Turner motion in Georgia

2025To state a cause of action for negligence in Georgia, a plaintiff must show (1) a legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct raised by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risks of harm; (2) a breach of this standard; (3) a legally attributable causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) loss or damage to plaintiff’s legally protected interest resulting from the breach. 5 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hunsucker, 304 Ga. App. at 201 (1). “[T]he mere fact that an accident happened and the plaintiff may have sustained injuries or damages affo

2025To state a cause of action for negligence in Georgia, a plaintiff must show (1) a legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct raised by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risks of harm; (2) a breach of this standard; (3) a legally attributable causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) loss or damage to plaintiff’s legally protected interest resulting from the breach. 5 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hunsucker, 304 Ga. App. at 201 (1). “[T]he mere fact that an accident happened and the plaintiff may have sustained injuries or damages affo

2026Randall, 274 Ga. at 109 (2).

2025See Tallman Pools, 181 Ga. App. at 343 (“When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported by evidence, respondent may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

2025These conjectures, without 12 substantiating facts, do not create a jury question.3 See Kicklighter, 202 Ga. App. at 655 (“A review of the record demonstrates that appellant produced no evidence to authorize a finding that, in the exercise of ordinary care, appellee could have avoided 3 Although the appellants note in their appellate brief that they have hired a collision reconstructionist “who will explain the dynamics of the crash to the jury[,]” it was incumbent upon the appellants to provide sufficient evidence supporting their inferences in response to Turner’s motion for summary judgment

2019OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5) (defining DUI per se as driving with blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or more at any time within three hours after such driving); Miller v. State, 307 Ga. App. 701, 703-704 (1) ( 706 SE2d 94 ) (2011).

2019OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5) (defining DUI per se as driving with blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or more at any time within three hours after such driving); Miller v. State, 307 Ga. App. 701, 703-704 (1) ( 706 SE2d 94 ) (2011).

2018See Mims v. State , 301 Ga. App. 436 , 437 (2), 687 S.E.2d 670 (2009) (when a defendant fails to show prejudice, we need not address the deficient performance prong). c) Turner's contention that the trial court was ineffective for failing to object to testimony that Turner's prior conviction was discovered through a drug warrant is also meritless.

2018See Mims v. State , 301 Ga. App. 436 , 437 (2), 687 S.E.2d 670 (2009) (when a defendant fails to show prejudice, we need not address the deficient performance prong). c) Turner's contention that the trial court was ineffective for failing to object to testimony that Turner's prior conviction was discovered through a drug warrant is also meritless.

2012Thus, contrary to McCrary’s assertions, MGM is not liable for Turner’s actions in this regard. 27 See Hunsucker, supra; Tuggle v. Helms, 231 Ga. App. 899, 902-903 (2) ( 499 SE2d 365 ) (1998). 28 See La Quinta Inns v. Leech, 289 Ga. App. 812, 817 (1) ( 658 SE2d 637 ) (2008); Alexander, supra. 29 See Alexander, supra; Gale v. North Meadow Assoc.

2012Thus, contrary to McCrary’s assertions, MGM is not liable for Turner’s actions in this regard. 27 See Hunsucker, supra; Tuggle v. Helms, 231 Ga. App. 899, 902-903 (2) ( 499 SE2d 365 ) (1998). 28 See La Quinta Inns v. Leech, 289 Ga. App. 812, 817 (1) ( 658 SE2d 637 ) (2008); Alexander, supra. 29 See Alexander, supra; Gale v. North Meadow Assoc.

2012Thus, contrary to McCrary’s assertions, MGM is not liable for Turner’s actions in this regard. 27 See Hunsucker, supra; Tuggle v. Helms, 231 Ga. App. 899, 902-903 (2) ( 499 SE2d 365 ) (1998). 28 See La Quinta Inns v. Leech, 289 Ga. App. 812, 817 (1) ( 658 SE2d 637 ) (2008); Alexander, supra. 29 See Alexander, supra; Gale v. North Meadow Assoc.

