responsibility clause in Indiana

2003“The selection of an attorney by a lay person must result from an informed choice, free of influences or persuasions.” Matter of Guerrero, 482 N.E.2d 1139, 1140 (Ind. 1985).

2003“The selection of an attorney by a lay person must result from an informed choice, free of influences or persuasions.” Matter of Guerrero, 482 N.E.2d 1139, 1140 (Ind.1985).

2011Co. of Ind., 137 Ind.App. 375, 382 , 209 N.E.2d 262, 265 (1965) (“[I]t may no longer be doubted that the extent of an insurer’s responsibility or its immunity from liability under an insurance contract are rights which it can petition to have determined by declaratory judgment” (quotation omitted)). 7 C.

2011Co. of Ind., 137 Ind.App. 375, 382 , 209 N.E.2d 262, 265 (1965) (“[I]t may no longer be doubted that the extent of an insurer’s responsibility or its immunity from liability under an insurance contract are rights which it can petition to have determined by declaratory judgment” (quotation omitted)). 7 C.

2005Id. at 886-87 ; see also Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 518 (Ind.1994) (affirming that the responsibility of warning patients about drug side effects lies with physicians but imposing a duty where the pharmacist had personal knowledge that the customer was taking medication more quickly than prescribed).

1996Far from a "source" of legislative authority, the responsibility clause simply ensures that, despite the presence of the right to speak clause, the state retains its delegated authority to promote the peace, safety, and well-being of Hoosiers by punishing expression that could be thought to undermine those ends. [7] E.g., Hanley v. State, 234 Ind. 326, 334 , 123 N.E.2d 452, 455 (1954). [8] E.g., Department of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 231 Ind. 293, 302 , 108 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1952). [9] Our use of the adjective "pure," instead of the adverb "purely," is no grammatical oversight; we intend

1996Far from a "source" of legislative authority, the responsibility clause simply ensures that, despite the presence of the right to speak clause, the state retains its delegated authority to promote the peace, safety, and well-being of Hoosiers by punishing expression that could be thought to undermine those ends. [7] E.g., Hanley v. State, 234 Ind. 326, 334 , 123 N.E.2d 452, 455 (1954). [8] E.g., Department of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 231 Ind. 293, 302 , 108 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1952). [9] Our use of the adjective "pure," instead of the adverb "purely," is no grammatical oversight; we intend

1996Far from a "source" of legislative authority, the responsibility clause simply ensures that, despite the presence of the right to speak clause, the state retains its delegated authority to promote the peace, safety, and well-being of Hoosiers by punishing expression that could be thought to undermine those ends. [7] E.g., Hanley v. State, 234 Ind. 326, 334 , 123 N.E.2d 452, 455 (1954). [8] E.g., Department of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 231 Ind. 293, 302 , 108 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1952). [9] Our use of the adjective "pure," instead of the adverb "purely," is no grammatical oversight; we intend

1996Far from a "source" of legislative authority, the responsibility clause simply ensures that, despite the presence of the right to speak clause, the state retains its delegated authority to promote the peace, safety, and well-being of Hoosiers by punishing expression that could be thought to undermine those ends. [7] E.g., Hanley v. State, 234 Ind. 326, 334 , 123 N.E.2d 452, 455 (1954). [8] E.g., Department of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 231 Ind. 293, 302 , 108 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1952). [9] Our use of the adjective "pure," instead of the adverb "purely," is no grammatical oversight; we intend

1996What we have not said— and do not decide here—is that the content of the expression must be "purely political," Radford v. State, 640 N.E.2d 90, 93 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). [10] We have no occasion here to consider whether an injury to government's ability to carry out some or all of its legitimate proprietary, administrative, or policymaking functions constitutes a harm "analogous" to tortious injury.

1981Defendants in criminal proceedings “are entitled to effective assistance of counsel” acting “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann v. Richardson (1970), 397 U.S. 759, 771 , 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773 ; see also, Toilett v. Henderson (1973), 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 .

1981Defendants in criminal proceedings “are entitled to effective assistance of counsel” acting “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann v. Richardson (1970), 397 U.S. 759, 771 , 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773 ; see also, Toilett v. Henderson (1973), 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 .