added clause in Louisiana

2009Nevertheless, Buxton relies on the general statement in Kelly that an “aggravation of a work-related injury is compensa-ble even if it occurs away from work.” Kelly, 414 So.2d at 772 . 5 He argues that the “foreseeability” 6 requirement enunciated in Dickerson v. Kroger, 509 So.2d 813, 816 (La.App. 1 Cir.1987) 7 (and reiterated in Hollingsworth v. East Baton Rouge School Board, 94-0518 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/15/95) , 666 So.2d 376 ), writ denied, 96-0165 (La.3/15/96), 669 So.2d 422 , is an added requirement never mentioned in the earlier jurisprudence, including \KKelly.

2009Nevertheless, Buxton relies on the general statement in Kelly that an “aggravation of a work-related injury is compensa-ble even if it occurs away from work.” Kelly, 414 So.2d at 772 . 5 He argues that the “foreseeability” 6 requirement enunciated in Dickerson v. Kroger, 509 So.2d 813, 816 (La.App. 1 Cir.1987) 7 (and reiterated in Hollingsworth v. East Baton Rouge School Board, 94-0518 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/15/95) , 666 So.2d 376 ), writ denied, 96-0165 (La.3/15/96), 669 So.2d 422 , is an added requirement never mentioned in the earlier jurisprudence, including \KKelly.

2009Nevertheless, Buxton relies on the general statement in Kelly that an “aggravation of a work-related injury is compensa-ble even if it occurs away from work.” Kelly, 414 So.2d at 772 . 5 He argues that the “foreseeability” 6 requirement enunciated in Dickerson v. Kroger, 509 So.2d 813, 816 (La.App. 1 Cir.1987) 7 (and reiterated in Hollingsworth v. East Baton Rouge School Board, 94-0518 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/15/95) , 666 So.2d 376 ), writ denied, 96-0165 (La.3/15/96), 669 So.2d 422 , is an added requirement never mentioned in the earlier jurisprudence, including \KKelly.

2003In support of his argument that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him, Sanchez cites Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 , 120 S.Ct. 1375 , 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000), where the United States Supreme Court held that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.

2003In support of his argument that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him, Sanchez cites Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 , 120 S.Ct. 1375 , 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000), where the United States Supreme Court held that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.

1998Defendant argues that instruction created a presumption which abridges the holding in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 513 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), thereby shifting the burden from the state to the defendant.

1998Defendant argues that instruction created a presumption which abridges the holding in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 513 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), thereby shifting the burden from the state to the defendant.

1989In Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So.2d 110 (La.1986), the court added the requirement that the plaintiff must prove the dangerous condition of the product existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's control.

1982But the court applied the presumption that the disability was caused by accident because there was "proof of an accident and of a following disability without any intervening cause." Whether or not it might have occurred at another place or time was said to be irrelevant, "[t]he only pertinent inquiry is whether in fact, the accident happened on the job." However, the court added that the test for causal connection is whether the accident changed plaintiff's condition so as to render him disabled and unfit for his former employment, citing Bertrand v. Coal Operators Casualty Co., 221 So.2d 816

1976We agree that the cross-claim is not a third-party demand within C.C.P. 1111; but the added claim is allowable, as to co-defendant Department of Highways, as an intervention within C.C.P. 1091; Kennedy v. Joseph, La.App. 1976, 325 So.2d 769 .

1940In Lewis v. Texas Company et al., 169 So. 181, 183 , the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit, in speaking of this clause of the statute, said: "It is clear that this added clause in no way deals with a right of action arising from death occurring more than one year after the date of an accident, even though the death was caused by the accident; and it does not in any way amend or destroy subsection 2, § 8 of Act No. 242 of 1928 (page 357), which limits the right of action for death under the compensation act to those deaths occurring less than one year after the accident.

1940This added clause only deals with the right to sue for an injury caused by an accident when the injury did not develop immediately after the accident, such as an eye injury, which did not cause loss of the eye until a month after the accident.” See, also, Stirling v. Industrial Lumber Company, La.App., 152 So. 120 ; Doby v. Canulette Shipbuilding Company, Inc., La.App., 156 So. 51 ; Heidecker v. Fidelity & Casualty Company, La.App., 153 So. 35 ; Dodd v. Lakeview Motors, Inc., La.App., 149 So. 278 ; Pitts v. M.