2012Thus, contrary to McCrary’s assertions, MGM is not liable for Turner’s actions in this regard. 27 See Hunsucker, supra; Tuggle v. Helms, 231 Ga. App. 899, 902-903 (2) ( 499 SE2d 365 ) (1998). 28 See La Quinta Inns v. Leech, 289 Ga. App. 812, 817 (1) ( 658 SE2d 637 ) (2008); Alexander, supra. 29 See Alexander, supra; Gale v. North Meadow Assoc.

2010See Willis v. Love, 232 Ga. App. 543, 544 (1) ( 502 SE2d 487 ) (1998).

2010See Willis v. Love, 232 Ga. App. 543, 544 (1) ( 502 SE2d 487 ) (1998).

2010See OCGA § 13-4-23 (“If the nonperformance of a party to a contract is caused by the conduct of the opposite party, such conduct shall excuse the other party from performance.”); Parkside Center, Ltd. v. Chicagoland Vending, 250 Ga. App. 607, 614 (5) ( 552 SE2d 557 ) (2001); Herrman, 83 Ga. App. at 890-891 (1).

2010See OCGA § 13-4-23 (“If the nonperformance of a party to a contract is caused by the conduct of the opposite party, such conduct shall excuse the other party from performance.”); Parkside Center, Ltd. v. Chicagoland Vending, 250 Ga. App. 607, 614 (5) ( 552 SE2d 557 ) (2001); Herrman, 83 Ga. App. at 890-891 (1).

2010See OCGA § 13-4-23 (“If the nonperformance of a party to a contract is caused by the conduct of the opposite party, such conduct shall excuse the other party from performance.”); Parkside Center, Ltd. v. Chicagoland Vending, 250 Ga. App. 607, 614 (5) ( 552 SE2d 557 ) (2001); Herrman, 83 Ga. App. at 890-891 (1).

2006All the Justices concur. 1 Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851, 853 ( 507 SE2d 419 ) (1998). 2 OCGA § 15-6-3 (32.1). 3 Rubiani v. State, 279 Ga. 299 ( 612 SE2d 798 ) (2005). 4 Smith v. State, 266 Ga. 687, 687 ( 470 SE2d 436 ) (1996); Brown v. State, 280 Ga. 658 (2) ( 631 SE2d 687 ) (2006). 5 Smith, 266 Ga. at 687; see also Caine v. State, 266 Ga. 421, 421 ( 467 SE2d 570 ) (1996) (direct appeal from a guilty plea will lie “if, and only if, the questions that he seeks to raise on appeal may be resolved by facts appearing in the record.”). 6 Coleman v. State, 278 Ga. 493, 494 ( 604 SE2d 157 ) (2004). 7 H

2006All the Justices concur. 1 Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851, 853 ( 507 SE2d 419 ) (1998). 2 OCGA § 15-6-3 (32.1). 3 Rubiani v. State, 279 Ga. 299 ( 612 SE2d 798 ) (2005). 4 Smith v. State, 266 Ga. 687, 687 ( 470 SE2d 436 ) (1996); Brown v. State, 280 Ga. 658 (2) ( 631 SE2d 687 ) (2006). 5 Smith, 266 Ga. at 687; see also Caine v. State, 266 Ga. 421, 421 ( 467 SE2d 570 ) (1996) (direct appeal from a guilty plea will lie “if, and only if, the questions that he seeks to raise on appeal may be resolved by facts appearing in the record.”). 6 Coleman v. State, 278 Ga. 493, 494 ( 604 SE2d 157 ) (2004). 7 H

2006All the Justices concur. 1 Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851, 853 ( 507 SE2d 419 ) (1998). 2 OCGA § 15-6-3 (32.1). 3 Rubiani v. State, 279 Ga. 299 ( 612 SE2d 798 ) (2005). 4 Smith v. State, 266 Ga. 687, 687 ( 470 SE2d 436 ) (1996); Brown v. State, 280 Ga. 658 (2) ( 631 SE2d 687 ) (2006). 5 Smith, 266 Ga. at 687; see also Caine v. State, 266 Ga. 421, 421 ( 467 SE2d 570 ) (1996) (direct appeal from a guilty plea will lie “if, and only if, the questions that he seeks to raise on appeal may be resolved by facts appearing in the record.”). 6 Coleman v. State, 278 Ga. 493, 494 ( 604 SE2d 157 ) (2004). 7 H

