independence defense in Illinois

1995Ed. 2d at 694 , 104 S. Ct. at 2065 .) As cautioned by the Supreme Court in Strickland, "[intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client;” (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 80 L.

1995Ed. 2d at 694 , 104 S. Ct. at 2065 .) As cautioned by the Supreme Court in Strickland, "[intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client;” (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 80 L.

1995As this court has emphasized, trial counsel's strategic decisions during the course of the proceeding are generally protected by a strong presumption that the attorney's decisions reflect sound trial strategy rather than incompetence. ( Ramey, 151 Ill.2d at 523 , 177 Ill.Dec. 449 , 603 N.E.2d 519 , citing People v. Steidl (1991), 142 Ill.2d 204, 240 , 154 Ill.Dec. 616 , 568 N.E.2d 837 .) The Supreme Court has admonished that "[i]ntensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acc

1995(Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d at 523 , citing People v. Steidl (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 204, 240 .) The Supreme Court has admonished that "[i]ntensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 80 L.

1995As this court has emphasized, trial counsel's strategic decisions during the course of the proceeding are generally protected by a strong presumption that the attorney's decisions reflect sound trial strategy rather than incompetence. ( Ramey, 151 Ill.2d at 523 , 177 Ill.Dec. 449 , 603 N.E.2d 519 , citing People v. Steidl (1991), 142 Ill.2d 204, 240 , 154 Ill.Dec. 616 , 568 N.E.2d 837 .) The Supreme Court has admonished that "[i]ntensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acc

1995(Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d at 523 , citing People v. Steidl (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 204, 240 .) The Supreme Court has admonished that "[i]ntensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 80 L.

1995As this court has emphasized, trial counsel's strategic decisions during the course of the proceeding are generally protected by a strong presumption that the attorney's decisions reflect sound trial strategy rather than incompetence. ( Ramey, 151 Ill.2d at 523 , 177 Ill.Dec. 449 , 603 N.E.2d 519 , citing People v. Steidl (1991), 142 Ill.2d 204, 240 , 154 Ill.Dec. 616 , 568 N.E.2d 837 .) The Supreme Court has admonished that "[i]ntensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acc

1995As this court has emphasized, trial counsel's strategic decisions during the course of the proceeding are generally protected by a strong presumption that the attorney's decisions reflect sound trial strategy rather than incompetence. ( Ramey, 151 Ill.2d at 523 , 177 Ill.Dec. 449 , 603 N.E.2d 519 , citing People v. Steidl (1991), 142 Ill.2d 204, 240 , 154 Ill.Dec. 616 , 568 N.E.2d 837 .) The Supreme Court has admonished that "[i]ntensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acc

1994Kunce v. Hogan (1977), 67 Ill.2d 55, 59-60 , 7 Ill.Dec. 63 , 364 N.E.2d 50 .) The usual protections of proceduraldue process do not apply to direct criminal contempt, which is punishable without notice or hearing, because the acts occur in the very presence of the judge. ( People v. Gholson (1952), 412 Ill. 294, 299 , 106 N.E.2d 333 .) While universally recognized as essential to the administration of justice, such power is susceptible to abuse and must be closely examined. ( People v. Loughran (1954), 2 Ill.2d 258, 263 , 118 N.E.2d 310 .) In particular, preserving the independence of the bar

1994Kunce v. Hogan (1977), 67 Ill.2d 55, 59-60 , 7 Ill.Dec. 63 , 364 N.E.2d 50 .) The usual protections of proceduraldue process do not apply to direct criminal contempt, which is punishable without notice or hearing, because the acts occur in the very presence of the judge. ( People v. Gholson (1952), 412 Ill. 294, 299 , 106 N.E.2d 333 .) While universally recognized as essential to the administration of justice, such power is susceptible to abuse and must be closely examined. ( People v. Loughran (1954), 2 Ill.2d 258, 263 , 118 N.E.2d 310 .) In particular, preserving the independence of the bar

