public nuisance claim in Illinois

2004The Supreme Court of Ohio, in City of Cincinnati, allowed a public nuisance claim against a similar group of defendants to stand, holding that, “under the Restatement’s broad definition, a public-nuisance action can be maintained for injuries caused by a product if the facts establish that the design, manufacturing, marketing, or sale of the product unreasonably interferes with a right common to the general public.” City of Cincinnati, 95 Ohio St. 3d at 520 , 768 N.E.2d at 1142.

2004The Supreme Court of Ohio, in City of Cincinnati , allowed a public nuisance claim against a similar group of defendants to stand, holding that, “under the Restatement’s broad definition, a public-nuisance action can be maintained for injuries caused by a product if the facts establish that the design, manufacturing, marketing, or sale of the product unreasonably interfere[ ] with a right common to the general public.” City of Cincinnati , 95 Ohio St. 3d at 520 , 768 N.E.2d at 1142.

2025She has not shown that the nature center’s ambassador animals program “injuriously affects the safety, health or morals of the public, or works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury to the public.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 33 Given Milan’s inability to meet the first prong, we do not reach the parties’ arguments about the three other elements of a public nuisance claim.

2013Id. ¶7 The first element that must be alleged is the existence of a right common to the general public.

2004All a creative mind would need to do is construct a scenario describing a known or perceived harm of a sort that can somehow be said to relate back to the way a company or an industry makes, markets, and/or sells its non-defective, lawful product or service, and a public nuisance claim would be conceived and a lawsuit born.” Spitzer, 309 A.D.2d at 96 , 761 N.Y.S.2d at 196 .

2004All a creative mind would need to do is construct a scenario describing a known or perceived harm of a sort that can somehow be said to relate back to the way a company or an industry makes, markets, and/or sells its non-defective, lawful product or service, and a public nuisance claim would be conceived and a lawsuit born.” Spitzer, 309 A.D.2d at 96 , 761 N.Y.S.2d at 196 .

2004Super. 291 , 820 A.2d 27 (2003), a New Jersey appellate court offered several reasons for declining to apply the municipal cost recovery rule to a public nuisance claim against gun manufacturers, distributors, and dealers.

2004Super. 291 , 820 A.2d 27 (2003), a New Jersey appellate court offered several reasons for declining to apply the municipal cost recovery rule to a public nuisance claim against gun manufacturers, distributors, and dealers.

2004The only other authority cited by the appellate court for this proposition is Commonwealth Edison, 24 Ill.App.3d at 632-33 , 321 N.E.2d 412 , in which the court concluded that although the defendant demonstrated that it was in compliance with applicable standards, the court was "not bound by federal air-pollution standards in deciding whether the facility's emissions constitute a common law nuisance." Rather, the court stated, "those standards offer us guidelines in the determination of the reasonableness of the operation and the extent of any harm to the public." In Commonwealth Edison , howe

2004The only other authority cited by the appellate court for this proposition is Commonwealth Edison, 24 Ill.App.3d at 632-33 , 321 N.E.2d 412 , in which the court concluded that although the defendant demonstrated that it was in compliance with applicable standards, the court was "not bound by federal air-pollution standards in deciding whether the facility's emissions constitute a common law nuisance." Rather, the court stated, "those standards offer us guidelines in the determination of the reasonableness of the operation and the extent of any harm to the public." In Commonwealth Edison , howe

2004Control Relying on the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in City of Cincinnati, the appellate court addressed the argument that defendants cannot be held hable in public nuisance for the harms alleged because they do not have control over the instrumentality at the time of injury: “[I]t is not fatal to the public nuisance claim that defendants did not control the actual firearms at the moment that harm occurred. [Citation.] The Ohio Supreme Court stated: ‘[A]ppellant alleged that appellees control the creation and supply of this illegal secondary market for firearms, not the actual use of the

2004Control Relying on the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in City of Cincinnati , the appellate court addressed the argument that defendants cannot be held liable in public nuisance for the harms alleged because they do not have control over the instrumentality at the time of injury: “[I]t is not fatal to the public nuisance claim that defendants did not control the actual firearms at the moment that harm occurred. [Citation.] The Ohio Supreme Court stated: ‘[A]ppellant alleged that appellees control the creation and supply of this illegal secondary market for firearms, not the actual use of t

2004Proximate Cause Leaving aside the question of duty, the remaining element of the public nuisance claim that must be present before injunctive relief against the dealer defendants may be available is “resulting injury” (see Gilmore, 261 Ill.