2006All the Justices concur. 1 Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851, 853 ( 507 SE2d 419 ) (1998). 2 OCGA § 15-6-3 (32.1). 3 Rubiani v. State, 279 Ga. 299 ( 612 SE2d 798 ) (2005). 4 Smith v. State, 266 Ga. 687, 687 ( 470 SE2d 436 ) (1996); Brown v. State, 280 Ga. 658 (2) ( 631 SE2d 687 ) (2006). 5 Smith, 266 Ga. at 687; see also Caine v. State, 266 Ga. 421, 421 ( 467 SE2d 570 ) (1996) (direct appeal from a guilty plea will lie “if, and only if, the questions that he seeks to raise on appeal may be resolved by facts appearing in the record.”). 6 Coleman v. State, 278 Ga. 493, 494 ( 604 SE2d 157 ) (2004). 7 H

2006All the Justices concur. 1 Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851, 853 ( 507 SE2d 419 ) (1998). 2 OCGA § 15-6-3 (32.1). 3 Rubiani v. State, 279 Ga. 299 ( 612 SE2d 798 ) (2005). 4 Smith v. State, 266 Ga. 687, 687 ( 470 SE2d 436 ) (1996); Brown v. State, 280 Ga. 658 (2) ( 631 SE2d 687 ) (2006). 5 Smith, 266 Ga. at 687; see also Caine v. State, 266 Ga. 421, 421 ( 467 SE2d 570 ) (1996) (direct appeal from a guilty plea will lie “if, and only if, the questions that he seeks to raise on appeal may be resolved by facts appearing in the record.”). 6 Coleman v. State, 278 Ga. 493, 494 ( 604 SE2d 157 ) (2004). 7 H

2006All the Justices concur. 1 Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851, 853 ( 507 SE2d 419 ) (1998). 2 OCGA § 15-6-3 (32.1). 3 Rubiani v. State, 279 Ga. 299 ( 612 SE2d 798 ) (2005). 4 Smith v. State, 266 Ga. 687, 687 ( 470 SE2d 436 ) (1996); Brown v. State, 280 Ga. 658 (2) ( 631 SE2d 687 ) (2006). 5 Smith, 266 Ga. at 687; see also Caine v. State, 266 Ga. 421, 421 ( 467 SE2d 570 ) (1996) (direct appeal from a guilty plea will lie “if, and only if, the questions that he seeks to raise on appeal may be resolved by facts appearing in the record.”). 6 Coleman v. State, 278 Ga. 493, 494 ( 604 SE2d 157 ) (2004). 7 H

2006All the Justices concur. 1 Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851, 853 ( 507 SE2d 419 ) (1998). 2 OCGA § 15-6-3 (32.1). 3 Rubiani v. State, 279 Ga. 299 ( 612 SE2d 798 ) (2005). 4 Smith v. State, 266 Ga. 687, 687 ( 470 SE2d 436 ) (1996); Brown v. State, 280 Ga. 658 (2) ( 631 SE2d 687 ) (2006). 5 Smith, 266 Ga. at 687; see also Caine v. State, 266 Ga. 421, 421 ( 467 SE2d 570 ) (1996) (direct appeal from a guilty plea will lie “if, and only if, the questions that he seeks to raise on appeal may be resolved by facts appearing in the record.”). 6 Coleman v. State, 278 Ga. 493, 494 ( 604 SE2d 157 ) (2004). 7 H

