Turner test in California

2025We have found it important to inquire whether prison regulations restricting inmates’ First Amendment rights operated in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression.” (Turner v. Safley (1987) 482 U.S. 78 , 89–90 (Turner).) As a result, when considering the various parts of the Turner test, a trial court’s exercise “of legal discretion must be grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal 6. principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.” (People v. Russel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 187, 195 .) It is also important to recognize that while this case consi

2025We have found it important to inquire whether prison regulations restricting inmates’ First Amendment rights operated in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression.” (Turner v. Safley (1987) 482 U.S. 78 , 89–90 (Turner).) As a result, when considering the various parts of the Turner test, a trial court’s exercise “of legal discretion must be grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal 6. principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.” (People v. Russel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 187, 195 .) It is also important to recognize that while this case consi

2023The rationale underlying the Turner test is based on the “considerable deference” owed “to the determinations of prison administrators who, in the interest of security, regulate the relations between prisoners and the outside world.” (Thornburgh v. Abbott (1989) 490 U.S. 401, 408 ; id. at p. 407 [noting the “expertise of these officials” and emphasizing the need to “be[] sensitive to the delicate balance that [they] must strike between the order and security of the internal prison environment and the legitimate demands of 14 PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. those on the ‘o

2010“Where ‘other avenues’ remain available for the exercise of the asserted right [citation], courts should be particularly conscious of the ‘measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials ... in gauging the validity of the regulation.’ ” (Turner, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 90 .) In applying this factor, “ ‘the right’ in question must be viewed sensibly and expansively.” (Thornburgh v. Abbott, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 417 .) In Turner, the Supreme Court, in upholding a ban on inmate-to-inmate correspondence, defined the right at issue as the right of expression.

2024The trial court subsequently refused to consider Turner’s motion to dismiss his prior strike conviction pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 because the motion was not explicitly provided for in his plea agreement.

2014After rejecting Turner's motion under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 to dismiss the remaining prior strike allegation, the court sentenced her to a total term of four years, plus various fines.

2005Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 27, 2005. 1 The Arizona policy also prohibits sexually explicit materials and defines them as “ ‘materials that show frontal nudity.’ ” (Mauro, supra, 188 F.3d at p. 1057 .) 2 All further regulatory references are to title 15 of the California Code of Regulations unless otherwise specified. 3 The Legislature adopted the Turner rule when it amended Penal Code section 2600 to provide in part: “A person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison may during that period of confinement be deprived of such rights, and only such rig

2001The Turner court cautioned, however, that it was not articulating a “least restrictive alternative” test. “[Pjrison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint. [Citation.] But if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological *1184 interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.” ( Turner, supra, 482 U.S. at pp. 90-91 [ 107 S.Ct. at

2001The Turner court cautioned, however, that it was not articulating a “least restrictive alternative” test. “[Pjrison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint. [Citation.] But if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological *1184 interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.” ( Turner, supra, 482 U.S. at pp. 90-91 [ 107 S.Ct. at

2001The Turner court cautioned, however, that it was not articulating a “least restrictive alternative” test. “[Pjrison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint. [Citation.] But if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological *1184 interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.” ( Turner, supra, 482 U.S. at pp. 90-91 [ 107 S.Ct. at

2002Also, we do not need to determine whether, as Proulx contends, the cost to remove the leaking liner is recoverable under Crest-Liners’ policies, either because the liner was incorporated into other property (as in Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 364 ] and Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 690 ]) or because removal was a remedial action (as in AIU, supra, 51 Cal.3d 807 ).

2002Also, we do not need to determine whether, as Proulx contends, the cost to remove the leaking liner is recoverable under Crest-Liners’ policies, either because the liner was incorporated into other property (as in Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 364 ] and Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 690 ]) or because removal was a remedial action (as in AIU, supra, 51 Cal.3d 807 ).

2002Also, we do not need to determine whether, as Proulx contends, the cost to remove the leaking liner is recoverable under Crest-Liners’ policies, either because the liner was incorporated into other property (as in Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 364 ] and Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 690 ]) or because removal was a remedial action (as in AIU, supra, 51 Cal.3d 807 ).

2002Also, we do not need to determine whether, as Proulx contends, the cost to remove the leaking liner is recoverable under Crest-Liners’ policies, either because the liner was incorporated into other property (as in Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 364 ] and Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 690 ]) or because removal was a remedial action (as in AIU, supra, 51 Cal.3d 807 ).

2002Because J&H failed to meet its burden of production to establish that Turner’s claim against Proulx did not seek to recover for at least some “physical injury” to property other than the liner (i.e., damages “because of’ “property damage”), J&H is not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that there was no alleged “property damage.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850 .) D.

