cross-comparison analysis in Illinois

2026However, our supreme court cautioned “that the cross- comparison challenge [would] not simply resurface as a due process challenge ***.” Id.

2025As to defendant’s proportionate penalties claim, the State contended that defendant’s argument on proportionate penalties relied on a cross-comparison test, which was disavowed in People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 521 (2005) (abandoning the cross-comparison analysis for proportionate penalties of claims).

2003Regarding the second step in the cross-comparison inquiry — the determination of whether a less serious offense is punished more severely than a more serious crime — it is a violation of the proportionate penalties clause “if the penalty prescribed for a less serious offense is greater than the penalty prescribed for a more serious offense.” People v. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140,144 (1995), citing People v. Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d 190, 196 (1983); see also People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 504-05 (1997) (“the proportionate penalties clause is violated where different offenses are compared and conduct th

2003The cross-comparison analysis comparing two similar offenses involves a potential two-step inquiry, depending on the answer to the first question: (1) whether the offenses being compared share a common statutory purpose (Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 476 ; Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at 522 ); and (2) if the purposes are related, whether the less serious offense is punished more harshly than the more serious offense (Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 475-76 ; Davis, 177 Ill. 2d at 506 ).

2025The cross-comparison analysis involves two steps: (1) “whether the purposes of the compared offenses are distinct such that comparative proportionality review is not appropriate,” and (2) “if the purposes are deemed related, we consider whether the offense with the harsher penalty is more serious than the offense with the less severe penalty.” People v. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d 440, 454 (2002), overruled by People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481 (2005).

2025The cross-comparison analysis involves two steps: (1) “whether the purposes of the compared offenses are distinct such that comparative proportionality review is not appropriate,” and (2) “if the purposes are deemed related, we consider whether the offense with the harsher penalty is more serious than the offense with the less severe penalty.” People v. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d 440, 454 (2002), overruled by People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481 (2005).

2012Walden, 199 Ill. 2d. at 397 (holding that 15-year sentencing enhancement for armed robbery while in possession of a firearm was unconstitutional); Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at 525-26 , 531 (citing Walden in support of its holding that 15-year and 20-year sentencing enhancements for possession of a firearm and personal discharge of a firearm in commission of aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated kidnapping, and armed robbery were unconstitutional). ¶ 31 Subsequently, in People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 519 (2005), our supreme court abandoned the cross-comparison test, declaring it to be “nothing

2007Defendant's argument is based on People v. Moss, 206 Ill.2d 503, 531 , 276 Ill.Dec. 855 , 795 N.E.2d 208 (2003), and People v. Walden, 199 Ill.2d 392, 397 , 264 Ill.Dec. 91 , 769 N.E.2d 928 (2002), where the court used cross-comparison analysis and declared, inter alia, that the 15-year sentencing enhancement for armed robbery while in possession of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)), and the 20-year enhancement for armed robbery when the offender discharges a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(3), (b) (West 2000)), violated the proportionate penalties clause and were unenforceable.

2004In People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462 , 705 N.E.2d 91 (1998), the Illinois Supreme Court noted three separate analyses used to identify a proportionate-penalties clause violation: (1) a penalty violates the proportionate-penalties clause if it is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed that it shocks the moral sense of the community, (2) a penalty is invalid under the proportionate-penalties clause where similar offenses are compared and conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety is punished more severely (“the cross-comparison

2004In People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462 , 705 N.E.2d 91 (1998), the Illinois Supreme Court noted three separate analyses used to identify a proportionate-penalties clause violation: (1) a penalty violates the proportionate-penalties clause if it is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed that it shocks the moral sense of the community, (2) a penalty is invalid under the proportionate-penalties clause where similar offenses are compared and conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety is punished more severely (“the cross-comparison

2007However, in People v. Morgan, 203 Ill.2d 470, 491-92 , 272 Ill.Dec. 160 , 786 N.E.2d 994 (2003), overruled by People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481 , 298 Ill.Dec. 169 , 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005), this court, using a cross-comparison analysis, struck down the 15-year enhancement for attempted first degree murder where "a firearm was in defendant's possession," as unconstitutionally disproportionate to second degree murder.