2006All the Justices concur. 1 Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851, 853 ( 507 SE2d 419 ) (1998). 2 OCGA § 15-6-3 (32.1). 3 Rubiani v. State, 279 Ga. 299 ( 612 SE2d 798 ) (2005). 4 Smith v. State, 266 Ga. 687, 687 ( 470 SE2d 436 ) (1996); Brown v. State, 280 Ga. 658 (2) ( 631 SE2d 687 ) (2006). 5 Smith, 266 Ga. at 687; see also Caine v. State, 266 Ga. 421, 421 ( 467 SE2d 570 ) (1996) (direct appeal from a guilty plea will lie “if, and only if, the questions that he seeks to raise on appeal may be resolved by facts appearing in the record.”). 6 Coleman v. State, 278 Ga. 493, 494 ( 604 SE2d 157 ) (2004). 7 H

2006All the Justices concur. 1 Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851, 853 ( 507 SE2d 419 ) (1998). 2 OCGA § 15-6-3 (32.1). 3 Rubiani v. State, 279 Ga. 299 ( 612 SE2d 798 ) (2005). 4 Smith v. State, 266 Ga. 687, 687 ( 470 SE2d 436 ) (1996); Brown v. State, 280 Ga. 658 (2) ( 631 SE2d 687 ) (2006). 5 Smith, 266 Ga. at 687; see also Caine v. State, 266 Ga. 421, 421 ( 467 SE2d 570 ) (1996) (direct appeal from a guilty plea will lie “if, and only if, the questions that he seeks to raise on appeal may be resolved by facts appearing in the record.”). 6 Coleman v. State, 278 Ga. 493, 494 ( 604 SE2d 157 ) (2004). 7 H

2006All the Justices concur. 1 Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851, 853 ( 507 SE2d 419 ) (1998). 2 OCGA § 15-6-3 (32.1). 3 Rubiani v. State, 279 Ga. 299 ( 612 SE2d 798 ) (2005). 4 Smith v. State, 266 Ga. 687, 687 ( 470 SE2d 436 ) (1996); Brown v. State, 280 Ga. 658 (2) ( 631 SE2d 687 ) (2006). 5 Smith, 266 Ga. at 687; see also Caine v. State, 266 Ga. 421, 421 ( 467 SE2d 570 ) (1996) (direct appeal from a guilty plea will lie “if, and only if, the questions that he seeks to raise on appeal may be resolved by facts appearing in the record.”). 6 Coleman v. State, 278 Ga. 493, 494 ( 604 SE2d 157 ) (2004). 7 H

2002Smith, P. J., and Barnes, J., concur. 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Gordon v. State, 244 Ga. App. 265, 266-267 (1) ( 535 SE2d 289 ) (2000).

2002Smith, P. J., and Barnes, J., concur. 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Gordon v. State, 244 Ga. App. 265, 266-267 (1) ( 535 SE2d 289 ) (2000).

1999“Whether to grant a mistrial is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and that discretion will not be interfered with on appeal unless it is apparent that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Cowards v. State, 266 Ga. 191, 194 (3) (c) ( 465 SE2d 677 ) (1996).

1999“Whether to grant a mistrial is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and that discretion will not be interfered with on appeal unless it is apparent that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Cowards v. State, 266 Ga. 191, 194 (3) (c) ( 465 SE2d 677 ) (1996).

1998In Touche Ross & Co. v. DASD Corp., 162 Ga. App. 438, 440 (2) ( 292 SE2d 84 ) (1982), we held that “a contract is not void because its performance is, as to particular details, left subject to the subsequent agreement of the parties.” See also Holland, supra at 795 (1).

1998In Touche Ross & Co. v. DASD Corp., 162 Ga. App. 438, 440 (2) ( 292 SE2d 84 ) (1982), we held that “a contract is not void because its performance is, as to particular details, left subject to the subsequent agreement of the parties.” See also Holland, supra at 795 (1).

1998In Touche Ross & Co. v. DASD Corp., 162 Ga. App. 438, 440 (2) ( 292 SE2d 84 ) (1982), we held that “a contract is not void because its performance is, as to particular details, left subject to the subsequent agreement of the parties.” See also Holland, supra at 795 (1).