posttrial evidentiary hearing (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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posttrial evidentiary hearing in Illinois

12 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2024 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurancegreen
ill · 1998 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 352 (1998); see also People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227, 234 (2004) (“we review the circuit court’s decisions regarding discovery for abuse of discretion”). “ ‘Abuse of discretion’ is the most deferential standard of review–next to no review at all–and is therefore traditionally reserved for decisions made by a trial judge in overseeing his or her courtroom or in maintaining the progress of a trial.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 356 (2004).

2014Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 352 (1998); see also People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227, 234 (2004) (“we review the circuit court’s decisions regarding discovery for abuse of discretion”). “ ‘Abuse of discretion’ is the most deferential standard of review – next to no review at all – and is therefore traditionally reserved for decisions made by a trial judge in overseeing his or her courtroom or in maintaining the progress of a trial.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 356 (2004).

22
In Re DTgreen
ill · 2004 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 352 (1998); see also People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227, 234 (2004) (“we review the circuit court’s decisions regarding discovery for abuse of discretion”). “ ‘Abuse of discretion’ is the most deferential standard of review–next to no review at all–and is therefore traditionally reserved for decisions made by a trial judge in overseeing his or her courtroom or in maintaining the progress of a trial.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 356 (2004).

2014Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 352 (1998); see also People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227, 234 (2004) (“we review the circuit court’s decisions regarding discovery for abuse of discretion”). “ ‘Abuse of discretion’ is the most deferential standard of review – next to no review at all – and is therefore traditionally reserved for decisions made by a trial judge in overseeing his or her courtroom or in maintaining the progress of a trial.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 356 (2004).

22
People v. Williamsgreen
ill · 2004 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 352 (1998); see also People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227, 234 (2004) (“we review the circuit court’s decisions regarding discovery for abuse of discretion”). “ ‘Abuse of discretion’ is the most deferential standard of review–next to no review at all–and is therefore traditionally reserved for decisions made by a trial judge in overseeing his or her courtroom or in maintaining the progress of a trial.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 356 (2004).

2014Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 352 (1998); see also People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227, 234 (2004) (“we review the circuit court’s decisions regarding discovery for abuse of discretion”). “ ‘Abuse of discretion’ is the most deferential standard of review – next to no review at all – and is therefore traditionally reserved for decisions made by a trial judge in overseeing his or her courtroom or in maintaining the progress of a trial.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 356 (2004).

22
People v. Townsgreen
ill · 1993 · cited in 3 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2009–2011
2 sentences

2011To compel a posttrial evidentiary hearing on juror misconduct, the moving party must produce "`specific, detailed and nonconjectural evidence in support of [its] position.'" People v. Kuntu, 188 Ill.2d 157, 161 , 242 Ill.Dec. 92 , 720 N.E.2d 1047 (1999) (quoting People v. Towns, 157 Ill.2d 90, 102 , 191 Ill.Dec. 24 , 623 N.E.2d 269 (1993)).

2011To compel a posttrial evidentiary hearing on juror misconduct, the moving party must produce "`specific, detailed and nonconjectural evidence in support of [its] position.'" People v. Kuntu, 188 Ill.2d 157, 161 , 242 Ill.Dec. 92 , 720 N.E.2d 1047 (1999) (quoting People v. Towns, 157 Ill.2d 90, 102 , 191 Ill.Dec. 24 , 623 N.E.2d 269 (1993)).

13
Forest Preserve District v. First National Bankgreen
illappct · 2010 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021Id. ¶ 39 The defendants appealed, and the appellate court held that a posttrial evidentiary hearing was required to determine whether “ ‘application of section 7-121 did not provide just compensation in this case.’ ” Id. ¶ 16 (quoting Forest Preserve District of Du Page County v. First National Bank of Franklin Park, 401 Ill.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

2011Several months prior to trial, on August 3, 2007, defendants filed a motion asking the trial court to schedule a posttrial evidentiary hearing under Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 , 104 S.Ct. 2187 , 81 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984).

2011Several months prior to trial, on August 3, 2007, defendants filed a motion asking the trial court to schedule a posttrial evidentiary hearing under Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 , 104 S.Ct. 2187 , 81 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984).

42010–2011
People v. Kuntu green
ill · 1999
2 sentences

2011To compel a posttrial evidentiary hearing on juror misconduct, the moving party must produce "`specific, detailed and nonconjectural evidence in support of [its] position.'" People v. Kuntu, 188 Ill.2d 157, 161 , 242 Ill.Dec. 92 , 720 N.E.2d 1047 (1999) (quoting People v. Towns, 157 Ill.2d 90, 102 , 191 Ill.Dec. 24 , 623 N.E.2d 269 (1993)).

2011To compel a posttrial evidentiary hearing on juror misconduct, the moving party must produce "`specific, detailed and nonconjectural evidence in support of [its] position.'" People v. Kuntu, 188 Ill.2d 157, 161 , 242 Ill.Dec. 92 , 720 N.E.2d 1047 (1999) (quoting People v. Towns, 157 Ill.2d 90, 102 , 191 Ill.Dec. 24 , 623 N.E.2d 269 (1993)).

32009–2011
People v. Bush green
ill · 2023
1 sentence

2024Bush, 2023 IL 128747, ¶ 72 . ¶ 49 In this case, there is a dearth of evidence suggesting that McGrath had a close relationship to defendant that rises to the level of an “extraordinary situation.” McGrath testified at the posttrial evidentiary hearing that he monitored various pods, including defendant’s, based on a rotating schedule.

12024–2024
People v. Witte green
illappct · 1983
1 sentence

1998People v. Witte, 115 Ill.

11998–1998

Where else courts name it

IL 12 (1998–2024) MI 8 (1990–2017) CA 3 (1983–2022) CT 3 (2010–2021) WA 2 (2009–2009)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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