2007However, in People v. Morgan, 203 Ill.2d 470, 491-92 , 272 Ill.Dec. 160 , 786 N.E.2d 994 (2003), overruled by People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481 , 298 Ill.Dec. 169 , 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005), this court, using a cross-comparison analysis, struck down the 15-year enhancement for attempted first degree murder where "a firearm was in defendant's possession," as unconstitutionally disproportionate to second degree murder.

2003Regarding the second step in the cross-comparison inquiry — the determination of whether a less serious offense is punished more severely than a more serious crime — it is a violation of the proportionate penalties clause “if the penalty prescribed for a less serious offense is greater than the penalty prescribed for a more serious offense.” People v. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140,144 (1995), citing People v. Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d 190, 196 (1983); see also People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 504-05 (1997) (“the proportionate penalties clause is violated where different offenses are compared and conduct th

2003With regard to the second step in the cross-comparison inquiry, the proportionate penalties clause is violated “if the penalty prescribed for a less serious offense is greater than the penalty prescribed for a more serious offense.” People v. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140, 144 , 656 N.E.2d 1065, 1069 (1995), citing People v. Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d 190, 196 , 446 N.E.2d 512, 514 (1983).

2003Regarding the second step in the cross-comparison inquiry — the determination of whether a less serious offense is punished more severely than a more serious crime — it is a violation of the proportionate penalties clause “if the penalty prescribed for a less serious offense is greater than the penalty prescribed for a more serious offense.” People v. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140,144 (1995), citing People v. Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d 190, 196 (1983); see also People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 504-05 (1997) (“the proportionate penalties clause is violated where different offenses are compared and conduct th

2003With regard to the second step in the cross-comparison inquiry, the proportionate penalties clause is violated “if the penalty prescribed for a less serious offense is greater than the penalty prescribed for a more serious offense.” People v. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140, 144 , 656 N.E.2d 1065, 1069 (1995), citing People v. Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d 190, 196 , 446 N.E.2d 512, 514 (1983).

2019Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d at 141 . ¶ 22 We also note our supreme court does not apply a cross-comparison analysis to determine whether a sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause found in our state constitution.

2018Huddleston , 212 Ill. 2d at 141 , 287 Ill.Dec. 560 , 816 N.E.2d 322 . ¶ 22 We also note our supreme court does not apply a cross-comparison analysis to determine whether a sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause found in our state constitution.

2007See Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d at 544 ("In People v. Sharpe, *** we held that we would no longer recognize the third type of proportionate penalties challenge--the cross-comparison challenge"); and In re M.T., 221 6 1-04-3077 Ill. 2d at 521 ("*** we no longer apply cross-comparison analysis in proportionate penalties cases.") The closest Sharpe came to a constitutional reference was at 216 Ill. 2d at 520, where it set out its three reasons for "departing from stare decisis and abandoning cross-comparison proportionate penalties analysis." First, said the court, the governing decisions are "badly rea

2007See Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d at 544 (“In People v. Sharpe, *** we held that we would no longer recognize the third type of proportionate penalties challenge — the cross-comparison challenge”); In re M.T., 221 Ill. 2d at 521 (“we no longer apply cross-comparison analysis in proportionate penalties cases”).

2007However, in People v. Walden, 199 Ill.2d 392, 397 , 264 Ill.Dec. 91 , 769 N.E.2d 928 (2002), overruled by People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481 , 298 Ill.Dec. 169 , 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005), this court held that pursuant to the cross-comparison test, the statutory 15-year mandatory enhancement for armed robbery while armed with a firearm violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution and was "unenforceable." Consequently, the trial courts in the instant case and in Harvey found that they lacked the authority, pursuant to Walden , to impose the 15-year "add on penalty" to the