2002Because J & H failed to meet its burden of production to establish that Turner's claim against Proulx did not seek to recover for at least some "physical injury" to property other than the liner (i.e., damages "because of "property damage"), J & H is not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that there was no alleged "property damage." ( Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850 , 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 24 P.3d 493 .) *452 D.

2025His reliance on People v. Turner (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1591 is unpersuasive because it involved the Three Strikes law and Perez explained why Turner “should be narrowly construed to apply only to the antirecidivist Three Strikes law, and not to the One Strike law, which punishes, as relevant here, not recidivism but the commission of sexual offenses against more than one victim.” (Perez, at p. 241; see also Anthony v. Superior Court (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 700 , 716–718 [holding Turner’s analysis was limited to the Three Strikes law and following Perez].) Bisbee appears to contend that we may

2025(See Los Angeles Free Press, supra, 9 Cal.App.3d at p. 457 .) As noted earlier, during the August 11, 2022, hearing on the motion, the proceedings consisted almost entirely of oral argument by the parties on defendant Sanchez’s motion seeking “unfettered” access to his entire defense team.

2025(See Los Angeles Free Press, supra, 9 Cal.App.3d at p. 457 .) As noted earlier, during the August 11, 2022, hearing on the motion, the proceedings consisted almost entirely of oral argument by the parties on defendant Sanchez’s motion seeking “unfettered” access to his entire defense team.

2025We have found it important to inquire whether prison regulations restricting inmates’ First Amendment rights operated in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression.” (Turner v. Safley (1987) 482 U.S. 78 , 89–90 (Turner).) As a result, when considering the various parts of the Turner test, a trial court’s exercise “of legal discretion must be grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal 6. principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.” (People v. Russel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 187, 195 .) It is also important to recognize that while this case consi

2025We have found it important to inquire whether prison regulations restricting inmates’ First Amendment rights operated in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression.” (Turner v. Safley (1987) 482 U.S. 78 , 89–90 (Turner).) As a result, when considering the various parts of the Turner test, a trial court’s exercise “of legal discretion must be grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal 6. principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.” (People v. Russel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 187, 195 .) It is also important to recognize that while this case consi

2023(See Harmon v. Harmon (Me. 1979) 404 A.2d 1020, 1025 ; Plimpton v. Gerrard (Me. 1995) 668 A.2d 882, 886 .) Turner’s brief argument does not address the benefit or detriment of either position, and does not persuade us that the trial court’s position—which appears to be consistent with the weight of authority on this issue—was erroneous.

2023(See Harmon v. Harmon (Me. 1979) 404 A.2d 1020, 1025 ; Plimpton v. Gerrard (Me. 1995) 668 A.2d 882, 886 .) Turner’s brief argument does not address the benefit or detriment of either position, and does not persuade us that the trial court’s position—which appears to be consistent with the weight of authority on this issue—was erroneous.

2022In Packingham v. North Carolina (2017) 137 S.Ct 1730 , the United States Supreme court addressed the constitutionality of a state statute that prohibited convicted sex offenders from accessing social networking websites after their release from prison.

2022In Packingham v. North Carolina (2017) 137 S.Ct 1730 , the United States Supreme court addressed the constitutionality of a state statute that prohibited convicted sex offenders from accessing social networking websites after their release from prison.

2021Ultimately we choose the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the lawmakers, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute.” (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1233 .) 1.

2021To consider Turner’s claim that these statutes require standing at the time an action is commenced rather than continuous standing, “we must begin by considering the statute’s language and structure, bearing in mind that our fundamental task in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the law’s intended purpose. [Citation.] We examine the ordinary meaning of the statutory language, the text of related provisions, and the overarching structure of the statutory scheme.” (Weatherford, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1246 .) “If, however, the statutory language is ambiguous, ‘we may resort t

2016We have reviewed the entire record on appeal as mandated by Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738 .

2016We have reviewed the entire record on appeal as mandated by Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738 .

2016We have reviewed the entire record on appeal as mandated by Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738 .

2016We have reviewed the entire record on appeal as mandated by Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738 .

2013Arbitrators must recuse themselves if “‘[f]or any reason . . . [a] person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that [they] would be able to be impartial.’” ( Haworth, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 388-389.) “‘Impartiality’ entails the ‘absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind.’” (Id. at p. 389.) In the context of recusal, “‘[p]otential bias and prejudice must clearly be established by an objective standard.’” (Ibid.) “‘An impression of possible bias in the arbitration context means that on