1994Kunce v. Hogan (1977), 67 Ill.2d 55, 59-60 , 7 Ill.Dec. 63 , 364 N.E.2d 50 .) The usual protections of proceduraldue process do not apply to direct criminal contempt, which is punishable without notice or hearing, because the acts occur in the very presence of the judge. ( People v. Gholson (1952), 412 Ill. 294, 299 , 106 N.E.2d 333 .) While universally recognized as essential to the administration of justice, such power is susceptible to abuse and must be closely examined. ( People v. Loughran (1954), 2 Ill.2d 258, 263 , 118 N.E.2d 310 .) In particular, preserving the independence of the bar

1994(People v. Loughran (1954), 2 Ill. 2d 258, 263 .) In particular, preserving the independence of the bar requires that a certain latitude be given to attorneys acting in good faith and on behalf of their clients.

1994People v. Miller (1972), 51 Ill.2d 76 , 281 N.E.2d 292 ; see People v. Bertelle (1987), 164 Ill.App.3d 831 , 115 Ill.Dec. 807 , 518 N.E.2d 332 .

1994People v. Miller (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 76 ; see People v. Bertelle (1987), 164 Ill.

1994Kunce v. Hogan (1977), 67 Ill.2d 55, 59-60 , 7 Ill.Dec. 63 , 364 N.E.2d 50 .) The usual protections of proceduraldue process do not apply to direct criminal contempt, which is punishable without notice or hearing, because the acts occur in the very presence of the judge. ( People v. Gholson (1952), 412 Ill. 294, 299 , 106 N.E.2d 333 .) While universally recognized as essential to the administration of justice, such power is susceptible to abuse and must be closely examined. ( People v. Loughran (1954), 2 Ill.2d 258, 263 , 118 N.E.2d 310 .) In particular, preserving the independence of the bar

1994Kunce v. Hogan (1977), 67 Ill.2d 55, 59-60 , 7 Ill.Dec. 63 , 364 N.E.2d 50 .) The usual protections of proceduraldue process do not apply to direct criminal contempt, which is punishable without notice or hearing, because the acts occur in the very presence of the judge. ( People v. Gholson (1952), 412 Ill. 294, 299 , 106 N.E.2d 333 .) While universally recognized as essential to the administration of justice, such power is susceptible to abuse and must be closely examined. ( People v. Loughran (1954), 2 Ill.2d 258, 263 , 118 N.E.2d 310 .) In particular, preserving the independence of the bar

1984(First Arlington National Bank v. Stathis (1980), 90 Ill.

1984App. 3d 802, 808 , 413 N.E.2d 1288 .) This rule is known as the independence principle and requires the issuer of the credit to pay the beneficiary even where the beneficiary nonfraudulently breached the underlying contract.

1984Stringer Construction Co. v. American Insurance Co. (1981), 102 Ill.

1984Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client." ( 466 U.S. ___ , ___, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 694-95 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065-66 .) Although we do not foresee that application of the Strickland rule will produce results that vary significantly from those reached under Greer , we hereby adopt the Supreme Court rule for challenges to effectiveness of both retained and appointed counsel (see People v. Royse (

1984Ed. 2d 674, 694-95 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065-66 .) Although we do not foresee that application of the Strickland rule will produce results that vary significantly from those reached under Greer, we hereby adopt the Supreme Court rule for challenges to effectiveness of both retained and appointed counsel (see People v. Royse (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 163, 170 ) and reject the single-component test of Twomey.

1977The preservation of the independence of the bar is too vital to the due administration of justice to allow of the application of any other general rule.’ [Citation.]” (Maness v. Meyers (1975), 419 U.S. 449, 467-68 , 42 L.

1977The preservation of the independence of the bar is too vital to the due administration of justice to allow of the application of any other general rule.’ [Citation.]” (Maness v. Meyers (1975), 419 U.S. 449, 467-68 , 42 L.