2004Proximate Cause Leaving aside the question of duty, the remaining element of the public nuisance claim that must be present before injunctive relief against the dealer defendants may be available is “resulting injury” (see Gilmore , 261 Ill.

2004Pa. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 12 F.3d 1270 (3d Cir. 1993), the federal district court held that, under Pennsylvania law, the economic loss doctrine was not applicable to a public nuisance claim.

2004Pa. 1993), rev’d on other grounds , 12 F.3d 1270 (3d Cir. 1993), the federal district court held that, under Pennsylvania law, the economic loss doctrine was not applicable to a public nuisance claim.

2003Ganim, 258 Conn. at 365 , 780 A.2d at 129-30 . [5] Held that, as to manufacturer appellees, the city failed to allege any legislatively unauthorized activity, and thus, the trial court properly dismissed the city's public nuisance claim. [6] Held that plaintiffs failed to allege facts that would support a finding that manufacturer was in control of the nuisance at the time plaintiffs were injured.

2003Ganim, 258 Conn. at 365 , 780 A.2d at 129-30 . [5] Held that, as to manufacturer appellees, the city failed to allege any legislatively unauthorized activity, and thus, the trial court properly dismissed the city's public nuisance claim. [6] Held that plaintiffs failed to allege facts that would support a finding that manufacturer was in control of the nuisance at the time plaintiffs were injured.

2003Young, 327 Ill.

2003Young , 327 Ill.

2003Ileto, 194 F.Supp.2d at 1061 .

2002Ileto , 194 F. Supp. 2d at 1061 .

2004Specifically, they rely on Riordan, 132 Ill.App.3d at 647 , 87 Ill.Dec. 765 , 477 N.E.2d 1293 (manufacturers and distributors of handguns owed no duty to plaintiffs in wrongful-death action to control the distribution of their products), and Linton, 127 Ill.App.3d at 678-79 , 82 Ill.Dec. 805 , 469 N.E.2d 339 (manufacturer of nondefective firearm has no duty to plaintiff in personal injury action to control the distribution of its product to the general public), which, they argue, preclude any reliance on allegations of negligence as the underpinning of a public nuisance claim.

2004Specifically, they rely on Riordan, 132 Ill.App.3d at 647 , 87 Ill.Dec. 765 , 477 N.E.2d 1293 (manufacturers and distributors of handguns owed no duty to plaintiffs in wrongful-death action to control the distribution of their products), and Linton, 127 Ill.App.3d at 678-79 , 82 Ill.Dec. 805 , 469 N.E.2d 339 (manufacturer of nondefective firearm has no duty to plaintiff in personal injury action to control the distribution of its product to the general public), which, they argue, preclude any reliance on allegations of negligence as the underpinning of a public nuisance claim.

2004Specifically, they rely on Riordan, 132 Ill.App.3d at 647 , 87 Ill.Dec. 765 , 477 N.E.2d 1293 (manufacturers and distributors of handguns owed no duty to plaintiffs in wrongful-death action to control the distribution of their products), and Linton, 127 Ill.App.3d at 678-79 , 82 Ill.Dec. 805 , 469 N.E.2d 339 (manufacturer of nondefective firearm has no duty to plaintiff in personal injury action to control the distribution of its product to the general public), which, they argue, preclude any reliance on allegations of negligence as the underpinning of a public nuisance claim.

2004Specifically, they rely on Riordan, 132 Ill.App.3d at 647 , 87 Ill.Dec. 765 , 477 N.E.2d 1293 (manufacturers and distributors of handguns owed no duty to plaintiffs in wrongful-death action to control the distribution of their products), and Linton, 127 Ill.App.3d at 678-79 , 82 Ill.Dec. 805 , 469 N.E.2d 339 (manufacturer of nondefective firearm has no duty to plaintiff in personal injury action to control the distribution of its product to the general public), which, they argue, preclude any reliance on allegations of negligence as the underpinning of a public nuisance claim.

1991Although he cites several cases for the general proposition that violation of certain statutes may be held to be prima facie evidence of negligence (see, e.g., Dini v. Naiditch (1960), 20 Ill.2d 406 , 170 N.E.2d 881 ), plaintiff has provided us with no pertinent authority, and precious little in the way of argument, relative to violations of the public nuisance statute.

1991Although he cites several cases for the general proposition that violation of certain statutes may be held to be prima facie evidence of negligence (see, e.g., Dini v. Naiditch (1960), 20 Ill.2d 406 , 170 N.E.2d 881 ), plaintiff has provided us with no pertinent authority, and precious little in the way of argument, relative to violations of the public nuisance statute.