warrant-preference requirement in Iowa

2022In State v. Ochoa, we considered the continued validity of Cullison principles in the wake of innovations by the United States Supreme Court that dramatically cut back on search and seizure protections of parolees under the Fourth Amendment.290 In Ochoa, the state sought to justify a warrantless search of a parolee when there was no claim of individualized suspicion.291 We refused to follow the eviscerating innovations of the United States Supreme Court that found getting a warrant impractical.292 We repeated our often expressed endorsement of the warrant preference requirement, noting that “[

2021We have stated that Iowa courts “strongly favor the warrant requirement, subject only to ‘jealously and carefully drawn exceptions.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Strong, 493 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1992)); see also State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015) (“ ‘A warrantless search is presumed unreasonable’ unless an exception applies.” (quoting State v. Moriarty, 566 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1997))); Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 285 (“We have also generally endorsed the warrant-preference requirement.”). 3.

2022State v. Pals: At a Minimum, Schneckloth “With Teeth.” In Pals v. State,297 we considered, among other things, the validity of consent to search by the driver of a vehicle who was seized by police on the open road, held in a police car, patted down for weapons, not told that he was free to leave, and who had surrendered his license to the officer.298 We extensively canvassed the caselaw and academic commentary related to the issue of consent to search in traffic stops, and ultimately found it sufficient to apply Schneckloth “with teeth.” We noted that, at a minimum, the failure of the state to

2021We have stated that Iowa courts “strongly favor the warrant requirement, subject only to ‘jealously and carefully drawn exceptions.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Strong, 493 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1992)); see also State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015) (“ ‘A warrantless search is presumed unreasonable’ unless an exception applies.” (quoting State v. Moriarty, 566 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1997))); Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 285 (“We have also generally endorsed the warrant-preference requirement.”). 3.

2021We have stated that Iowa courts “strongly favor the warrant requirement, subject only to ‘jealously and carefully drawn exceptions.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Strong, 493 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1992)); see also State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015) (“ ‘A warrantless search is presumed unreasonable’ unless an exception applies.” (quoting State v. Moriarty, 566 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1997))); Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 285 (“We have also generally endorsed the warrant-preference requirement.”). 3.

2017See Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d at 16 (holding a search- warrant is generally required before a search); Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 286 (holding under the Iowa Constitution we have a warrant-preference requirement); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (“We do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure,.,,”).

2017See Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ("We do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure ...."); State v. Ochoa , 792 N.W.2d 260 , 285 (Iowa 2010) ("We have also generally endorsed the warrant-preference requirement.").

2017See Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ("We do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure ...."); State v. Ochoa , 792 N.W.2d 260 , 285 (Iowa 2010) ("We have also generally endorsed the warrant-preference requirement.").

2020We take this deferential stance because “[w]e have . . . generally endorsed the warrant-preference requirement.” See State v. McNeal, 867 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Iowa 2015) (quoting State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 285 (Iowa 2010)).

2017We “generally endorse[] the warrant-preference requirement,” and “we do not strictly 7 Additional footage of LePon exists until almost 1:25 a.m.—the time the search warrant was signed—but that portion of the video does not show LePon’s legs, so we cannot be sure whether his jeans had yet been seized. 14 scrutinize the sufficiency of the underlying affidavit.” State v. McNeal, 867 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Iowa 2015) (quoting Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 285 ). “[A]s a reviewing court, we do not independently determine probable cause and instead ‘merely decide whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis fo

2022In State v. Ochoa, we considered the continued validity of Cullison principles in the wake of innovations by the United States Supreme Court that dramatically cut back on search and seizure protections of parolees under the Fourth Amendment.290 In Ochoa, the state sought to justify a warrantless search of a parolee when there was no claim of individualized suspicion.291 We refused to follow the eviscerating innovations of the United States Supreme Court that found getting a warrant impractical.292 We repeated our often expressed endorsement of the warrant preference requirement, noting that “[

2021We have stated that Iowa courts “strongly favor the warrant requirement, subject only to ‘jealously and carefully drawn exceptions.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Strong, 493 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1992)); see also State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015) (“ ‘A warrantless search is presumed unreasonable’ unless an exception applies.” (quoting State v. Moriarty, 566 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1997))); Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 285 (“We have also generally endorsed the warrant-preference requirement.”). 3.

2021The generally applicable bright-line “get a warrant” rule is subject to narrow and well-defined exceptions that should be “jealously guarded” against even small incursions. “[T]he basic rule [is] that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment— subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ ” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 , 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 , 88 S. Ct. at 514 ).

2021The generally applicable bright-line “get a warrant” rule is subject to narrow and well-defined exceptions that should be “jealously guarded” against even small incursions. “[T]he basic rule [is] that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment— subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ ” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 , 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 , 88 S. Ct. at 514 ).

2017Close cases are decided in favor of upholding the validity of the warrant.” Id. (citations omitted).

2017We “generally endorse[] the warrant-preference requirement,” and “we do not strictly 7 Additional footage of LePon exists until almost 1:25 a.m.—the time the search warrant was signed—but that portion of the video does not show LePon’s legs, so we cannot be sure whether his jeans had yet been seized. 14 scrutinize the sufficiency of the underlying affidavit.” State v. McNeal, 867 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Iowa 2015) (quoting Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 285 ). “[A]s a reviewing court, we do not independently determine probable cause and instead ‘merely decide whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis fo

2010See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 , 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619, 634 (1991); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 576 (1971); Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57 , 88 S.Ct. at 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d at 585 .

2010See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 , 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619, 634 (1991); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 576 (1971); Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57 , 88 S.Ct. at 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d at 585 .

2010See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 , 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619, 634 (1991); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 576 (1971); Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57 , 88 S.Ct. at 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d at 585 .

2010See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 , 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619, 634 (1991); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 576 (1971); Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57 , 88 S.Ct. at 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d at 585 .