impossible standard in Georgia

1991To say otherwise “would be to establish an impossible standard.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 723 (81 SC 1639, 6 LE2d 751).

1983But he concedes as to one of these that "she agreed that she could base her decision on the evidence and instructions by the Court." Thus she falls within the rule stated in Brooks v. State, 244 Ga. 574, 577 ( 261 SE2d 379 ) (1979) (death penalty vacated and case remanded for further consideration of sentence on other grounds, 446 U. S. 961 (1980)), quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 723 (81 SC 1639, 6 LE2d 751) (1961): "To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective

1986It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.’ Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 723 (81 SC 1639, 6 LE2d 751) (1961). ‘Qualified jurors need not ... be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.’ Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 799 (95 SC 2031, 44 LE2d 589) (1975).” Baker v. State, 245 Ga. 657, 660 ( 266 SE2d 477 ) (1980).

1979It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.’ Id,., at 723 [81 SC at 1642] At the same time, the juror’s assurance that he is equal to this task cannot be dispositive of the accused’s rights, and it remains open to the defendant to demonstrate 'the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of partiality.’ Ibid.” Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 799-800 (1975).

1989It is sufficient if the juror can 'lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 529-530 ( 292 SE2d 389 ) (1982).

1989It is sufficient if the juror can 'lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 529-530 ( 292 SE2d 389 ) (1982).

1986It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.’ Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 723 (81 SC 1639, 6 LE2d 751) (1961). ‘Qualified jurors need not ... be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.’ Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 799 (95 SC 2031, 44 LE2d 589) (1975).” Baker v. State, 245 Ga. 657, 660 ( 266 SE2d 477 ) (1980).

1986It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.’ Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 723 (81 SC 1639, 6 LE2d 751) (1961). ‘Qualified jurors need not ... be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.’ Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 799 (95 SC 2031, 44 LE2d 589) (1975).” Baker v. State, 245 Ga. 657, 660 ( 266 SE2d 477 ) (1980).

1983But he concedes as to one of these that "she agreed that she could base her decision on the evidence and instructions by the Court." Thus she falls within the rule stated in Brooks v. State, 244 Ga. 574, 577 ( 261 SE2d 379 ) (1979) (death penalty vacated and case remanded for further consideration of sentence on other grounds, 446 U. S. 961 (1980)), quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 723 (81 SC 1639, 6 LE2d 751) (1961): "To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective

1983But he concedes as to one of these that "she agreed that she could base her decision on the evidence and instructions by the Court." Thus she falls within the rule stated in Brooks v. State, 244 Ga. 574, 577 ( 261 SE2d 379 ) (1979) (death penalty vacated and case remanded for further consideration of sentence on other grounds, 446 U. S. 961 (1980)), quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 723 (81 SC 1639, 6 LE2d 751) (1961): "To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective

1982The defendant argues that by reason of extensive publicity from all the news media, a fair trial was impossible. “ ‘The test as to whether pretrial publicity has so prejudiced a case that an accused can not receive a fair trial is whether the jurors summoned to try the case have formed fixed opinions as to guilt or innocence of the accused from reading such publicity.’ Dampier v. State, supra [ 245 Ga. 427, 431 ( 265 SE2d 565 ) (1980)]. ‘To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of

1982The defendant argues that by reason of extensive publicity from all the news media, a fair trial was impossible. “ ‘The test as to whether pretrial publicity has so prejudiced a case that an accused can not receive a fair trial is whether the jurors summoned to try the case have formed fixed opinions as to guilt or innocence of the accused from reading such publicity.’ Dampier v. State, supra [ 245 Ga. 427, 431 ( 265 SE2d 565 ) (1980)]. ‘To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of