1940This added clause only deals with the right to sue for an injury caused by an accident when the injury did not develop immediately after the accident, such as an eye injury, which did not cause loss of the eye until a month after the accident.” See, also, Stirling v. Industrial Lumber Company, La.App., 152 So. 120 ; Doby v. Canulette Shipbuilding Company, Inc., La.App., 156 So. 51 ; Heidecker v. Fidelity & Casualty Company, La.App., 153 So. 35 ; Dodd v. Lakeview Motors, Inc., La.App., 149 So. 278 ; Pitts v. M.

1940This added clause only deals with the right to sue for an injury caused by an accident when the injury did not develop immediately after the accident, such as an eye injury, which did not cause loss of the eye until a month after the accident.” See, also, Stirling v. Industrial Lumber Company, La.App., 152 So. 120 ; Doby v. Canulette Shipbuilding Company, Inc., La.App., 156 So. 51 ; Heidecker v. Fidelity & Casualty Company, La.App., 153 So. 35 ; Dodd v. Lakeview Motors, Inc., La.App., 149 So. 278 ; Pitts v. M.

1940This added clause only deals with the right to sue for an injury caused by an accident when the injury did not develop immediately after the accident, such as an eye injury, which did not cause loss of the eye until a month after the accident.” See, also, Stirling v. Industrial Lumber Company, La.App., 152 So. 120 ; Doby v. Canulette Shipbuilding Company, Inc., La.App., 156 So. 51 ; Heidecker v. Fidelity & Casualty Company, La.App., 153 So. 35 ; Dodd v. Lakeview Motors, Inc., La.App., 149 So. 278 ; Pitts v. M.

1940This added clause only deals with the right to sue for an injury caused by an accident when the injury did not develop immediately after the accident, such as an eye injury, which did not cause loss of the eye until a month after the accident.” See, also, Stirling v. Industrial Lumber Company, La.App., 152 So. 120 ; Doby v. Canulette Shipbuilding Company, Inc., La.App., 156 So. 51 ; Heidecker v. Fidelity & Casualty Company, La.App., 153 So. 35 ; Dodd v. Lakeview Motors, Inc., La.App., 149 So. 278 ; Pitts v. M.

1940This added clause only deals with the right to sue for an injury caused by an accident when the injury did not develop immediately after the accident, such as an eye injury, which did not cause loss of the eye until a month after the accident.” See, also, Stirling v. Industrial Lumber Company, La.App., 152 So. 120 ; Doby v. Canulette Shipbuilding Company, Inc., La.App., 156 So. 51 ; Heidecker v. Fidelity & Casualty Company, La.App., 153 So. 35 ; Dodd v. Lakeview Motors, Inc., La.App., 149 So. 278 ; Pitts v. M.

1940This added clause only deals with the right to sue for an injury caused by an accident when the injury did not develop immediately after the accident, such as an eye injury, which did not cause loss of the eye until a month after the accident.” See, also, Stirling v. Industrial Lumber Company, La.App., 152 So. 120 ; Doby v. Canulette Shipbuilding Company, Inc., La.App., 156 So. 51 ; Heidecker v. Fidelity & Casualty Company, La.App., 153 So. 35 ; Dodd v. Lakeview Motors, Inc., La.App., 149 So. 278 ; Pitts v. M.

1940This added clause only deals with the right to sue for an injury caused by an accident when the injury did not develop immediately after the accident, such as an eye injury, which did not cause loss of the eye until a month after the accident.” See, also, Stirling v. Industrial Lumber Company, La.App., 152 So. 120 ; Doby v. Canulette Shipbuilding Company, Inc., La.App., 156 So. 51 ; Heidecker v. Fidelity & Casualty Company, La.App., 153 So. 35 ; Dodd v. Lakeview Motors, Inc., La.App., 149 So. 278 ; Pitts v. M.

1914But we return to Act No. 50 of 1902 as absolutely controlling. [3] The decision in State v. Maryland Casualty Co., 62 South. 606 , 1 has been cited as expressive of a contrary rule of interpretation.