2007However, in People v. Walden, 199 Ill.2d 392, 397 , 264 Ill.Dec. 91 , 769 N.E.2d 928 (2002), overruled by People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481 , 298 Ill.Dec. 169 , 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005), this court held that pursuant to the cross-comparison test, the statutory 15-year mandatory enhancement for armed robbery while armed with a firearm violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution and was "unenforceable." Consequently, the trial courts in the instant case and in Harvey found that they lacked the authority, pursuant to Walden , to impose the 15-year "add on penalty" to the

2005Defendant's remaining proportionate penalty challenge, made pursuant to the first test, is that his 15-year sentence for armed violence predicated on aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude, i.e. , for possessing a gun while fleeing from police, shocks the moral conscience . " '[T] the constitutional command that "penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense" would justify interference with the legislative judgment only if the punishment was "cruel," "degrading" or "so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community." ' " People v

2005Defendant's remaining proportionate penalty challenge, made pursuant to the first test, is that his 15-year sentence for armed violence predicated on aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude, i.e. , for possessing a gun while fleeing from police, shocks the moral conscience . " '[T] the constitutional command that "penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense" would justify interference with the legislative judgment only if the punishment was "cruel," "degrading" or "so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community." ' " People v

2005See Steppan , 105 Ill. 2d at 320 ; Simmons , 145 Ill. 2d at 270 ; Johns , 153 Ill. 2d at 449 ; Hickman , 163 Ill. 2d at 259-60 ; Bailey , 167 Ill. 2d at 236 ; Lee , 167 Ill. 2d at 145 ; Miller , 171 Ill. 2d at 334 .

2005See Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d at 320 ; Simmons, 145 Ill. 2d at 270 ; Johns, 153 Ill. 2d at 449 ; Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d at 259-60 ; Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d at 236 ; Lee, 167 Ill. 2d at 145 ; Miller, 171 Ill. 2d at 334 .

2005See Christy , 139 Ill. 2d at 181-88 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Ryan, J.); Lewis , 175 Ill. 2d at 424-26 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Nickels, J.).

2005See Christy, 139 Ill. 2d at 181-88 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Ryan, J.); Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d at 424-26 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Nickels, J.).

2005See Bradley , 79 Ill. 2d at 418 . 4: 4 Setting this forth as an initial threshold called into question the court’s most recent use of the cross-comparison analysis to invalidate a penalty.

2005See Bradley, 79 Ill. 2d at 418 . 4 Setting this forth as an initial threshold called into question the court’s most recent use of the cross-comparison analysis to invalidate a penalty.

2005See Christy , 139 Ill. 2d at 181-88 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Ryan, J.); Lewis , 175 Ill. 2d at 424-26 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Nickels, J.).

2005See Christy, 139 Ill. 2d at 181-88 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Ryan, J.); Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d at 424-26 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Nickels, J.).

2004See Austin, 349 Ill.

2004See Austin, 349 Ill.

2004See Washington, 343 Ill.

2004See Washington, 343 Ill.

2007However, in People v. Walden, 199 Ill.2d 392, 397 , 264 Ill.Dec. 91 , 769 N.E.2d 928 (2002), overruled by People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481 , 298 Ill.Dec. 169 , 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005), this court held that pursuant to the cross-comparison test, the statutory 15-year mandatory enhancement for armed robbery while armed with a firearm violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution and was "unenforceable." Consequently, the trial courts in the instant case and in Harvey found that they lacked the authority, pursuant to Walden , to impose the 15-year "add on penalty" to the

2007However, in People v. Walden, 199 Ill.2d 392, 397 , 264 Ill.Dec. 91 , 769 N.E.2d 928 (2002), overruled by People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481 , 298 Ill.Dec. 169 , 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005), this court held that pursuant to the cross-comparison test, the statutory 15-year mandatory enhancement for armed robbery while armed with a firearm violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution and was "unenforceable." Consequently, the trial courts in the instant case and in Harvey found that they lacked the authority, pursuant to Walden , to impose the 15-year "add on penalty" to the

2014Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d at 76-77 .

2014Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d at 76-77 .