740 , 183 So. 7 ; Hedges v. Lysek, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1955, 84 So.2d 28 . [3] See Chapter 66, Florida Statutes. [4] Cowgill v. Hopkins, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1951, 52 So.2d 343 ; Bridgehead Land Co. v. Hale, 1940, 145 Fla. 389 , 199 So. 361 . [5] F.S. 66.041-66.101. [6] See McCre 1975NOTES [1] Although appellee questioned the right of appellants to construct the house on the disputed land prior to completion, he also admitted that he led appellants to believe that they could "work out a deal later" if the land was later proved to belong to him. [2] See McCreary v. Lake Boulevard Sponge Exchange Co., 1938, 133 Fla. 740 , 183 So. 7 ; Hedges v. Lysek, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1955, 84 So.2d 28 . [3] See Chapter 66, Florida Statutes. [4] Cowgill v. Hopkins, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1951, 52 So.2d 343 ; Bridgehead Land Co. v. Hale, 1940, 145 Fla. 389 , 199 So. 361 . [5] F.S. 66.041-66.101. [6] See McCre | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Pesce v. Linaido
green
1 sentence1969On page 30 it states: "and similarly, if defendant, X, pleads a cross-claim against his co-party, defendant Y, the latter must plead as a counterclaim any claim which he (Y) has against X that arises out of the transaction or occurrence which has made the basis of X's cross-claim." In 2A Moore's Federal Practice § 7.04, at 1539 it is reported: "No reply is mandatory to an answer made to a cross-claim unless it contains a counterclaim denominated as such.[4]" "[4] See Rule 13(a), (g), which authorizes a counterclaim in such a situation as this: defendant A cross-claims against defendant B; B sh | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Hightower v. Bigoney
green
2 sentences1969On page 30 it states: "and similarly, if defendant, X, pleads a cross-claim against his co-party, defendant Y, the latter must plead as a counterclaim any claim which he (Y) has against X that arises out of the transaction or occurrence which has made the basis of X's cross-claim." In 2A Moore's Federal Practice § 7.04, at 1539 it is reported: "No reply is mandatory to an answer made to a cross-claim unless it contains a counterclaim denominated as such.[4]" "[4] See Rule 13(a), (g), which authorizes a counterclaim in such a situation as this: defendant A cross-claims against defendant B; B sh 1969On page 30 it states: "and similarly, if defendant, X, pleads a cross-claim against his co-party, defendant Y, the latter must plead as a counterclaim any claim which he (Y) has against X that arises out of the transaction or occurrence which has made the basis of X's cross-claim." In 2A Moore's Federal Practice § 7.04, at 1539 it is reported: "No reply is mandatory to an answer made to a cross-claim unless it contains a counterclaim denominated as such.[4]" "[4] See Rule 13(a), (g), which authorizes a counterclaim in such a situation as this: defendant A cross-claims against defendant B; B sh | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.